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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines economic aspects of fiscal transfers for resource-rich subnational 
governments, with quantitative analysis for a large number of districts in Indonesia. 
Despite the advantages of resource endowment, these districts face a variety of 
challenges in fiscal management, which intersect with vertical fiscal transfers. There 
can be difficulties in raising own-source revenue as natural resource revenue may 
discourage own-source revenue raising. In the expenditure dimension, the presence of 
environmental spending spillovers can lead to non-optimal environmental spending 
decision-making by local governments. A further dimension relates to fiscal 
incentives. The central government attempts to achieve national development 
objectives through subnational government level by attaching conditions to fiscal 
transfers, but subnational governments have the opportunity to substitute the assisted 
expenditures with tied fiscal transfers.  
This thesis investigates these challenges through three analytical studies. It contributes 
to knowledge by providing theoretical and empirical understanding of fiscal policies in 
resource-rich districts. The findings provide insights to policy makers to further 
revamp the fiscal transfer design for resource-rich districts. 
The first study examines the impact of shared mining revenue on own-source revenue 
in mineral-producing districts. Using fixed effect method and district level data from 
2001–2012, this study finds that the shared mining revenue does not become a 
disincentive for mobilizing local own-source revenue. The absence of control over 
mining sector revenue management makes these districts unable to substitute their 
own-source revenue to mining sector revenue. Nevertheless, the higher poverty rate in 
mineral-producing districts is negatively correlated with retribution revenue, which 
contributes to the lower own-source revenue in these districts. Retribution is charges or 
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fess collected by local governments to community for the use of local government 
service, including fees for license issuance. 
The second study investigates the presence of spatial interaction in environmental 
spending policy. Using data for all physically neighbouring districts in Sumatera and 
Kalimantan Island for the period of 2009–2012, the spatial econometric estimations 
find positive spatial interaction of environmental spending, suggesting a district will 
increase its own environmental spending in response to neighbours’ environmental 
spending. There appears strong evidence that pollution spillover produced by 
neighbouring districts serves as the channel of positive spatial interaction.  
The third study evaluates the existing fiscal incentive which is earmarked to education 
spending. Using a difference in difference approach for three periods of analysis, 
2009–2010, 2009–2011 and 2009–2012, this study finds strong positive effect of this 
fund on recipients’ education spending. However, the econometric estimations find 
dissipating increment of education spending over the three periods. This suggests the 
potential presence of non-additionality fungibility, where recipients reallocate their 
own budget for education spending in response to regional incentive fund they receive.  
Three overall insights emerge from this thesis. Firstly, there needs to establish 
incentive in fiscal transfer design which drives own-source revenue raising in resource-
rich districts. Secondly, there is a case for greater intervention by central government 
to promote greater environmental spending in resource-rich districts. Thirdly, the 
ability of the central government to achieve policy objectives through fiscal transfer is 
hampered by substitutability of funds at local level. This calls for innovative design of 
fiscal transfer, possibly in the form of output-based fiscal transfers.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The natural resource sector plays an important role in the Indonesian economy. The 
adoption of fiscal decentralization in 2001 changed the pattern of the fiscal system, so 
that resource-rich districts received a greater share of revenue from their natural 
resource endowment. However, resource revenue can have a perverse impact on fiscal 
behaviour (Cevik & Teksoz 2014). This thesis examines economic aspects of fiscal 
transfers for resource-rich districts in Indonesia, in particular the impact of shared 
natural resource revenue. 
After the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesia entered a new stage of its 
democratic process. In 2001, the Indonesian government adopted fiscal 
decentralization, where certain fiscal authorities were transferred to local governments. 
The main purpose of fiscal decentralization was to ensure efficient public service 
delivery through devolving some fiscal authority held by central government to local 
governments. The closeness of local governments to their citizens means they 
understand the characteristics of the region, including culture, environment, 
endowment of natural resources, and economic and social institutions. This better 
understanding will enhance the efficiency of public service delivery. From a macro 
perspective, fiscal decentralization is able to offer greater potential for improved 
macroeconomic governance and performance (Shah 2007). In order to implement 
assigned public tasks, such as education, health and environmental services, local 
governments must enhance their taxing capacity and improve the quality of their 
expenditure.  
1.1 Fiscal transfers and decentralization 
The literature in public finance recognizes four components in fiscal decentralization, 
(1) intergovernmental fiscal transfer, (2) revenue, (3) spending assignment, and (4) 
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borrowing. Clear functional responsibility among levels of government is considered a 
crucial step in designing systems of intergovernmental fiscal relations (Vasquez & 
Qiao 2010). Intergovernmental transfers and revenue assignment to local governments 
serve to finance expenditure assigned to them to ensure they can deliver efficient 
public services. Intergovernmental grants are an important tool in fiscal federalism and 
can have at least three potential roles: (1) the internalization of spillover benefits across 
jurisdictions, (2) fiscal equalization, and (3) an improved overall tax system (Oates 
1999). 
Although fiscal decentralization is expected to enhance effectiveness in public service 
delivery, previous studies raise concerns regarding perverse effects on local 
governments’ public services. Fiscal transfers can become a disincentive for local 
governments to mobilize resources in their own jurisdictions to finance expenditure. 
Being analogous with aid, the availability of fiscal transfer can potentially become a 
disincentive to mobilize domestic revenue through more efficient and effective taxation 
systems (Bacarreza & Espinoza 2010). When local governments have higher 
dependency on transfers from central government but lack own-source revenue, the 
budget constraints will impact public service quality. A previous study has shown 
mixed results about the impact of fiscal decentralization on citizens’ welfare and fiscal 
outcomes (see Vasquez 2011).  
District level governments in Indonesia are allowed to collect certain taxes and 
retributions which are solely prescribed in the law number 28/2009 concerning local 
tax and retribution. Nevertheless, unlike provincial governments, dependence on fiscal 
transfers by district level governments has been persistent since the big bang of 
decentralization in 2001. In order to increase tax receipts, district level or local 
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governments are expected to optimize and intensify the prescribed taxes and 
retributions.  
With regard to spending, Law 32/2004 regulates the division of administrative affairs 
which fall into the responsibility of local governments and central government. 
Indonesia’s central government is only responsible for the judicial system, religious 
affairs, national defence and security, fiscal and monetary affairs, and international 
diplomatic relationships. Other than those five duties plus macroeconomic planning 
and standardization, all government duties must be handled by local governments, 
especially at district and municipal level. Law 32/2004 also regulates the list of 
government services that fall under the responsibility of local governments, including 
public works, health, education, trade and industry, investment, control of 
environmental impacts, agriculture, cooperatives, and labour. Despite the divided 
responsibility of the spending area, a lack of own-source revenue would obviously 
affect spending quality, leading to greater reliance on fiscal dependence. Hence, fiscal 
constraints can see local governments encounter difficulties in developing strategic 
policies, including environmental protection programs. 
Due to limited budget and revenue sources, spending choices become an important 
issue for local governments. A previous study (Keen & Marchand 1997) argues that 
fiscal competition between districts may lead to systematic inefficiencies in the 
composition of public expenditure and may put downward pressure on welfare 
spending. Another factor which can affect spending levels is the presence of spending 
externalities. For example, the provision of environmental services involves spatial 
externalities where the costs of provision are borne by a jurisdiction, but the benefits 
are realized on a larger scale, thus giving rise to interdependence among regions’ fiscal 
policies. The mismatch between decision-making responsibilities and costs and 
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benefits has been considered a cause of under-provision of services (Kumar & Managi 
2009).  
Another dimension relating to fiscal decentralization is the provision of 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers aimed to support local governments’ financing for 
public services. Three types of intergovernmental transfers serving as balancing funds 
are stated in Law 33/2004: (i) revenue sharing, (ii) general allocation fund, and (iii) 
specific allocation fund. Revenue sharing could be further classified into natural 
resources revenue sharing and tax-revenue sharing. Four natural resource commodities 
are shared between central and local governments: oil and gas, general mining, 
forestry, and fisheries. Among local governments, revenue is shared among provincial 
governments, producing district/municipal governments, and other district/municipal 
governments within a province. The general allocation fund or Dana Alokasi Umum 
(DAU) is the most important and significant revenue source for many local 
governments. The revenue sharing and DAU are classified as general purpose 
transfers; on the other hand, the specific allocation fund falls into conditional or 
earmarked transfers. This particularly aims to help local governments to perform 
central government’s priorities in certain sectors. Table 1-1 below shows the 
development of fiscal transfers for fiscal balance purposes. DAU is the most important 
fiscal transfer and dominates more than 60% of total transfers, with an upward trend.  
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Table 1-1 The composition of fiscal transfers (in trillion IDR) 
Type of transfer 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Shared tax revenue 38 41 46 41 47 
Shared natural resource 
revenue 
41 36 45 54 62 
General allocation fund 
(DAU) 
180 186 204 225 274 
Specific allocation fund 
(DAK) 
21 25 21 25 26 
Source: Audited transfer report for various years 
Note: The figures include transfer to provinces. IDR represents Indonesian rupiah, where 1 US$ was 
around 12.000 IDR on average.  
1.2 Natural resource revenue 
Compared to shared tax revenue, the composition of shared natural resource revenue is 
greater, but was lower in 2009 as a result of the oil price decline as shown in Table 1-1. 
The Indonesian Crude Price (ICP) was US$61 per barrel in 2009, which is much lower 
than in 2008 when it was US$101.4 per barrel. The drop in shared natural resource 
revenue suggests Indonesia’s vulnerability to global commodity prices.  
The natural resource sector plays a crucial role in the Indonesian economy, accounting 
for a significant portion of central government revenue composition. Before 2009, total 
average natural resource revenue accounted for around 30% of total national receipts. In 
2006, the natural resource sector contributed almost 33 per cent of total national 
revenue; however this figure declined to 18 per cent in 2012. There two sources of 
natural resource revenue in the revenue composition of the Indonesian government are 
(1) non-tax revenue, which includes royalties and fees, and (2) taxes on the natural 
resource revenue sector, which includes income tax on oil and gas companies.  
Figure 1-1 shows the size and trend of natural resource revenue composition in the 
national government budget. Although non-tax natural resource revenue contributes a 
greater portion of the total government budget, it has fluctuated and declined since 
2009. This is mostly explained by the lower oil price and declining oil drilling. Non-tax 
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natural resource revenue, which excludes income tax from oil and gas, shows a 
significant downward trend, from 22% in 2005 to only 14% in 2012 (MoF 2012). 
Similarly, government revenue from income tax from the natural resource sector also 
fluctuated and showed a declining trend. This is income tax collected from the oil and 
gas sector. In 2005, income tax from this sector contributed to around 7 percent of total 
central government revenue, but it declined to only 5 percent in 2012. Despite the 
decline in revenue from oil and gas, mining sector revenue shows a slight upward trend 
from 2005 to 2012. Interestingly, forest sector revenue was relatively stable during this 
period. This boom and bust in revenue suggests the vulnerability of the Indonesian 
economy to world commodity prices, and suggests the Indonesian government needs to 
diversify its revenue sources from natural sectors to non-natural resource sectors.   
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Figure 1-1 The composition of the natural resource revenue sector in national 
revenue 
 
Source: Annual budget note-various years (Ministry of Finance) 
Figure 1-2 below shows the development of coal and crude oil production and the 
production of crude palm oil (CPO) and other selected agriculture products. CPO 
plantation and coal mining are two sectors which bring risk with forest clearing for new 
investment or expansion. Over the period of 2000–2012, CPO and coal show an upward 
trend, in particular coal production. Since 2001, when decentralization commenced, coal 
production has jumped significantly. However, crude oil production shows a significant 
decline from around 480 million barrels in 2000 to only 314 million barrels in 2012. 
The production of CPO increased almost fourfold within 12 years, from 5 million tons 
in 2010, and jumped to 26 million tons in 2012. In contrast, the production of other 
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agricultural products was stagnant or not drastically altered. These facts show that palm 
oil is a preferred commodity, although it often claims forests for expansion.  
Figure 1-2 The development of the production of selected agricultural products 
and the mining sector (oil and coal) 
 
Source: Indonesia statistics office online database. 
Note: The unit of measurement for coal is millions of tons, and millions of barrels for crude oil. 
1.3 Environmental policy and management 
While Indonesia is richly endowed with natural resources, environmental degradation 
is continuing at an alarming rate. The International Energy Agency (2011) estimates 
Indonesia’s carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion amounted to 376 million 
tonnes of CO2 in 2009, ranked 16th among world carbon emitters. As a forest rich 
country, degradation in the forestry sector dominates carbon emissions in Indonesia. 
About 75 per cent of carbon dioxide emissions came from deforestation, followed by 
energy sector (PEACE 2007). The World Bank (2009) reports that air pollution costs 
the Indonesian economy approximately $400 million per year.   
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Along with fiscal policy devolution, environmental policy decentralization also 
accompanied the democratic process in Indonesia. The motivation for this policy is that 
local governments have more information about their jurisdiction, so they will be able 
to address environmental problems, and provide better environmental services at the 
local level and better management of the natural resource sector. The fiscal 
decentralization introduced in 2001 brought the involvement of local governments in 
forest management in Indonesia (Barr et al. 2006). It is expected that forest 
decentralization will bring benefits such as better forest conservation as local 
governments can closely monitor forestry issues in their region. A previous study 
suggests that decentralization in forest management will result in more cost-effective 
forest conservation (Somanathan et al. 2009). 
Although environmental policy decentralization can bring benefits, Sigman (2014) 
shows that devolution of environmental management authority to local governments not 
only presents greater hope for better environmental conservation but may also lead to 
detrimental effects on environmental sustainability. At times, decentralization has 
motivated fiscal competition among local governments for capital, leading to what is 
called a ‘race to the bottom’ (Konisky 2007), where less stringent environmental 
regulations are used to attract mobile capital. Farzanegan and Mennel (2012) find that 
fiscal decentralization leads to higher pollution in their cross-country estimation.  
Despite being an archipelagic country, almost 52 per cent of land in Indonesia is forest 
cover. Forest is not only an important source of living for local communities, but forests 
are home to many important sectors. Forest is more than just trees; it is also home for 
many industries, including mining. Mining sites in forestry areas cover more than 15 
million hectares (Mha) or around 15% of total forest size (FWI 2010). Although mining 
contributes an important portion of national revenue, it unfortunately contributes toward 
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environmental devastation. Abood et al. (2014) find that oil palm plantation, logging, 
fibre plantation (pulp and paper), and coal mining concessions accounted for 44.7% (6.6 
Mha) of forest loss in Kalimantan, Sumatera, Papua, Sulawesi, and the Moluccas 
between 2000 and 2010. Illegal mining and illegal logging have plagued this sector and 
led to massive devastation. The impact of forest loss is more than just biodiversity loss, 
with the issue of haze pollution from forest fires sparking both economic and health 
concerns.  
From the forest conservation perspective, previous studies present different results and 
arguments. Curran et al. (2004) finds, during the 1985–2001 period, that 56 per cent of 
lost forest cover in west Kalimantan was attributed to forestry decentralization reform. 
This decentralization reform allowed local governments to issue small logging parcels 
that caused ‘uncontrolled harvest of remaining accessible lowlands’. Another plausible 
argument to explain the failure of forest decentralization is that good governance is 
lacking in many tropical forest countries. Structural constraints, including corruption 
and a lack of accountability, may have hampered improvements in governance and it is 
difficult to see forest decentralization working ideally (Tacconi 2007).  
Another environmental challenge facing Indonesia in promoting sustainable growth is 
the high and frequent incidence of forest fire. Forest fires can result from natural factors, 
such as high heat intensity in dry areas and El Niño, and human induced factors. The 
human induced forest fire is a planned activity which is driven by economic motives 
and this is the main cause in Indonesia (World Bank 2001). As a major world CPO 
producer, the incidence of forest fire in palm oil plantations has been a hot domestic 
issue, in particular in Sumatera and Kalimantan. The incidence of forest fires not only 
harms forest cover, but also leads to worsening global climate change. 
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1.4 The challenges in environmental policies at local level 
As a country reliant on natural resources and one of the main contributors to global gas 
emissions, Indonesia is vulnerable to the impact of environmental degradation. Amidst 
global concern about the impact of climate change, Indonesia plays a significant role in 
global emissions. As a part of national action, the Ministry of Finance (2009) published 
a Green Paper which suggests a broad range of fiscal policies to address carbon 
emission abatement, including the introduction of fiscal incentives for local 
governments. 
In response to the global climate change issue, the Indonesian government has 
committed to reducing emissions to 26% relative to business as usual (BAU) in 2020 
and to an additional 15% reduction in carbon emissions with international support. 
Given its role in Asia and the global economy, Indonesia’s reduced emissions can 
significantly contribute toward lower greenhouse gas emissions and potentially make 
the country a role model for other developing countries in tackling global climate issues 
(Jotzo 2012). Robust environmental policies are crucial to ensure the Indonesian 
government is able to achieve expected emission reductions. Despite the decentralized 
environmental policies, the current environmental problems do suggest the need to 
further investigate the implementation of local governments’ environmental policies. In 
addition, this reveals the need for innovative fiscal policies which can induce stronger 
commitment from local governments’ toward environmental conservation.  
The environmental problems in mineral-producing districts in Indonesia have 
emphasized the importance of research about how natural resource endowments 
influence local governments’ fiscal behaviour. By understanding this linkage, central 
government can determine the right fiscal transfer policies to encourage local 
governments’ involvement in environmental management issues. Studies aiming to 
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investigate this issue at the local level in Indonesia are still limited. On the policy 
making side, the narrow aspect of the findings of this research will help provide insights 
to policy makers on environmental issues and fiscal transfer design in Indonesia. In the 
broader aspect, this research can contribute to the literature on environmental fiscal 
transfer. This background forms the basic argument about the importance of this 
research.  
1.5 Research and analysis in this thesis 
Given the broad range of environmental conservation issues, this research focuses on 
three dimensions of fiscal and environmental decentralization. Specifically, this 
research aims to study the dynamics of fiscal transfer and environmental issues in 
Indonesia through revenue and spending, and fiscal transfer design. In particular it will 
examine how natural resource endowment links with local governments’ fiscal 
performance, own revenue and spending. In particular, it will consider which transfer 
model can increase the effectiveness of fiscal transfers. In regard to the research 
purpose, this thesis has three research questions: (i) does shared-resource revenue affect 
own-source revenue efforts, (ii) is environmental spending inter-correlated among 
districts? (iii) Which fiscal transfer system can help achieve desirable outcomes in 
resource-rich districts? 
Three analytical studies are undertaken to answer the questions in this thesis. The first 
study in the thesis attempts to examine the impact of shared natural resource revenue 
over local governments’ own-source revenue, in particular in resource-rich districts. In 
2012, of 479 districts, 302 districts or 63% were classified as mineral-producing 
districts. Shared natural resource revenue was dominated by districts in Sumatera and 
Kalimantan Island. The shared-mining revenue has become an important source of 
revenue and contributes the greatest portion of total shared natural resource revenue. 
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Despite greater shared-mining revenue, own-source revenue in mineral-producing 
districts in Indonesia is lower than in non-mineral producing districts. Given the limited 
financing capacity of the central government, high reliance on fiscal transfers can 
weaken public service delivery, in particular the impact of natural resource exploitation. 
Hence it is important to investigate whether shared-mining revenue becomes a 
disincentive for own-source revenue raising in mineral-producing districts. 
This study uses a newly constructed revenue dataset of 479 districts in Indonesia, with a 
focus on 302 mineral-producing districts for the period of 2001–2012. The theory of the 
natural resource revenue sharing system is used to develop the argument in this study. A 
fixed effect model is used to estimate the impact of shared-mining revenue on own-
source revenue raising. The main argument is that the natural resource revenue sharing 
system gives mineral-producing districts no control over natural resource revenue 
management, so shared-mining revenue becomes exogenous for these districts.  
The second aspect of the study in this thesis is to investigate the inter-correlation of 
environmental spending among districts in Sumatera and Kalimantan Island. Most 
districts in these islands are classified as resource-rich due to their natural resource 
endowments. On the other hand, these districts are claimed to contribute the most to 
incidence of environmental problems in Indonesia, including forest fires and pollution. 
The literature has suggested the presence of spatial interaction in environmental 
spending among neighbouring jurisdictions when externality exists. In other words, a 
local government will take into account their neighbouring governments’ spending 
when spending externality exists. With regard to the environmental sector, both 
positive and negative externalities lead to non-optimal environmental spending. Hence, 
it is important to examine whether local governments in Sumatera and Kalimantan 
Island behave strategically in determining the size of their environmental spending.  
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The spatial interaction in environmental spending is estimated using spatial 
econometrics. This study uses district level data of physically neighbouring districts in 
Sumatera and Kalimantan for the period of 2009–2012. The study also develops the 
argument on the potential channels of spatial interaction in environmental spending 
interaction. The presence of pollution spillover, proxied by shared natural resource 
revenue, serves as a channel for positive spatial interaction. When a polluting district 
has a lack of environmental spending, it cannot address the environmental impact in its 
jurisdiction, and passes pollution to its neighbours. When the neighbouring district 
suffers and bears costs from pollution spillovers from neighbouring districts, it must 
increase its environmental spending to mitigate the impacts. The districts are split into 
two groups, mineral and timber producing districts and non-mineral and timber 
producing districts. Following the argument developed in this study, the lack of 
environmental spending in mineral and timber producing districts leads to pollution 
spillover and drives positive spatial interaction in environmental spending.  
The third line of research considers an alternative fiscal transfer design to promote 
greater environmental spending at the local level. Compensation to local governments 
for environmental conservation costs is considered an important aspect to incentivize 
local governments in the area of environmental conservation policies (Ring & Schlaack 
2010). The literature recognizes that fiscal transfer aims to address environmental 
conservation as ecological fiscal transfers (Ring 2002, 2008). To achieve national 
programs in environmental conservation, central government can involve local 
governments through the provision of fiscal transfers. Some countries use general 
purpose grants as the channel to transfer central government’s financial support to local 
governments to manage forestry issues, called ecological fiscal transfer (see Ring 
2008). Through this transfer, ecological indicators, including protected forest size, are 
included in the calculation of the size of general purpose transfers. This is mainly 
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motivated by the fact that districts with greater sized ecological endowments need 
greater expenditure for conservation. In some countries certain ecological indicators 
are included in the grant formula, hence it is called ecological fiscal transfer. 
Ecological fiscal transfers are allocated on the basis of ecological or conservation-
based indicators, such as protected areas. Countries which have adopted this approach 
include Brazil (ecological ICMS at state level), Portugal which has incorporated an 
explicitly ecological dimension into the distribution of fiscal transfers from national or 
state levels to local governments in its Local Finances Law of 2007, and recently India 
(Ring 2008; Santos et al. 2012). The ICMS-E is an intergovernmental fiscal transfer 
from state to municipalities, which rewards municipalities for the creation of protected 
areas.  
Although intergovernmental fiscal transfers are conceptually designed to provide 
benefits to local governments, many studies find negative effects of fiscal transfers on 
local governments’ fiscal performance (Gamkhar & Shah 2007). Fungibility is an issue 
in fiscal transfer whereby the use of a grant is diverted to other unintended purposes. 
Hence, the targeted expenditure will be lower than expected and will reduce the 
effectiveness of the fiscal transfer. An approach to ensure the appropriate use of fiscal 
transfer is through conditioning fiscal transfer, called earmarked or conditional grants. 
This grant serves as a tool for central government to get local governments to 
implement national priorities and to internalize the externality or spillover across a 
neighbouring jurisdiction. Nevertheless, previous studies find grant fungibility in spite 
of the embedded conditionality (Duan & Zhan 2011; Wagstaff 2008). Hence, the 
design of fiscal transfers plays a crucial role in ensuring the effectiveness of the central 
government’s fiscal transfer. The main purpose of this third study is to gain insight into 
the design of environmental fiscal incentives for resource-rich districts. This is done by 
evaluating the current central government’s fiscal incentive. 
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The third study evaluates the current central government’s incentive, the Regional 
Incentive Fund (RIF) or Dana Insentif Daerah on recipients’ education spending. A 
difference in difference approach combined with a propensity score is used to evaluate 
the impact of this fiscal incentive on education spending in the recipient districts for 
three periods of analysis, 2009–2010, 2009–2011 and 2009–2012. Although this 
incentive is conditioned to education spending, fungibility is still likely, which can 
occur through non-additionality fungibility as the literature suggests. When fungibility 
is present in this fiscal incentive, there appears to be a need to consider alternative 
designs, possibly in the form of output-based transfers (UNCDF 2010; Shah 2007). 
1.6 Contributions 
This thesis contributes to knowledge by providing theoretical and empirical 
understanding of fiscal policies in resource-rich districts in Indonesia. The first study 
enriches the literature by developing the argument about the extent of the impact of the 
natural resource revenue sharing system on own-source revenue. The findings highlight 
further steps central government should take to encourage greater own-source revenue 
in mineral-producing districts. Although pollution spillover is a common environmental 
problem (Ulph 2000), the second study provides evidence that pollution spillover can 
affect environmental spending. This study expands the perspective on environmental 
management, which needs to include a fiscal policy dimension. The third study provides 
an insight to the Indonesian government on the effectiveness of the current design of the 
regional incentive fund.   
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2. IS MINING REVENUE SHARING A DISINCENTIVE FOR NON-
RESOURCE REVENUE? AN EMPIRICAL STUDY IN MINERAL-
PRODUCING DISTRICTS IN INDONESIA 
Abstract 
Shared mining revenue has been an important revenue source for mineral-producing 
districts. However, the average own-source revenue in mineral-producing districts in 
Indonesia is lower than in non-mineral producing districts. This paper investigates 
whether shared mining revenue is a disincentive for mineral-producing districts to raise 
additional own-source revenue. This paper uses a newly constructed revenue dataset of 
302 mineral-producing districts for the period of 2001–2012. This study finds evidence 
that shared mining revenue does not become a disincentive toward the collection of 
local own revenue in mineral-producing districts in Indonesia. This results from the 
exogeneity of shared mining revenue. The study also finds a higher poverty rate in 
mineral-producing districts which contributes to the lower own-source revenue.  
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2.1 Introduction 
Natural resources serve as an important element to promote economic development. Tax 
and non-tax revenue, employment for local people, and technology spillover effects are 
some of the benefits which are frequently expected to result from this sector. Revenue 
from extractive industries has dominated natural resource revenue in many resource-
endowed countries (IMF 2012).   
Despite the strategic role, previous studies undertaken at cross-country level point out 
that natural resource endowment leads to lower non-resource revenue (Thomas & 
Trevino 2013; Bolthole et al. 2012; Bornhorst et al. 2009; Ossowski & Gonzales 2012). 
McGuirk (2013) argues that a leader cuts tax revenue to keep citizens politically 
delinked, increasing the probability of survival for a leader of a resource-rich country. 
Although there is a large body of studies on the nexus between non-resource and 
resource revenue (see Bornhorst et al. 2009; Thomas and Trevifio, 2013) , there are 
limited studies which investigate this issue at sub-national level. Particularly under 
fiscal decentralization, the question of whether low non-resource revenue is a result of 
natural resource endowments needs to be explored further. High reliance on natural 
resource extraction brings negative side effects, including rampant corruption, lack of 
accountability and environmental consequences (see Resosudarmo et al. 2012).  
Besides, natural resource revenue is not sustainable over the long term and can 
adversely affect local governments’ fiscal capacity. 
The average tax and retribution revenue for the period 2001 to 2012 in mineral-
producing districts in Indonesia was lower than the tax and retribution revenue in non-
mineral-producing districts. Following previous studies at cross-country level, this lack 
of tax and retribution revenue may result from the natural resource endowment they 
have. However, due to fiscal arrangements under fiscal decentralization, the findings at 
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cross-country level need to be tested at sub-national level. This study aims to examine 
whether natural resource-revenue sharing, in particular shared mining revenue, has 
discouraged revenue efforts in mineral-producing districts. The answer to this question 
has important implications for strengthening fiscal policy at sub-national government 
level.  
This paper develops the argument that the extent of sub-national government control 
over resource revenue assignment plays a central role in determining the effects of 
natural resource endowments on non-natural resource revenue. When sub-national 
governments do not have control over natural resource revenue collection, there is no 
incentive for sub-national governments to substitute non-resource revenue. This paper 
aims to test this argument by examining revenue efforts in 491 districts in Indonesia and 
specifically focusing on 302 mineral-producing districts. The findings of this paper have 
two benefits: (i) to provide an alternative answer for persistent stagnant growth of sub-
national tax revenue, which is still limited in the literature, and (ii) to fill in the gap in 
studies on the effect of natural resource endowment on revenue efforts at the sub-
national level.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the literature and conceptual 
framework. Section three discusses some facts about fiscal policy in mineral-producing 
districts in Indonesia. Section four focuses on data and methodology and is followed by 
interpretation and discussion. Section five wraps up and provides policy implications.  
2.2 Literature review  
Recent studies have empirically analysed the impact of natural resource wealth on a 
country’s non-natural resource revenue efforts. Bornhorst, Gupta, and Thornton (2009) 
examine panel data for 30 hydrocarbon-producing countries (oil and gas). They find that 
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the ratio of non-hydrocarbon revenue to GDP is inversely related to the ratio of 
hydrocarbon revenue to GDP and a 1 percentage point increase in hydrocarbon revenue 
(in relation to GDP) lowers non-hydrocarbon revenues by about 0.2 percentage points. 
Crivelli & Gupta (2014) find a statistically significant negative relationship between 
resource revenue and total domestic revenue in 35 resource-rich countries. 
Geographically based studies also find a negative correlation between these two 
variables. Thomas and Trevino (2013) and Bolthole et al. (2012) find that non-resource 
revenue is negatively influenced by a higher resource revenue-to-GDP ratio in resource-
rich countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ossowski and Gonzales (2012) also find a 
negative effect of natural resources on non-natural resource revenue in resource-rich 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Kaghazian et al. (2013) and Eltony 
(2010) find negative relationships between tax efforts and oil incomes in oil-rich Arab 
countries.  
Although the low level of tax revenue is attributed to, among other factors, inadequate 
enforcement, low levels of accountability, lack of oversight and weak administrative 
capacity, previous studies in the literature have developed arguments regarding the low 
tax revenue in natural resource-rich countries. Bolthole et al. (2012) argue that 
institution quality is crucial for the contribution of natural resources to tax revenue 
mobilization. Moore (2007) argues that governments relying on resource rents and aid 
are likely to mobilize less revenue from other income sources. As a consequence there 
is less incentive to build up the political and organizational capacities of the state. The 
avoidance of broad-based taxes lowers citizens’ demands for better public spending, 
lowering the political costs and collection costs for government. This explains why 
countries with higher resource revenue have lower domestic tax revenue. In the same 
vein, McGuirk (2013) suggests that in the presence of high natural resource rents, 
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leaders lower the burden of taxation on citizens in order to reduce demand for 
democratic accountability. 
Leite and Weidmann (1999) argue that natural resource abundance creates opportunities 
for rent-seeking behaviour and is an important factor in determining a country’s level of 
corruption. In turn, rampant corruption results in lower tax revenues (Thornton 2008). 
Various studies attempting to investigate the determinants of tax revenues find that the 
corruption level is one of the most important determinants of tax revenue (Gupta 2007; 
Imam & Jacobs 2007; Bird et al. 2008). Thomas & Trevino (2013) find that lower non-
resource tax revenue in resource high countries is correlated with higher levels of 
corruption rather than any differences in statutory tax rates. Corruption becomes a 
fertile ground for tax evasion, large tax exemptions, and/or weaker enforcement. 
2.2.1 Natural resources and fiscal decentralization 
The shifting of some responsibilities for expenditures and revenues to sub-national 
governments is at the core of fiscal decentralization. If sub-national governments carry 
out decentralized functions effectively, they must have an adequate level of revenue, 
either raised sub-nationally through local taxes and charges, or transferred from the 
central government. One potential revenue source for local governments to effectively 
provide public services is revenue from their resource wealth. Therefore, the negative 
effect of natural resource revenue on non-resource revenue, as argued by previous 
studies at country level, can be realized as well at local government level.  
A previous study from Freinkman and Plekhanov (2009) finds that local governments 
which rely on federal transfers and natural resource rents for a major share of their 
revenue may face distortion in their fiscal performance. In the context of a sub-national 
economy, this study shows that natural resource-revenue sharing becomes a potential 
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channel for disincentive effects on higher non-resource revenue efforts. Previous studies 
also find a negative effect of natural resource revenue on macroeconomic variables. 
James and Aadland (2011) find that resource-dependent counties exhibit more anaemic 
economic growth. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) examine county and state levels in the 
US and find that natural resource abundance decreases investment, schooling, openness, 
and R&D expenditure and increases corruption. Partridge et al. (2012) find that 
dependence on coal mining in the Appalachian mountain region has contributed to deep 
poverty in this region.   
James (2013) uses forty-two years of US state-level data and finds that a 1 percentage 
point increase in resource revenue results in a 0.2 percentage point decrease in non-
resource revenue. He develops the argument that in response to an exogenous increase 
in resource-based government revenue, a benevolent government will partially move 
away from taxing income, increasing spending and saving. The substitution of non-
resource for natural resource revenue has also been raised by Crivelli & Gupta (2014). 
In addition to the negative effect correlation, they find that substitution between natural 
resources and tax revenue occurred in 35 resource-rich countries during 1992–2009, 
where the econometric estimation shows that 30 cents in non-resource tax revenue are 
lost with each additional dollar in resource revenue.  
2.2.2 Natural resource revenue assignment  
Under fiscal federalism, a central government distributes natural resource revenue to 
lower level governments. This revenue distribution also serves to mitigate the vertical 
imbalance between the central government, and local governments which produce 
natural resources. Among available methods for resource revenue distribution, revenue 
sharing is commonly used although it is not an attractive general instrument for 
financing sub-national governments, since it reduces accountability. When a central 
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government controls natural resource revenue policy and regulates resource-revenue 
sharing, the role of local government is minimal. Therefore, beneficiary governments 
are not responsible for the burden they impose on their citizens (Brosio 2006). In other 
words, local governments still receive the agreed sharing amount regardless of local 
economic performance through resource-revenue sharing.  
In natural resource-rich countries, the sharing of natural resource rent is more 
complicated in fiscally decentralized countries than in non-fiscally decentralized ones. 
In non-fiscally decentralized countries, natural resource revenue assignment is generally 
centralized at central government level or is fully centralized. The central government 
pays all the expenses of lower level government. However, under fiscal decentralization 
the demand from sub-national governments to benefit from their natural resource wealth 
is greater and may become seeds for secession when the sharing is deemed unfair. This 
case shows that an optimal natural resource transfer is needed.  
The allocation of control of natural resource revenue to sub-national governments gives 
rise to some concerns as resource revenue assignment to sub-national governments does 
not come without consequences. Brosio and Singh (2014) argue that local governments 
do not have the same capacity to face resource revenue related problems, such as 
revenue volatility, mobility of factors, likely misspending of the rent and the potential 
for corruption. In the same line, Ahmad and Mottu (2002) posit that when sub-national 
governments have other assigned non-resource taxes, oil-rich regions may have 
incentives to use non-resource revenue bases, which may lead to misallocation of 
factors of production1.  
                                                 
1 A study from James (2013) finds a negative effect of resource revenue on non-resource revenue in coal 
producing counties.  
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Despite the arguments against assigning resource revenues to sub-national governments, 
there are several reasons which favour this option (see Brosio 2006, pp. 451–454). The 
need for additional investment in infrastructure aiming to support the development of 
mining businesses requires local governments to have sufficient financial resources to 
ensure they can provide this. Local community is the most directly impacted party as a 
result of resource-based industries. This emphasizes the strategic role of local 
government in determining a socially efficient level of natural resource use to overcome 
the externality (Brosio & Singh 2014). Another argument is that is the central 
government can reassign certain expenditure to resource-rich local governments for 
strategic and national-interest projects.  
Following Brosio (2006), there are five types of fiscal arrangement for revenue-sharing 
assignment between central and local governments, as shown in Table 2-1. The first 
method is the separation of taxing authorities. The national and local governments 
separately impose taxes on natural resources on firms or projects located within their 
jurisdiction. For example, royalties might be assigned to sub-national governments, 
whereas profit or resource rent taxes are assigned to the central government. Under this 
system, local governments possess control over natural resource revenue. The important 
aspect is that this system requires fiscal policy coordination between national and sub-
national governments. This system is commonly found in federated nations such as the 
US, Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Australia.  
 
 
 
 
27 
 
Table 2-1 Resource revenue assignment method 
Method Separation 
of Tax 
Bases 
(own-
source 
taxes) 
Concurrence 
of Taxes 
(sharing of 
tax bases) 
Sharing 
of 
Revenue 
Sharing of 
Revenue In-Kind  
Intergovernmental 
Transfers out of 
Revenue from 
Natural Resources 
Determination 
of the tax base  
Sub-
national 
National National Mostly national National 
Determination 
of the tax rates  
Sub-
national 
Sub-national 
(within limits) 
National Mostly national National 
Administration Sub-
national 
Mostly 
national 
National By the producing 
firm 
Mostly national 
Criterion for 
beneficiary 
jurisdiction  
Origin Origin Origin Origin  Need, equity, or 
other 
Source: Brosio 2006, p. 441.  
The second method is concurrence of taxes or tax base sharing. With this method, 
central and local governments use the same tax instrument. For example, the national 
government can determine the tax base, and the sub-national government determines the 
tax rate. However, there is concern about potential excessive government take and such 
a system may lead to a retrenchment of investors and cause a decrease in production. 
The third method is tax-revenue sharing, where the tax bases, tax rates and revenue 
shares are determined by the central government and the revenue is allocated according 
to an agreed rate based on the origin principle. Indonesia and Nigeria have adopted this 
method. The fourth method is in-kind revenue sharing where sub-national governments 
have access to a share of natural resource revenue generated within their jurisdiction via 
the provision of infrastructure by the companies that exploit these resources, and on the 
basis of an explicit national regulation. The last method is intergovernmental transfers 
based on the revenue from natural resources. 
2.2.3 Conceptual framework 
Through taxing its citizens, government collects financial resources to undertake public 
service tasks. In return, citizens demand better public policies and require higher 
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accountability for the use of tax money paid. This relationship establishes a political 
relationship between government and citizens. However, when governments have 
alternative financial sources rather than taxation, they are likely to prefer not to tax their 
citizens. In natural resource rich countries, it is argued that governments prefer to 
collect income from natural resources, rather than using taxation as a budget source. 
Less taxation would reduce the need for accountability, and also reduce incentive for 
citizens to scrutinize the government (see Collier & Hoeffler 2005). Under weak 
governance and low institution quality, the lack of citizens’ scrutiny results in the abuse 
of resource revenue. Resource money will be used to maintain power by reducing 
checks and balances in the political system. Therefore, previous studies find that 
resource-rich countries are less democratic (Collier & Hoeffler 2005), and their tax 
efforts are lower than in resource-poor countries (Thomas & Trevino 2013; Bolthole et 
al. 2012; Bornhorst et al. 2009).  Government discretion to collect more resource 
revenue or taxes is motivated by the quality of governance or institution (see McGuirk 
2013; Moore 2007).  
However, at sub-national level, the situation will be different, depending on the fiscal 
mechanism of resource revenue assignment applied. Among the five fiscal systems of 
resource revenue sharing between different layers of government, each method has its 
own implications for local government control. When sub-national governments do not 
have control over determining the amount of resource revenue they receive from 
resource wealth, non-resource revenue will not be affected. Regardless of the non-
resource revenue amount, the sub-national government still needs to collect non-
resource revenue to cover its spending. Conversely, when local governments have 
broader control over determining shared mining revenue, they have budget financing 
options, whether from resources or from taxation. A resource-rich local government can 
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switch its budget financing component from non-resource to resource revenue. Similar 
to at the country level, when local governments have broader authority over resource 
revenue determination, there is incentive to partially move away from non-resource 
taxation (see James 2013). Therefore, the type of natural resource revenue assignment 
plays an important role in linking resource wealth and revenue efforts at the local 
government level.  
I differentiate the resource revenue assignment based on the level of control of local 
government in resource revenue collection. When resource-producing local 
governments do not have control over resource revenue collection2, such as resource-
revenue sharing, local governments do not have revenue alternatives to offset the lower 
non-resource revenue. Regardless of the non-resource revenue amount, the resource 
revenue they receive will only be based on the agreed percentage. As a result, sub-
national governments will make optimal efforts to increase non-resource revenue when 
total revenue is still insufficient to cover total spending.  
Take a local government which is considering collecting revenue from natural resources 
(R) or non-natural resource (NR). Assume revenue options only comprise resource tax 
and non-resource tax or own-source revenue. When a government has control over 
resource revenue, it can choose to raise a non-resource tax or resource tax. This 
situation is illustrated in Figure 2-1. The horizontal axis measures total revenues both 
from resource tax and non-resource tax. The points to the right of NR show the non-
resource revenue, and the points to the left of R indicate resource revenue. The vertical 
axis represents total expenditure (S).  
                                                 
2 This implies the absence of power of local government in the determination of the tax base, tax rate 
and its administration.  
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The two bold lines, TR and TN represent the total revenue for resource revenue and non-
resource revenue respectively. The non-resource revenue, own-source revenue in this 
case, includes the utilization of tax rate and tax base. The intersection point (E*) 
determines the optimal combination of non-resource revenue (TN) and resource revenue 
(TR) to cover total spending (S). A resource-producing local government has two 
options to cover its spending. It can increase own-source revenue or increase resource 
revenue when it has control over natural resources revenue. This resource revenue 
control potentially becomes an incentive to replace non-resource revenue with resource 
revenue. When a local government has control over resource revenue, the greater 
resource revenue will be collected by moving to new revenue composition at E1 where 
the new dotted resource line (TR
1) and non-resource line (TN
1) intersect. The increase in 
resource tax (∆TR) offsets the decrease in non-resource tax (-∆ TN) and leads to lower 
non-resource revenue.  
Figure 2-1 Tax effort selection in full control district 
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Now consider when a local government does not have control over resource revenue 
collection, as represented by the bold flat line TR in Figure 2-2. This line implies that 
resource revenue is exogenous and a local government does not have control over it. In 
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this case, the resource revenue is transferred by central government through shared 
resource revenue. The upward sloping line TN represents non-resource revenue; the 
point further right from N implies higher non-resource revenue. The upward sloping 
line implies that higher non-resource revenue is needed to close the budget gap. The 
intersection point E* is the composition between non-resource revenue and a given 
shared resource revenue. It is assumed there are two revenues, non-resource revenue or 
own-source revenue and shared resource revenue. When shared resource revenue and 
non-resource revenue only cover total spending at S0 and do not cover total spending 
as represented by BD, local government needs to make extra effort by scaling up non-
resource revenue as represented by TNR
1. Because shared resource revenue is 
exogenous, the non-resource revenue will change (∆ TNR) to cover total spending.  
This posits that under centralized natural resource revenue, the impact of natural 
resource revenue on the resource revenue effort will be absent. As a local government 
does not have control over natural resource revenue collection, it cannot substitute its 
non-natural resource revenue for natural resource revenue. Hence, regardless of the 
amount of natural resource revenue transfer, a local government still needs to collect 
non-resource revenue to close the budget gap. 
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Figure 2-2 Tax effort selection in no control district 
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2.3 Background of own-source revenue at sub-national government level 
Under the principle of fiscal decentralization, fiscal authority devolution must be 
accompanied by fiscal support from central government to lower levels of government. 
Due to broader fiscal responsibility at the central level, fiscal devolution to lower 
governments is limited and intergovernmental transfers will help support local 
government budgets. District tax revenue over GDP in Indonesia was only 0.1% in 2001 
and jumped to 0.3% in 2012, which is still lower than the central tax ratio which 
accounted for 11% and 12% respectively as Table 2-2 shows. This national revenue 
structure is common under fiscal federalism. For the case of Australia, where city 
governments are only eligible to collect property taxes, the local tax effort is relatively 
stagnant, at 0.9% in 2001 and remaining at 0.9% in 2012. Although this figure is lower 
when compared to other developed economies, the average local tax ratio in developed 
countries is higher in developing countries. Table 2-2 shows the comparison of different 
levels of tax ratio among selected countries. 
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Table 2-2  Cross-country tax ratio comparison at each level of government (in 
percentage) 
COUNTRY CENTRAL/FEDERAL STATE MUNICIPALITY/DISTRICTS(*) 
2001  2005  2010  2012  2001  2005  2010 2012  2001 2005  2010 2012  
AUSTRALIA 24 25 21 22 4 4 4 4 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
CANADA 18 17 16 16 13 12 12 12 3 3 3 3 
GERMANY 26 25 26 26 8 8 8 8. 3 3 3 3 
USA 19 17 15 16 5 5 5 5 3 4 4 4 
MEXICO 17 18 18 19 0.4 0.4 0.5 N/A 0.2 0.2 0.2 N/A 
INDONESIA 11 13 11 12 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Note: the tax ratio percentage denotes the total tax revenue at each level of government over national total 
GDP. Despite the division of government level, Indonesia is not federal country. Figures are rounded. (*) 
denotes second third tier level of government. 
Source: OECD online database 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/federalism/oecdfiscaldecentralisationdatabase.htm#C_4, and the Indonesian 
government Financial Note for various years.  
Own-source revenue is defined as revenue that is withheld based on local regulations in 
accordance with legislation, for the purposes of financing activities. Local own-source 
revenues or Pendapatan Asli Daerah (PAD) in Indonesia consist of local taxes, charges 
or fees, the income of local government owned corporates, and other local government 
revenue. The assigned local tax collection is distinguished at provincial and district 
levels (kabupaten and kota).3 Mobile tax objects, such as vehicles, are assigned to the 
provincial level. However, immobile tax objects, such as property, are assigned to the 
district level4. Most of these district taxes can be classified as consumption and wealth 
taxes. On the other hand, income taxes including personal income tax (PIT) and wage 
tax are collected by central government and distributed through fiscal transfers. Table 2-
3 shows a list of taxes and fees collected at district and provincial levels. 
 
 
                                                 
3 District level is the third layer of government after national and provincial level. District is classified 
into two, kabupaten and kota (city). This classification is based on demography, area size and income 
source. Kabupaten has a wider area but lower population density and is more dominated by the 
agriculture sector.  
4Since 2012 property tax administration has been transferred to local governments, however, only 17 
districts were ready then. By 2014, property tax was fully administered by local government.  
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Table 2-3 Types of taxes and fees collected at provincial and district levels 
Provincial taxes District taxes 
 Motor Vehicle Tax; 
 Excise/Tax For Transfer of Ownership of 
Motor Vehicle; 
 Motor Vehicle Fuel Tax; 
 Surface Water Tax; 
 Cigarette Tax. 
 Restaurant Tax; 
 Entertainment Tax; 
 Advertising Tax; 
 Street Lighting Tax; 
 Tax on Non-Metal Mineral and Rock; 
 Parking Tax; 
 Ground Water Tax; 
 Tax on Swallows’ Nests; 
 Rural and Urban Land and Building Tax; 
 Excise/Tax for Acquiring Right on Land and 
Building. 
District charges 
Public Services e.g. Retribution for Health/Medical Services; Retribution for Garbage 
Disposal/ Cleanliness Services 
Business Services e.g. Retribution for the Utilization of Regional Assets; Retribution for 
Wholesale Markets and/or Shops; Retribution for Auction Venues 
Certain Permits 
 
e.g. Retribution for Building Construction Permit; Retribution for Permits 
for Venues Selling Alcoholic Beverages; as well as the use of natural 
resources 
Source: Law No. 28 Year 2009 
The tax assignment to local government employs a closed list system, where only 
limited tax objects are assigned to local government. The rationale of this policy is to 
avoid excessive new taxes and fees by local governments for their budget, so that they 
can promote a fertile new investment environment. 
Figure 2-3 displays the role of each revenue type on total revenue at district and 
province levels for the period 2001–2012. At district level, fiscal transfer dominates 
total revenue by 91% and total own revenue (tax + retribution and other own revenue) is 
only 9%. On the contrary, at provincial level, total own revenue significantly dominates 
revenue composition, accounting for 46.1%, with 54.8% coming from fiscal transfers. 
The contribution of tax and retribution revenue to total revenue at provincial level plays 
a significant role, accounting for 41%. At the provincial level, the fiscal transfer 
component is dominated by tax sharing, accounting for 15.3%, and general allocation 
grant (block grant) for 19.3%. On the other hand, the general allocation grant dominates 
the fiscal transfer composition at district level accounting for more than 64%, followed 
by revenue sharing from natural resources and shared taxes. Although districts have 
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more types of tax and retribution for services provided than provinces do, the different 
sizes of tax bases and tax rates are the cause of the gap.  
Figure 2-3 Composition of average revenues by type at district and provincial level 
(2001–2012) 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculation based on Indonesia statistics office data 
 
2.3.1 Is the district tax base too narrow? 
The different types of taxes at provincial and district levels, as elaborated above, would 
have different contributions to revenue, which is based on the characteristics of 
particular tax objects. Figure 2-4 shows the contribution of major types of tax at district 
and province levels. The contribution of street lighting tax dominates tax revenues at 
district level, accounting for 43%, followed by hotel and restaurant tax. The tax base of 
District level 
Provincial level 
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the street lighting tax, i.e. the sale value of electricity, is imposed on assigned electricity 
consumers, and withheld by state-owned electricity companies.   
Hotel and restaurant taxes are imposed on the services and goods provided by hotels 
and restaurants, including the sale of food and/or beverages consumed by buyers. The 
tax base is the total payment paid to hotels and restaurants. The street light tax and hotel 
and restaurant tax can be classified as consumption taxes, which is a tax on goods and 
services consumed by users. 
Figure 2-4 Revenue composition at district and provincial level 
  
 
 
Source: Own calculation based of Indonesia statistics office data 
Note: Due to data unavailability, the calculation only covers 353 districts. The calculation also excludes 
Jakarta province. 
On the other hand, vehicle ownership transfer taxes dominate provincial tax revenue 
accounting for 34%, followed by vehicle taxes accounting for 28%. The tax base of 
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motor vehicle tax is the result of multiplication between the sale value and the weight of 
the vehicle. In principle, these wealth tax types are imposed on the ownership of 
vehicles. Another dominant type of provincial tax is the vehicle fuel tax. This 
consumption tax type is imposed on the basis of the value of fuel, before VAT, used for 
vehicles. 
The different types of taxes at province and district levels would result in different 
effects on the revenue side. All taxes collected at district level apply a withholding 
system, where the withholders have been clearly assigned by the law. On the contrary, 
an official assessment system applies for most provincial taxes. Conversely, provincial 
taxes are assessed by assigned tax officers who assess taxable asset values and issue the 
tax payable notices. Despite the complexity, the value of taxes collected can approach 
the tax potential. 
Hotel, restaurant and street lighting tax rate have a maximum of 10%. Vehicle tax 
applies a progressive tax rate with a maximum of 1% for the first vehicle, and a 
maximum of 10% for the next vehicle owned. Various rates apply for vehicle ownership 
transfer tax; the maximum rate is 20% for a first time transfer and 1% for the next 
transfer5. Fuel tax applies with maximum rate of 10%.  
Table 2-4 shows the trends of restaurant income and output values of four wheeled 
vehicles for the period 2007–2010. On average the potential tax base of vehicle 
ownership transfer is almost four times bigger than the tax base from the restaurant sub-
sector. 
 
                                                 
5 Previously maximum rate for vehicle ownership transfer was maximum 10% and increased to 20% along with the introduction of 
law number 29 year 2009. The province head has discretion on determining vehicle ownership transfer tax for first delivery. There 
is competitive tax rate among provinces, for example, Jakarta and West java province imposes 10%. These two provinces are 
neighboured. 15% rate applies in in East Java and Bali province.  
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Table 2-4 The development of restaurant and automotive sector (trillion IDR) 
Sector 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Restaurant income (medium and large scale 
business) 
7 8 9 10 
Production value of four wheeled vehicles or 
more 
35 57 44 63 
Source: Own calculation based on BPS, restaurant 
statistics:http://www.bps.go.id/eng/hasil_publikasi/flip_2011/8204004/index11.php?pub=Statistik%20Re
storan/Rumah%20Makan%202010 \, and Ministry of Industry data: 
http://www.kemenperin.go.id/statistik/ibs_tahun.php?tahun=2009. 
Note: Figures are rounded 
 
2.3.2 Is there a difference in natural resource-endowed districts? 
The previous section has shown the lower own-source revenues to total revenue at 
district level compared to provincial level. The different tax base plays a crucial role in 
determining tax revenues at local government level. In addition, the locality factor or 
local specifics also play a crucial role in determining tax revenue (Drummond et al. 
2012; Ehrhart 2009; Gupta 2007).  
 A further analysis at district level shows the significant gap between revenue mineral-
producing and non-producing districts. From four types of intergovernmental transfer, 
grants (DAU), earmarked grants (DAK), tax-revenue sharing, and natural resource-
revenue sharing, the natural resource producing districts are entitled to a higher portion 
of natural resource-revenue sharing. This is an additional fiscal transfer from the 
utilization of their natural resource endowments. In addition to budget support, this 
resource-revenue sharing aims to offset the district horizontal inequality due to different 
natural resource endowments.  
The types of natural resource revenue have been established in law number 33/2004, 
including natural resources from (1) forestry, (2) mining, (3) fishery. The revenues from 
mining can be grouped into oil, natural gas, geothermal, and general mining. Since 
2006, shared natural resource revenue has also included a forestry reforestation fund, 
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which is a diversion from the Specific Purpose Fund Reforestation Funds. The sharing 
portion can be seen in Table 2-5. 
Table 2-5 Natural resource-revenue sharing allocation 
Sources Central Province Producing 
districts 
Other districts 
(equally 
distributed) 
Forestry: 
(1) Reforestation fund  
(2) Forestry provision  royalty (PSDH) 
(3) Forest tenure licence fees (IIUPH) 
 
60% 
20% 
20% 
 
 
16% 
16% 
 
40% 
32% 
64% 
 
 
32% 
 
Fishery (fishery fee and fishery licence fee) 20%  80% 
Mining: 
General mining 
a. Land-rent 
b. Royalty 
Oil 
Gas 
Geothermal 
  
 
20% 
20% 
84.5% 
69.5% 
20% 
  
  
16% 
16% 
3.1% 
6.1% 
16% 
  
  
64% 
32% 
6.2% 
12.2%  
32% 
 
 
 
32% 
6.2% 
12.2% 
32% 
 
Source: Law 33/2004 
Mineral-producing districts receive a significant portion of resource sharing for general 
mining (including coal, gold). There were 302 mineral-producing districts out of 491 
districts (kabupaten and kota) in Indonesia in 2012 which were classified as mineral-
producing districts as decreed by the Minister of Energy and Mining number 2300 
K/80/MEM/2012. Figure-2-5 shows the significant role of natural resource revenue 
among other types of fiscal transfer. In total, mineral-producing districts receive higher 
fiscal transfers, accounting for 16 percent of total revenue. Because shared natural 
resource revenue serves as a subtraction factor in general purpose grant (DAU) 
allocation, the portion of DAU in total revenue is only around 63 percent, which is 
lower than in non-mineral producing districts, which account for 69 percent. Despite the 
high portion of fiscal transfers, producing districts have lower own-source revenue 
ratios than non-producing districts, as Figure 2-5 shows. The average tax revenue over 
total revenue is significantly higher in non-mineral producing districts, accounting for 
almost 6 percent, compared to only around 2 percent in mineral-producing districts. 
Similarly, the average charge revenue is higher in non-mineral producing districts. 
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Figure 2-5 Revenue composition at district level (Average 2001–2012) 
 
Source: Own calculation based on DGFB data.  
Note: The figure is the percentage of each type of revenue over total revenue. Other resource-revenue 
sharing consists of forestry and fishery revenue sharing. 
The greater shared-natural resource revenue received by mineral producing districts 
reflects greater fiscal capacity in this group. However, the fiscal transfer dependency is 
own source revenue over total revenue. Figure 2-6 shows the portion of fiscal transfer in 
mineral producing districts accounts for 94%, which is much higher than in non-mineral 
producing districts accounting for 87%.The portion of own-source revenue is also 
higher in non-mineral producing district accounting for 13%. By contrast, the portion of 
own-source revenue is mineral producing districts account for only almost 6%. 
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Figure 2-6 The composition of total fiscal transfer and own-source revenue (% of 
total revenue) 
 
Source: Own calculation based on DGFB data. 
Note: Figure is the average of 2001-2012. 
 
2.3.3 Natural resource-revenue sharing in Indonesia 
Natural resource revenue makes an important contribution to Indonesia’s economic 
growth and government budget. Despite the declining trend over the years, the role 
remains important in central government budget composition. Agriculture, forestry, and 
mining contributed about 28% of Indonesia’s GDP in 2000 and about 19% in 2012. 
This sector contributed about 22% of central government revenue in 2012, declining 
from 38% in 2001. As total natural resource revenue is dominated by oil and gas, 
decreased drilling for oil and shifts in other types of national revenues have led to a 
downward trend in natural resource revenues in central government revenue 
composition. 
The central government distributes non-tax receipts from natural resources through 
natural resource-revenue sharing to eligible districts based on certain formula. Figure 2-
6 shows that oil revenue dominates the revenue sharing with an average of 44%, 
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followed by gas and mining. Although oil and gas revenue show a declining trend, the 
contribution of the mining sector shows an upward trend to offset the lower role of oil 
and gas revenue.  
Figure 2-7 Natural resource revenue component 
 
Source: Own calculation based on World Bank-Indodapoer 
Note: The figures include provincial allocation. Mining refers to non-oil and gas. 
In line with the dominant role of oil revenue, the development of natural resource 
revenue has been dominated by the development of oil price. Figure 2.8 shows the 
development of shared mining, shared natural resource revenue and the development of 
oil price. 
 Figure 2-8 The development of real shared mining, real shared natural resource 
revenue and oil price 
 
Source: Own calculation based on World Bank-Indodapoer and Annual Financial Note 
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Figure 2-8 clearly points out the development of oil price during this period has 
supported the growing shared natural resource revenue to local governments.  
2.4 Data and methodology  
2.4.1 Data 
This paper uses unbalanced panel data, obtained for 544 districts for the period 2001–
2012. The dataset does not include the DKI Jakarta districts because local tax and 
retribution are administered at the provincial level. The mineral classification includes 
oil, geo thermal, coal and other types of extractive commodities. In addition to receiving 
special allocations from resource-revenue sharing from minerals, they also receive 
revenue sharing from fisheries and forestry. In this paper, I consider only the district 
level due to different types of taxable and chargeable objects between the provincial 
level and the district level.  
The analysis draws mainly on three sources of data. At the core is the panel data on 
Indonesian local governments’ public finances, which is obtained from the Directorate 
General of Financial Balance at the Ministry of Finance. This study also benefits from 
the World Bank INDODAPOER database. The data relating to natural resource-revenue 
sharing and other intergovernmental transfers are obtained from natural resource 
revenue transfer reports published by the Directorate General of Financial Balance 
(DGFB). The public finance data, including districts’ own-source revenues, taxes and 
retribution, and intergovernmental fiscal transfers, are obtained from the Ministry of 
Finance and biannual financial statistics of district and city reports published by the 
statistics office. I also refer to the Finance Minister’s decree, audited resource sharing 
transfer audit report from 2009–2012, and central government financial report for the 
period of 2005–2008 on the realization of natural resource revenue transfers to local 
government. The shared mining revenue in this paper only includes oil, gas and rock 
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minerals. The revenue sharing from the fishery and forestry sectors is grouped into 
other natural resource-revenue sharing.  
The data for regional gross domestic product are obtained from yearly reports of 
regional gross domestic product published by the statistics office. The RGDP deflator is 
used to measure price increases. Other data, including population, trade, hotel, and 
restaurant share of GDP, literacy rate, household access to electricity, poverty rate and 
percentage of population in urban area are obtained from the INDODAPOER database.  
The number of districts grew from 336 in 2001 to 491 in 2012. This proliferation brings 
consequences of changing characteristics in the original districts. This paper 
differentiates the original district by before and after proliferation. For the purpose of 
econometric estimation, I assign new district codes for original (old) districts after 
proliferation. In this way, the econometric estimation will recognize the original 
districts’ codes as different units. Hence, there are a total of 544 districts.    
All economic and fiscal data are real term data, where nominal data are deflated by each 
district’s RGDP deflator. This aims to minimize data distortion due to price movements. 
Table 2-6 displays the descriptive statistics of data used in this study for all districts. 
Several variables show significant data variation, including mining revenue sharing and 
RGDP per capita. This particularly results from the high share of mining revenue 
sharing for high natural resource districts in the province of East Kalimantan, the 
province of Riau, the province of Island of Riau, Jambi and South Sumatera. Mining 
dominates the economic output in these districts. Most data in this study are skewed 
right. 
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Table 2-6 Descriptive statistics 
Variable N  Mean     Std. Dev. Min Max 
Own revenue/capita 5131 .030                0.051 0 1.076 
Mining revenue sharing/capita 5128 0.131 0.656 0 22.065 
Other revenue sharing/capita 5129 0.008 0.029 0 0.721 
General purpose transfer 
(DAU)/capita 
5130 0.690 0.920 0 21.326 
Tax sharing transfer/capita 5130 0.095 0.243 0 9.615 
Special allocation transfer/capita  5130 0.084 0.164 0 4.259 
Real RGDP /Capita 5131 7.600 13.267 0.347 270.80 
Trade, hotel and restaurant (share 
of Real RGDP) 
5114 0.176 0.084 0 0.478 
Literacy rate (%) 4941 90.953 10.211 10.93 99.92 
Population in urban area (%) 4940 35.986 31.918 0 100 
Poverty rate (%) 4732 17.076 9.844 1 61 
Household access to electricity (%) 4525 83.354 20.762 0 100 
Note: All fiscal and economic variables are measured in million rupiah in constant 2000 term and per capita term.  
The own revenue per capita consists of local tax and retribution revenue and a zero 
value shows the unavailability of data, particularly for new districts. The lowest value of 
mining revenue sharing is zero indicating that some districts do not receive revenue 
sharing from the mining sector, such as districts in Bali province. The zero figures in the 
percentage of population in urban areas and household access to electricity indicate the 
absence of data.  Figure 2-7 shows the result of a scatter plot graph between the two 
variables of interest, mining revenue sharing and local own revenue (tax and 
retribution). It can be observed that the dots in the scatter plot do not show a pattern of 
movement of correlation. The flat fitted line reveals the absence of correlation. This 
pattern gives a preliminary indication that there is no relationship between these two 
variables. Further, the correlation score is only 0.0138 suggesting the absence of 
correlation between the two variables.  
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Figure 2-9 Scatter plot of shared mineral revenue and OSR 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from STATA. Figure is in log. 
2.4.2 Methodology and estimation model 
The own-source revenues collected by districts comprise taxes, charges and other types 
of revenue. As mentioned in the previous section, other revenue includes local 
government revenue obtained from local government-owned enterprises and separate 
local government wealth, and other revenue sources, including deposit interest. Among 
the types of own revenue, local taxes and retribution require well-designed, proactive 
fiscal policies, to ensure potential local tax retribution revenue is collected. Other types 
of own revenue only require supervisory policies from local government to ensure 
potential revenue distribution for local government. Against this background, this study 
only examines local revenue from local tax and retribution. 
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Previous studies on the nexus between natural resource revenues and tax efforts at 
cross-country level employ the level of development (per capita of GDP), trade (imports 
and exports as a percentage of GDP) and education (public expenditure on education as 
per cent of GDP), inflation (CPI), income distribution (GINI coefficient), the ease of tax 
collection (agricultural sector value added as GDP percentage), and corruption 
(Fenochietto & Pessino 2014, see also Davoodi & Grigorian 2007; Gupta 2007; Le, 
Dodson & Bayraktar 2012). Dioda (2012) extends the determinants by including social 
and political factors including civil liberties, female labour force participation, the age 
composition of the population, the degree of political stability, the level of education, 
and population density, as well as the size of the shadow economy. Crivelli & Gupta 
(2014) investigate the impact of natural resource revenue by employing foreign debt to 
GDP and foreign aid as control variables in addition to GDP per capita, corruption, 
agriculture share in GDP, inflation and non-resource openness. Following cross-country 
studies, this study uses some macroeconomic variables, including regional gross 
domestic product and price level.  
Previous studies (Mahdavi 2008; Chaudhry & Munir 2010) argue that widespread 
literacy in society is essential to efficiently generating tax revenues, for example, 
personal income, small business profits, and capital gains as well as domestic trade as at 
facilitates tax compliance and collection. The wider literacy rate enables citizens to 
understand tax regulations, which promotes higher tax compliance. In addition, a wider 
literacy rate plays an important role in promoting tax revenue through reducing tax 
evasion. Book (2003) finds that literacy becomes a channel for deviant taxpayers to hide 
their tax evasion. By consequence, an increase in literacy tends to eliminate this kind of 
evasion. Therefore, this paper uses the literacy rate for adults over 15 years as a control 
variable for local own revenue.  
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Literature about determinants of local government own revenue finds that 
intergovernmental transfers play an important role in local own revenue variation. Fiscal 
grants are aimed to minimize horizontal inequality and help to finance sub-national 
spending. However, some previous studies show the disincentive effect of equalization 
grants on local tax efforts, creating fiscal dependence at the sub-national level. Mogues 
& Benin (2011) examine Ghana’s districts’ local public finances over 11 years, finding 
that intergovernmental and other transfers to local governments discourage the 
collection of internally generated revenues and funds. Liu & Zhiao (2011) find that 
fiscal transfers and equalization grants are negatively correlated with local provincial 
tax efforts in China. Other previous studies also find negative correlations between local 
tax efforts and intergovernmental transfers (see Panda 2009; Bacarreza & Espinoza 
2010). Given the important role of other types of intergovernmental transfers, I include 
tax-revenue sharing, special allocation transfers, general purpose grants and forest 
revenue sharing as additional explanatory variables.  
For the case of Indonesia, a few studies on the impact of intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers on local government performance have shown mixed results. Fadliya and 
McLeod (2010) argue that the general purpose grant (DAU) formula demotivates local 
own-source revenue mobilization, because each additional rupiah collected will be fully 
offset by an induced equal reduction in the total transfer entitlement. Shah et al. (2012) 
uses the year of 2010 only, finding a negative correlation between general purpose 
grants and local own revenue. They argue that the use of actual revenues in the formula, 
as opposed to potential revenues creates disincentive effects for own tax efforts. On the 
contrary, Lewis (2005) finds a positive association between fiscal transfers and local 
own revenue for the post-decentralization period. He argues that heads of local 
governments and DPRD expect their overhead expense budgets to grow as general 
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revenues grow. As a result, if central transfers increase, overhead budgets must increase 
as well. By law, routine local government overhead expenses must be funded out of 
own-source revenue. Therefore, as transfers increase, if overheads are also to increase, 
local taxes must rise. In the same line, Lewis and Smoke (forthcoming) split the types of 
fiscal transfer, and find that shared taxes and general purpose grants have positive 
effects on local own revenue. 
RGDP per capita is used as a proxy for the level of a district’s economic development, 
and it is expected to be positively correlated with the government’s ability to collect 
taxes and the people’s ability to pay them. The presence of THR (trade, hotel and 
restaurant) share of GDP is to show the local role of this sector. The increase in trade 
and number of hotels plays a crucial role for municipal own revenue since they are only 
eligible to collect the hotel and restaurant tax and government issued permits. The tax 
on hotels and restaurants is imposed on turnover at a rate of 10%. Therefore, higher 
turnover in this sector will lead to a greater revenue base for local own revenue from the 
hotel and restaurant sector. Hence, a greater share of hotel and restaurant turnover in the 
economy can contribute to greater own-source revenue. 
The percentage of the population living in urban areas captures the urban character of 
districts’ tax and retribution. Based on specific criteria, the statistics office divides the 
lowest government level (kelurahan) into urban and rural areas. The criteria include 
population density, urban facilities, and agricultural households. As the hotel and 
restaurant tax is one of the urban facility criteria, the more people reside in an urban 
area, the higher potential revenue from hotels and restaurants. Besides, more business 
offices are located in municipalities and cities.  
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The percentage of population in urban areas is only available for the years 2005 and 
2010, the latest censuses. For the year 2001, urban population is estimated from the 
2000 census.6  
Another important determinant of local own revenue in Indonesia is the percentage of 
poor people. A higher proportion of poor people will lower local food consumption and 
impact restaurant tax revenue. I also include the percentage of household electricity 
access, where the street lighting tax plays an important role in local tax revenue 
composition.  
This study employs unbalanced panel data of mineral-producing districts in Indonesia 
and applies a fixed effect approach for estimation. The idea of fixed-effects estimation 
is to investigate “within-district variation,” that is, to investigate whether a district 
becomes more reluctant to enhance own-source revenues as it receives resource-revenue 
sharing. Each entity has its own time constant individual unobserved characteristics or 
heterogeneity that may affect the revenue efforts. The existence of unobserved 
heterogeneity, including area size and district geography, would lead to omitted 
variables when the regression model does not take into account, and makes the 
estimators become biased and inconsistent (Wooldridge 2002, p. 50).   
With fixed effects, it is assumed that unobserved heterogeneity variables are correlated 
with other explanatory variables. Geographical factors, such as area size, are constant, 
and correlated with grant size. The district’s location factor, mountainous area and 
beachfront area will be related to special transfer allocations, such as fishery and 
                                                 
6 I use Urban Rural Growth Difference approach to estimate the urban population percentage for other relevant years with 
following formula (Bappenas et al.  2013): 
U’ =  x U , Where U’ = Urban population in year t+1, U = Urban population in year t, R = Rural population in year t, d 
= Urban Rural Growth Difference, T’ = Total population in year t+1, and T = Total population in year t. 
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forestry special allocation transfer (DAK). This correlation may lead to potential 
endogeneity between unobserved variables and other relevant explanatory variables. 
The fixed effect removes the effect of time invariant unobserved variables, by 
differencing or demeaning, so that the estimation will result in the net effect of other 
explanatory variables on the dependent variable.  
The linear estimation models will be used to estimate the determinants of tax efforts in 
mineral-producing districts in Indonesia as follows: 
  fit = γ0 + γ1MRS+ γ2 Xit + ρt+ αi + εit    (2) 
The dependent variable (fit) represents total own revenue from local tax and retribution, 
which is defined in log of real per capita. The mining revenue sharing per capita (MRS) 
is the variable of interest. The vector of X represents the control variables including 
other resource-revenue sharing (forestry and fishery) per capita, other types of fiscal 
transfers per capita (general purpose grants, shared tax and special purpose transfers), 
RGDP/capita, the trade, hotel and restaurant/RGDP, percentage of adult literacy rate, 
percentage of people in urban areas, poverty rate and percentage of household 
electricity access. αi denotes district fixed effects or districts’ unobserved heterogeneity, 
ρt represents the time fixed effect which accounts for government policy changes which 
may affect revenue efforts. εit is an error term capturing all other omitted factors, with 
E(εit) = 0 for all i.  
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Based on the argument developed in the previous section, natural resource revenue does 
not discourage local own revenue collection when local government does not have 
control over natural resource revenue collection7. Therefore, the primary hypothesis of 
this study is that natural resource revenue does not become a disincentive for local own 
revenue mobilization. Besides, different types of natural resources may have different 
impacts on sub-national own revenue as previous studies suggest. I postulate the 
following hypotheses: 
HP-1: Shared mining revenue does not discourage sub-national revenue efforts in 
mineral-producing districts 
HP-2: Other types of intergovernmental transfers discourage sub-national revenue 
efforts in mineral-producing districts. 
2.4.3 Empirical results discussion 
The first estimation uses all districts to obtain general hints about the impact of mining 
revenue on non-resource revenue for all districts in Indonesia. The next step is to split 
the districts into mineral and non-mineral-producing districts with the purpose of testing 
arguments developed in the previous section. Table 2-7 presents the econometric 
estimation result with robust error fixed effect8.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Under article 17 of Law No. 18/2004 on Estate Crops ore, local leaders have the authority to issue 
permits for estate crop and mining businesses investment for certain area size in their jurisdiction. This 
authority is solely the extension of central government’s authority and central government can revoke the 
licences when they do not meet the requirements. Further, the calculation of mining sector revenue is 
based on previous year realization and takes into account the projected global economic conditions which 
are exercised by the Ministry of Energy and Resources. Every fiscal year the mining permit holder 
provides production prognoses for estimating mining revenue.  Hence, the authority in issuing licence 
does not necessarily grant power for local governments to increase production. 
8 Hausman test between fixed and random shows significant chi2 value= 217.34, which is statistically 
significant. This suggests the significant difference in coefficients between fixed and random model. 
Hence, fixed effect is preferred for the estimation. 
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Table 2-7 Panel data results with fixed effects  
Dependent variable: 
Total own revenue/capita 
District and time Fixed effect with robust 
standard error 
Independent variables:  All 
districts 
Mineral-
producing 
Non mineral-
producing 
Mining resource-revenue sharing/capita -0.0008   
(0.0079) 
0.003    
(0.0113) 
0.001  
  (0.010) 
Other natural resource revenue /capita 0.027   
(0.019) 
0.027    
(0.025) 
0.038   
(0.026) 
General purpose transfer (DAU)/capita 0.123***   
(0.044) 
0.145**   
(0.059) 
0.075    
(.059) 
Tax sharing transfer/capita -0.019 
   (0.023) 
0.015     
(0.027) 
-0.112**   
 (.044) 
Special allocation transfer/capita  0.024**   
(0.011) 
0.027**    
(.0137) 
0.008    
(0.018) 
RGDP /capita 0.196**   
(0.093) 
0.136    
(0.111) 
0.344**    
(0.162) 
Trade, hotel and restaurant (share of Real RGDP) (%) 0.127 
(0.086) 
0.131     
(0.097) 
0.077   
 (0.134) 
Literacy rate (%) 0.238*    
(0.144) 
0.638     
(0.553) 
0.229*    
(0.120) 
People in urban area (%) 0.034   
  (0.037) 
0.060    
(.0419) 
-0.087    
(0.065) 
Poverty rate (%) -0.024    
(0.064) 
-0.034  
  (0.109) 
0.045    
(0.075) 
Household access to electricity (%) 0.096  
(0.101)   
0.080  
  (0.118) 
0.139    
(0.191) 
Number of population -0.267 
   (0.191) 
-0.353    
(0.241) 
-0.111   
(0.308) 
R2 within 0.20 0.22 0.20 
Time fixed Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 3291 2118 1174 
Number of groups 544 357 187 
Note: All variables are in logarithmic terms. The dependent variable is total own revenue comprising 
local tax and retribution only. All fiscal and economic variables are measured in real per capita terms. 
Figure in bracket is standard error. The signs ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, 10 per cent 
respectively. RGDP per capita is million rupiahs. 
All districts 
All estimation specifications use time fixed effect (two way fixed effect) with the 
purpose of capturing temporal variation in local own revenue resulting from policy 
improvements by local governments. Besides, the increase in local people’s awareness 
over local government accountability and transparency will drive improvement in local 
revenue performance.    
For all districts in Indonesia, this study does not find evidence that natural resource-
revenue sharing negatively affects local own revenue efforts. This estimation is for both 
mineral-producing and non-producing districts. The other natural resource-revenue 
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sharing (forestry and fishery) and tax sharing do not correspond with local tax and 
retribution collection9. On the other hand, overall general allocation grants are strongly 
correlated with local own revenue. Because all variables are in logarithmic form, the 
coefficient can be read as every 1 per cent increase in general allocation grants, other 
variables being constant, leads to more than 0.1 per cent increase in local own revenue. 
Although previous studies argued there were potential disincentive effects of general 
allocation grants on local own revenue (Shah et al. 2012; Fadliya & McLeod 2010), this 
finding shows no evidence of disincentive effects. One potential argument that may 
explain this finding is that own-source revenues serve as an important secondary source 
of funding for local salaries and allowances, that is, above and beyond those from 
general purpose grants, and this might be one reason why own-source revenues increase 
hand in hand with DAU (Lewis and Smoke forthcoming; Lewis 2005).  
It is plausible to expect a negative correlation between shared tax revenue and local own 
revenue. Income tax and property tax make significant contributions toward local 
revenue. The infrastructure for these taxes is already mature, and local governments 
only assist the central government in tax collection. With a greater tax base, local 
governments would prefer to actively assist in income and property tax collection and 
retain their local own revenue potential. Although, the general hint from fixed effect 
estimation on all districts supports the argument of disincentive effects of tax sharing 
transfer, the effect is insignificant. In the same vein, it is reasonable to argue the 
disincentive effect of special allocation grants on local own revenue mobilization. Local 
governments might consider lowering their local revenue efforts when special allocation 
transfers cover their spending needs. As the purpose of special allocation transfer is to 
assist local government spending in specific activities, this transfer helps to close 
financing gaps of the specific activities and reduce the need to explore more own 
                                                 
9 Tax sharing revenues comprise those from property tax and the personal income tax. 
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revenues. Unlike shared tax revenue, special purpose transfers (DAK) promote more 
local own revenue in local governments in Indonesia. 
The estimation undertaken for all districts shows that real GDP per capita has a 
statistically significant positive correlation with local own revenue. The estimator 
coefficient implies that every 1 per cent higher RGDP per capita is correlated with 
almost 0.2 per cent higher local own revenue per capita, which takes the form of local 
tax and retribution. In other words, a bigger district economy size leads to higher 
potential revenue from local tax and retribution. The total output from the trade, hotel 
and restaurant sectors, which serves as one important tax base, does not statistically 
significantly contribute to local own revenue.  
The all district estimation finds that overall literacy rates significantly contribute toward 
promoting local own revenue efforts, although only at a 10% level of significance. The 
number of people in urban areas and poverty rates do not statistically correspond with 
local own revenue, although the coefficient sign supports the reasoning underlying these 
variables. Household electricity access, as an important tax base for local own revenue, 
does not promote local own revenue efforts although the coefficient sign is positive as 
expected. 
Mineral-producing and non-mineral producing districts 
The estimation results based on the classification of districts based on mineral 
production also shows generally similar results to the all districts sample. In mineral-
producing districts, the main focus of this study, the impact of resource revenue on non-
resource revenue appears muted. The econometric estimation finds evidence that shared 
mining revenue does not become a disincentive for local revenue efforts as suggested by 
arguments in the previous section. The allocation of natural resource-revenue sharing 
follows the nationally regulated percentage. Hence, it is obvious that districts with 
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mineral resource abundance receive higher amounts of resource revenue. However, 
these districts cannot increase their natural resource-revenue sharing at their discretion. 
In Indonesia’s case, although central government needs to consult with mineral-
producing local governments beforehand, the natural resource policies are still managed 
by central government. The tax rate or tariff is a domain of the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of Energy and Resources. The tax base and mineral (oil and gas, and coal) 
production are under the domain of the Ministry of Energy and Resources. Therefore, 
this revenue is exogenous as it is outside the control of local governments, under present 
legal and administrative arrangements (Lewis 2013). Under this arrangement, local 
governments cannot substitute local own revenue for natural resource revenue when 
they suffer from budget deficits. Nevertheless, other external factors, such as higher 
mineral product prices, will increase mining revenue sharing. This estimation also finds 
no evidence of a disincentive effect of mining revenue sharing in non-mineral-
producing districts10.  
Similar to all district estimation, other natural resource-revenue sharing (forestry and 
fishery) does not depress local own revenue in either mineral or non-mineral-producing 
districts. General purpose grants and special allocation transfers play an important role 
in greater collection efforts of own-source revenue in mineral-producing districts only, 
but are statistically insignificant in non-mineral-producing districts.  
The shared tax has mixed effect on local own revenue. The impact is insignificant in 
mineral-producing districts but statistically significant in non-mineral-producing 
districts, with a negative effect. Although the previous section elaborated the argument 
of negative effects of shared tax on local revenue, the different potential tax base 
between the two types of districts may provide a plausible explanation.  The urban 
                                                 
10 Districts (kabupaten and kota) in the mineral-producing provinces are entitled to obtain certain 
allocation of mining revenue sharing. 
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character plays an important role in determining shared tax revenue. There are 18 
municipalities in mineral-producing districts and 74 municipalities in non-mineral-
producing districts. The higher value of property in city areas results in higher property 
tax and provides greater revenue for local government. Therefore, property tax revenue 
is higher in non-mineral-producing districts and depresses own-source revenue efforts 
in this group of districts.  The special purpose grants (DAK) are positively correlated 
with own-source revenue in mineral-producing districts only.  
The RGDP per capita is an important tax base for promoting local own revenue. The 
higher standard of living may lead to higher purchasing power by local government, and 
boost demand for locally taxable objects. However, the correlation is only significant in 
non-mineral-producing districts. Although the average size of RGDP per capita in 
mineral-producing districts, accounting for almost 8 million rupiahs per capita, is 
greater than in non-mineral-producing districts accounting for 6.8 million rupiahs per 
capita for, this different effect may reflect the high poverty rate in mineral-producing 
districts. The average poverty rate in mineral-producing districts for the period of 2001–
2012 was 17.8 per cent, which is higher than in non-mineral-producing districts where it 
was 15.8 per cent. Hence, one plausible explanation regarding the insignificant effect of 
RGDP per capita in mineral-producing districts is that the natural resource endowment 
does not necessarily lead to poverty reduction (Ilmma & Wai Poi 2014). In the same 
vein, Bhattacharyya and Resosudarmo (2015) find that growth in non-mining sectors 
significantly reduces poverty and inequality. In contrast, overall growth and growth in 
the mining sector appears to have no effect on poverty and inequality. Unlike in 
mineral-producing districts, the coefficient of poverty rate in mineral-producing districts 
is negative, as expected, but the effect is not statistically significant. In other words, 
GDP per capita does not translate into lower poverty in mineral-producing districts.  
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This study also carries out a further analysis on mineral-producing districts based on the 
mineral resource endowment. This aims to investigate whether there is a different 
pattern of disincentive effects between rich and non-rich mineral-producing districts 
(see Lewis 2005). This paper uses the average value of total shared mining revenue per 
capita of 0.13, or 130.000 IDR per capita, as the threshold of rich and non-rich districts. 
The greater mining resource-revenue sharing a district receives reflects the high mineral 
endowment it possesses. To ensure consistency, each district’s average mining revenue 
is compared to average mining revenue sharing for all mineral-producing districts. 
Districts with averages higher than the threshold are classified as rich mineral-
producing districts, and those with average mining revenue sharing lower than the 
threshold are grouped into non-rich mineral-producing districts. The different sizes of 
natural resource endowments may bring about different effects of mining revenue on 
local own revenue. Table 2-8 presents the estimation results of natural resource revenue 
effects on local revenue efforts by districts’ mineral endowment. 
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Table 2-8 Time and district fixed effect- resource wealth size classification (robust 
error) 
Dependent variable: 
Total own revenue/capita 
Mineral rich producing 
districts 
Non-mineral rich producing 
districts 
Independent variables: Coefficient Standard 
error 
Coefficient Standard error 
Mineral revenue sharing/capita -0.070  
 
  (0.055) 0.009      (0.010) 
Other natural resource revenue 
/capita 
-0.009    (0.049) 0.064**    (0.028) 
General purpose transfer 
(DAU)/capita 
0.147**    (0.057) 0.086    (0.099) 
Tax sharing transfer/capita 0.004    (0.042) 0.026      (0.036) 
Special allocation transfer/capita  0.027    (0.022) 0.008    (0.015) 
RGDP /Capita 0.115    (0.262) 0.126     (0.124) 
Trade, hotel and restaurant (share of 
Real RGDP) 
-0.260    (0.260) 0.196**    (0.068) 
Literacy rate (%) 2.310*    
 
(1.186) -0.010    (0.673) 
People in urban area (%) 0.102    (0.069) 0.021    (0.043) 
Poverty rate (%) 0.175    (0.109) -0.292*    (0.160) 
Household access to electricity (%) -0.066    (0.208) 0.238*      (0.144) 
F-test 4.51*** n.a 13.44*** n.a 
R2 (within) 0.18 n.a 0.27 n.a 
Time fixed Yes n.a Yes n.a 
Number of observation 647 n.a 1471 n.a 
Number of groups 108 n.a 249 n.a 
Note: Figure in bracket is standard error. The signs ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, 10 per 
cent respectively. RGDP per capita is in million rupiahs. 
The estimation over mineral rich and non-rich districts generally results in practically 
similar results with previous estimations. The impact of shared mining revenue on local 
own revenue is muted, which is consistent with the arguments developed in this study. 
The impact of general purpose grants on local own revenue is only positively 
statistically significant in rich mineral-producing districts. Special allocation transfers 
are only significant in rich mineral districts. The split of mineral-producing districts 
based on resource wealth gives interesting results, where the important tax bases, trade, 
hotel and restaurant and street light taxes (percentage of household access to electricity) 
are only positively significant in non-rich mineral-producing districts. There are at least 
two reasonable arguments that may explain the muted role of the trade, hotel and 
restaurant sector on local own revenue. Firstly, the lack of technical and administrative 
capacity of local tax agencies undermines local tax collection. In Jakarta, the nation’s 
capital, only about 41% of registered hotel, restaurant, and entertainment industry 
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taxpayers actively remit sales tax every month (ADB 2015). Low voluntary compliance 
is exacerbated by local tax regulations that impose a heavy burden or high compliance 
costs, and contributes to low local own revenue. The low institution quality of local tax 
agencies, including outdated information systems, has hampered better local tax 
collection. Secondly, possible income underreporting from businessmen in this sector, 
in particular small individual hotel and restaurant businesses, reduces tax collection. 
The difficulty in obtaining true income figures from individual taxpayers has been a 
longstanding issue in Indonesia tax authorities, which particularly results from income 
underreporting. Further, local governments need to ensure that the state-owned 
electrical company (PLN), as a tax withholder, collects all potential street light taxes.   
2.4.4 Why is the tax effort suboptimal in mineral-producing districts? 
The econometric estimations in the previous section point out that the significant shared 
natural resource revenue in both types of group is not associated with variation in own-
source revenue. However, the average tax and retribution revenue per capita is higher in 
non-mineral-producing districts. The simple t-test in Table 2.9 shows significant 
different revenue differences between these two groups. The average tax revenue per 
capita in mineral-producing districts only accounts for 0.012 or IDR 12,000 per capita, 
which is much lower than in non-mineral-producing districts, accounting for 0.022 or 
IDR 22,000 per capita. The tax revenue over total economic turnover or tax ratio is 
0.022 or 2.2% in non-mineral-producing districts, which is greater than in mineral-
producing districts where it accounts for only 1.2%. The t-test also shows that the 
difference is significant. This figure suggests that non-mineral-producing districts are 
apparently more active in mobilizing tax revenue from their economic activities. The 
second explanation results from the level of poverty. The average poverty rate is greater 
in mineral-producing districts, implying lower economic activity, leading to a lower 
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revenue base. I investigate the impact of poverty on each type of revenue. The results 
are shown in Table 2.10. 
Table 2-9 Comparison of tax effort between groups (average value) 
Group Tax per 
capita 
Retribution per 
capita 
Tax over 
GRDP (%) 
Retribution 
over GRDP 
(%) 
Poverty rate 
(%) 
Mineral-producing 
districts 
0.012 0.012 0.002 0.002 17.86 
Non Mineral-
producing districts 
0.022 0.017 0.003 0.003 15.80 
 t- value  7.29*** 12.37*** 10.10*** 15.28*** -7.01*** 
Note: RGDP is constant value at 2000 price.  
The fixed effect estimation for each type of revenues (tax and retribution) consistently 
shows the absence of effects of shared natural resource revenue over tax and retribution, 
as shown in Table 2-10. However, this estimation provides evidence that poverty has a 
negative effect on retribution revenue, although only at the 10% level of significance, 
but not for tax revenue. The estimation for mineral-producing districts also shows a 
consistent negative effect of poverty over retribution11.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 The estimation of non-mineral-producing districts shows the absent role of poverty over both tax and 
retribution. 
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Table 2-10 Estimation on each type of revenue 
 All districts Mineral-producing districts 
only 
Independent variables Tax per capita Retribution 
per capita 
Tax per 
capita 
Retribution 
per capita 
Mining Resource-revenue 
sharing/capita 
-0.004    
(0.007) 
-0.0003   
(0.010)   
-0.010   
(0.012) 
0.018    
(0.014) 
Other natural resource 
revenue /capita 
0.021 
(0.019) 
0.0120963   
(0.026) 
0.027   
(0.025) 
-0.0004  
(0.033) 
General purpose transfer 
(DAU)/capita 
0.118***   
(0.032) 
0.108**   
(0.052) 
0.144***   
(0.043) 
0.120*   
(0.070) 
Tax sharing transfer/capita -0.002    
(0.029) 
-0.021    
(0.032) 
0.018    
(0.037) 
0.010 
 (0.039) 
Special allocation 
transfer/capita  
0.026*  
 (0.012) 
0.006    
(0.015) 
0.039**   
(0.015) 
0.001 
  (0.018) 
RGDP /capita 0.181  
(0.142) 
0.121   
(0.146) 
0.156   
(0.187) 
0.105   
(0.183) 
Trade, hotel and restaurant 
(share of Real RGDP) (%) 
0.094    
(0.115) 
0.035   
(0.113) 
0.119   
(0.124) 
0.011    
(0.132) 
Literacy rate (%) 0.479*    
(0.250)   
0.0378   
(0.178) 
0.530  
(0.584) 
0.247     
(0.688)   
People in urban area (%) -0.041     
(0.048) 
0.0856 *  
(0.047) 
-0.017   
(0.057) 
0.091   
(0.053) 
Poverty rate (%) 0.075    
(0.048) 
-0.180*   
(0.094) 
0.108   
(0.085) 
-0.238*   
(0.141) 
Household access to electricity 
(%) 
0.063    
(0.108) 
0.253*   
(0.142) 
0.215   
(0.123) 
0.117    
(0.165) 
Number of population -0.041   
(0.233) 
-0.560*   
(0.216) 
0.030  
(0.308)  
-0.636   
(0.264) 
F-test 40.08 11.21 25.86 10.01 
R2 (Within) 0.36 0.08 0.33 0.10 
Time fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 3290 3288 2117 2115 
Number of groups 544 543 357 357 
Note: All variables are in logarithmic term. All fiscal and economic variables are measured in real per 
capita terms. Figure in bracket is standard error. Figure in bracket is standard error. The signs ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at 1, 5, 10 per cent respectively. RGDP per capita is million rupiahs.  
 
A study from Gamu et al. (2015) which reviews 52 studies on poverty and extractive 
industries finds that institution quality and the scope and modes of resource exploitation 
affect the scales and mechanisms through which extractive industries influence poverty. 
Although poverty is not necessarily associated with environmental destruction (see 
Purnamasari 2010), the high poverty rate in mineral-producing districts in this study 
suggests an urgent need to look into the current practices of the extractive industry in 
Indonesia, in particular its environment and social impacts. 
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2.5 Conclusion and policy implication 
The own-source revenue from tax and retribution is lower in mineral-producing districts 
than in non-mineral-producing districts in Indonesia. Following the argument developed 
in this study, when shared mining revenue is exogenous, its impact on own-source 
revenue is muted. The important finding of this study supports the argument that shared 
mining revenue does not become a disincentive toward the collection of local own-
source revenue in mineral-producing districts in Indonesia. The effect is found to be 
consistent for all specifications. In line with the arguments developed in this paper, 
mineral-producing district governments in Indonesia have very limited control over 
resource revenue assignment. Under this mechanism, local governments of mineral-
producing districts are not able to substitute own-source revenue for shared mining 
revenue. Therefore, regardless of the amount of mining revenue through revenue 
sharing, it will not depress local own-source revenue efforts. 
Although the main finding suggests that natural resource endowment does not 
necessarily become a disincentive for fiscal performance, the higher poverty rate in 
mineral-producing districts should become a focus of attention. The higher poverty rate 
in mineral-producing districts has contributed to the lower own-source revenue. The 
literature has shown a strong linkage between the lack of institution quality in the 
extractive sector and poverty. This suggests the need to revisit the supervision and 
regulation of the extractive industry in mineral producing districts in Indonesia and to 
ensure that this sector implements more sustainable mining practices. 
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3. TESTING SPATIAL INTERACTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
SPENDING AMONG LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN SUMATERA 
AND KALIMANTAN ISLAND, INDONESIA 
Abstract 
Fiscal decentralization in Indonesia comes with the devolution of authority for 
environmental management to local governments. However, previous studies have 
shown that environmental policy can become one channel of spatial strategic fiscal 
interaction, resulting in spending spillover. The presence of spending spillover can 
result in divergence between private and social benefits, and thus lead to non-optimal 
spending decision making. Using district level data for the period of 2009–2012, this 
study empirically investigates the presence of spatial interdependence of environmental 
spending among local governments in Sumatera and Kalimantan Island. This study 
finds strong evidence of positive spatial interaction through spending spillover, 
suggesting that a district will increase its own environmental spending in response to 
neighbours’ environmental spending. This study argues that pollution spillover serves as 
a channel of interaction for negative spending externality. This study shows that 
environmental spending per capita in mineral and timber producing districts is not 
systematically different from non-mineral and timber producing districts; suggesting a 
lack of environmental spending to optimally overcome the environmental impact due to 
natural resource exploitation. The lack of environmental spending in mineral and timber 
producing districts makes these districts unable to overcome the environmental 
consequences effectively. It worsens environmental problems and adversely affects its 
border-sharing neighbours; forcing neighbouring districts to increase environmental 
spending to counteract the adversely impacted environment, and to increase health 
spending. 
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3.1 Introduction 
In many developing countries, environmental degradation has imposed significant costs 
over economic development, equivalent to 3–10 per cent of GDP (see the World Bank 
2012). For Indonesia, the total cost of environmental degradation, including climate 
change, is over 5 percent of GDP per year and likely to increase (the World Bank 2009). 
Yet environmental degradation not only has adverse impacts on economic development, 
but also puts a burden on social and health costs. Rigorous public policies aimed to 
protect and preserve the environment are needed to ensure the achievement of more 
fruitful economic development.  
Environmental problems, such as air pollution, coastal water pollution and 
deforestation, have national impacts, but their nature is locally specific. Hence, local 
government intervention is required to overcome this issue. The economic dividend of 
devolution through fiscal decentralization can result in more efficient outputs to local 
communities because local government can cater to local residents' preferences and 
needs (Rodriguez & Sandall 2008; Brennan & Buchanan 1980). As local governments 
have better knowledge of local environmental problems, they can address the problems 
more efficiently.  
Since the introduction of fiscal decentralization in 2001 in Indonesia, the role of local 
governments has become more important and significant in environmental protection 
efforts. Through broader fiscal authority devolution and fiscal transfer, local 
governments can provide greater public expenditure for better public service, in 
particular environmental conservation services. The provision of conditional and non-
conditional grants to local governments is expected to help provide better public 
expenditure, in particular environmental expenditure. Nevertheless, the environmental 
spending portion of total expenditure is very low, averaging 1% of total spending. The 
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lack of expenditure will not only undermine efforts to conserve the environment, but in 
greater scope, the efforts to mitigate climate change will be weakened. 
Despite the benefits, some previous studies argue that decentralized environmental 
policy will result in a race to the bottom, the relaxation of environmental standards to 
attract investment (Esty & Geradin 1998). This situation particularly occurs when local 
governments inefficiently lower tax rates and consequently reduce spending to less than 
would be required for welfare maximization (see Wilson 1999). In addition to tax 
competition, trans-border pollution problems are considered to result in inefficiently 
weak environmental policies at the local level (Ulph 2000). Trans-border pollution 
occurs when a jurisdiction takes benefit from its neighbours by doing ‘environmental 
dumping’ when central government’s intervention is absent. The literature has 
recognized this interaction among governments or spatial interaction in determining 
fiscal policies. Revelli (2003) argues that a local government’s spending function is 
affected by spending somewhere else, or in neighbouring governments. A study from 
Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) finds some US states use strategic behaviour in setting 
their environmental policies.  
The literature reviews of spatial interdependence by Brueckner (2003) and Revelli 
(2005) indicate that fiscal decisions in neighbouring jurisdictions tend to play a 
prominent role in decisions on tax rates or the level of public goods provision at local 
government level. In other words, there exists an expenditure spillover. Theoretically, 
the presence of fiscal spillover can result in divergence between private and social 
benefits, and thus lead to non-optimal fiscal decision making (Dahlby 1996). Therefore, 
it is important to understand how spatial interdependence, when it exists, affects a local 
government’s fiscal behaviour. This study aims to investigate whether local 
governments in Sumatera and Kalimantan behave strategically in making environmental 
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spending decisions. Specifically, this study aims to investigate whether local 
governments in Sumatera and Kalimantan behave strategically in making environmental 
spending decisions. This study focuses on districts in Sumatera and Kalimantan. These 
two islands share similar characteristics, are rich in natural resources and suffer from 
environmental degradation (FWI 2014).  
Studies on spatial independence and environmental spending are limited in the 
literature. Some of the few are recent studies from Deng et al. (2012) and Statsna 
(2009). However previous studies aiming to examine environmental spending in 
Indonesia are absent. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it fills the public 
expenditure literature gap by analysing the behaviour of local governments toward 
environmental spending. Second, it provides insights for policy makers about 
environmental policies at local level for these islands, and for Indonesia in general.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section two provides theoretical background and a 
literature review regarding decentralized spending. The third section discusses some 
facts about decentralization and the environment in Indonesia. Section four focuses on 
data and methodology and is followed by interpretation discussion. Section five wraps 
up and provides policy implications. 
3.2 Literature review 
The basic idea of fiscal decentralization is that central governments have limited 
capacity to provide optimal public services to their citizens due to differences in 
particular preferences and circumstances of their constituencies. By decentralizing the 
provision of goods and services to local governments, the outputs of such goods and 
services will increase economic welfare above that provided by central government 
(Oates 1999). The local government can efficiently provide public goods which match 
citizens' preferences and needs, and government resource allocation will be more 
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efficient, because local governments are better informed about diverse local preferences 
than national governments (see Oates 1999; Tiebout 1956).  By assuming a benevolent 
government, this line of argument is known as the first-generation theory of federalism 
(see Qian & Weingast 1997).  
The studies under the second-generation theory of federalism examine the workings of 
fiscal decentralization with different political and fiscal institutions, particularly the 
fiscal and political incentives facing sub-national officials (Weingast 2009). The second 
generation treats governments as non-benevolent because they have goals induced by 
political institutions that often diverge from maximizing citizen welfare. One line of 
argument under the second generation is from Brennan and Buchanan (1980), who 
coined the usage of the term "Leviathan" for a revenue-maximizing government. They 
argue that emigration poses restrictions on the ability of government to exploit taxes. 
Therefore, a decentralized fiscal system through smaller government levels is one way 
to limit governments’ excessive taxing power and to introduce fiscal competition among 
them, and thus pushes local governments to supply public goods efficiently.  
To support the implementation of decentralized public services at the sub-national level, 
some types of spending and revenue are devolved to local governments. However, the 
devolution of spending responsibilities does not necessarily go hand in hand with the 
devolution of taxing responsibility, where in many cases the devolution of expenditure 
power is more substantial than taxing power (Dziobek et al. 2011). When fiscal transfer 
does not appropriately address the mismatch between revenue means and expenditure 
needs, this will result in a vertical fiscal gap (Shah 2007)12. Four causes can give rise to 
vertical fiscal gaps: inappropriate assignment of responsibilities, centralization of taxing 
                                                 
12 Vertical fiscal imbalance is mistakenly used interchangeably with vertical fiscal gap. A situation where vertical 
fiscal gap is not adequately addressed by the reassignment responsibilities or by fiscal transfer or by other means is 
called vertical fiscal imbalance (Shah 2007). 
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powers, pursuit of beggar-thy-neighbour tax policies (wasteful tax competition) by sub-
national governments, and lack of tax room at sub-national levels due to heavier tax 
burdens imposed by the central government (Shah 2007). Besides, different 
characteristics across sub-national governments, including natural resource endowment 
and demography, result in disparities in fiscal resources at the sub-national level leading 
to horizontal fiscal imbalance. Among other purposes, intergovernmental fiscal transfers 
are frequently used to address both vertical and horizontal fiscal gaps, commonly called 
equalization transfer. This equalization aims to fill the gap to ensure sub-national levels 
of government can increase spending efficiency. Fiscal transfers can be used to correct 
biases in state governments' decisions resulting from fiscal externality. Through this, 
central government provides compensation for the benefit spillover. 
3.2.1 Fiscal transfers and local government spending 
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are not only intended to help local government public 
service financing, but central government can use them as strategic tools to achieve 
diverse objectives, including dealing with providing compensation for benefit spillover, 
and influencing sub-national policies in taxing, spending, and regional and local 
economic stabilization (Gamkhar & Shah 2007). However, the fiscal decentralization 
literature has documented several anomalies in local government spending behaviour. 
Previous studies have found that the availability of external financing sources, including 
from borrowing and fiscal transfers, can adversely affect local government fiscal 
behaviour. Commonly known as soft budget constraint, this reflects opportunistic 
behaviour of local officials to inflate spending while expecting higher levels or central 
government to cover additional unnecessary expenditure (Prud’homme 1995). Hence, 
this behaviour potentially undermines fiscal discipline in lower level governments.  
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Some empirical studies have shown that a dollar of general purpose grants leads to 
significantly greater public spending than an equivalent dollar of citizens’ income, or 
which is called the flypaper effect (Inman 2008). One of the arguments to explain the 
flypaper effect is the existence of substitution and price effects from fiscal transfers 
(Hamilton 1983). He suggests that the flypaper effect is due to the fact that 
unconditional grants constitute additional income. The increased income due to fiscal 
transfers results in a substitution effect for purchased inputs. The price of the output 
falls with increased endowment of the input income. This price reduction stimulates 
demand for the output, which in turn stimulates demand for the purchased input. In the 
same line, Hamilton (1986) argues that grant-financed expenditures have lower costs 
than tax-financed expenditure. Therefore, a local government will promote higher 
spending financed from grants.  
Another problem which has been discussed in the literature is what is called the 
common pool problem. This may occur where sub-national governments do not 
internalize the full cost of local expenditure and tend to overspend or lower their tax 
efforts. This results from local public expenditures which come partially from taxes 
collected from residents outside the jurisdiction, which incentivizes local governments 
to spend more than they would when using their own tax revenues (Stein 1999).  
The literature has also identified that tax competition to attract mobile capital leads local 
governments to inefficiently lower tax rates and reduce spending to lower than would be 
required for welfare maximization (see Wilson 1999). Such competition may motivate 
local governments to provide growth-promoting infrastructure and not to offer socially 
inefficient services (Qian & Roland 1998).  
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3.2.2 Spatial interdependence of local government spending 
Interaction among economic agents is considered an important part in the decision-
making process. There are three types of interaction among economic agents (Mansky 
2000): (i) constraint interactions, a situation where an economic agent will consider the 
decisions of other agents in a situation of shared common resources, (ii) expectations 
interactions, where an economic agent makes a decision by drawing lessons from 
observing the actions chosen and outcomes experienced by other agents, and (iii) 
preference interactions, which occur when an agent’s preference ordering of the 
alternatives in a choice set depends on the actions chosen by other agents. Social 
interaction among economic agents leads to a situation of similar economic behaviour 
among members of the same group when they have similar individual characteristics or 
face similar institutional environments; this situation is called correlated effect (Mansky 
2000).  
Broadway (2001) elaborates in his paper that the decentralization of fiscal 
responsibilities entails various spillover costs, or fiscal externalities. These fiscal 
externalities take three main forms: (i) fiscal inefficiencies and inequities, (ii) horizontal 
externalities, (iii) vertical fiscal externalities. Fiscal inefficiencies and inequities arise 
when regions have different capacities to provide public services. The difference in net 
fiscal benefit creates fiscal incentives for firms and households to relocate (fiscal 
inefficiency) and fiscal inequities for those who stay in the region. 
Horizontal fiscal externalities arise from tax and expenditure competition, and occur at 
the same level of government. This interaction can take both positive and negative form, 
in the sense that it can provide an incentive for sub-national governments at the same 
level to set too high or too low a level of taxes and/or expenditure size. However, the 
presence of horizontal fiscal externalities can distort the allocation of resources, leading 
72 
 
to inefficiencies across the economy. Positive fiscal externalities arise when a region’s 
public service provision has beneficial effects for other regions, leading these other 
regions to lower their public service provision and reallocate the spending to other 
needs. Conversely, when a region’s public policy bring harm to other regions and forces 
the other regions to utilize extra fiscal policies, including higher spending, this spillover 
is called negative externality.13  
Vertical externality arises when the fiscal externality effects involve different tiers of 
government. Rivelli (2003) explains that vertical fiscal externalities can arise for three 
main reasons, (i) tax base sharing between different tiers of government, (ii) the lower 
demand provided by other levels of government due to increases in tax rates, (iii)  the 
nature of public services provided at different levels of government, whether they be 
complements or substitutes for different level tiers of government.  
The strategic interaction between governments can be explained by two frameworks, 
spillover and resource-flow models (Brueckner 2003). Under a spillover framework, 
there are two channels of strategic interaction among local governments, expenditure 
spillover and yardstick competition. In their paper, Case, Hines and Rosen (1993) argue 
that there is another important determinant of state and local government spending, that 
is, the spending of neighbouring jurisdictions. A local government may mimic fiscal 
policies of other local governments with similar situations. They emphasize the 
presence of spatial dependence and find strong empirical evidence in support of the 
mimicry hypothesis, which suggests the correlated hypothesis as argued by Mansky 
(2000). The spillover or externality occurs where public expenditure of a jurisdiction 
generates beneficial or negative effects that pass across its boundaries. The second 
                                                 
13 It should be differentiated between positive externality and positive spatial pattern. When the 
affected jurisdictions benefit from a jurisdiction’s spending, there exists positive externality. However a 
positive spatial pattern occurs when a jurisdiction must exert greater spending since neighbouring 
jurisdictions inflict negative externality on its spending. 
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channel is the presence of yardstick competition (Besley and Case 1995). This model 
argues that imperfectly informed citizens in a jurisdiction compare the performance of 
other governments as a comparison or yardstick to evaluate their own governments. 
Consequently, an informed government will mimic fiscal policies of neighbouring 
jurisdictions in order to be re-elected. 
The second type of strategic interaction framework refers to what is called a resource-
flow model. Under this framework, strategic interaction occurs through the existence of 
particular shared resources.  There are two channels that fall into this framework, tax 
competition and welfare competition. This hypothesis suggests tax competition might 
occur if local governors compete with their neighbours to attract households or firms 
and a mobile tax base (Revelli 2003). When the jurisdiction reduces the tax rate to 
attract mobile capital, expenditure will be adversely affected, leading to what is called 
the race to the bottom hypothesis.  
Under welfare competition, a jurisdiction strategically chooses benefit levels, taking 
into account the targeted community. When a jurisdiction attempts to avoid in-
migration of poor people, a low benefit level will be provided. In principle, the idea of 
these models originate from Tiebout’s hypothesis that individuals “vote with their feet”, 
where people or voters will move to a community that matches their desired level of 
public goods.  
To complement the spatial interaction literature, Statsna (2009) argues that fiscal 
interaction among local governments can be explained through cooperative and non-
cooperative behaviour. The main sources of strategic interaction in the non-cooperative 
setup are spillovers, fiscal competition and yardstick competition. Cooperative 
behaviour among local governments can be undertaken through joint projects, such as 
jointly financed infrastructure, recreational services, and environmental protection. 
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Hence, cooperative behaviour has a positive effect of spatial interdependence among 
cooperative local governments.  
The types of expenditure which have externality effects include infrastructure spending, 
environmental protection and education spending. A jurisdiction with better 
environmental quality will create a positive spillover to its neighbouring jurisdictions. 
The strategic interaction is that the benefiting jurisdictions will free-ride and reduce 
their environmental efforts or spending because this spending has been partially covered 
by another jurisdiction; they can then reallocate resources to different spending. 
Nevertheless, positive spillover can occur when a jurisdiction’s high infrastructure 
spending results in environmental consequences, and the affected neighbouring 
jurisdictions are forced to exert higher environmental efforts. The positive or negative 
correlation of intergovernmental activities as a result of spillovers depends on the 
complementarity and substitutability of the spending.  When a local government can 
reduce its spending due to its neighbours’ spending, then the spending is classified as 
substitute. Conversely, when neighbour’s spending causes greater spending, then the 
spending interaction is treated as complementary. The externality effect may also 
involve imitation behaviour. Better parks and amenities in one jurisdiction may induce 
similar expenditure in other jurisdictions. 
Previous studies examining spatial relations in environmental spending are limited in 
the literature. A recent study from Deng et al. (2012) uses city-level data in China and 
find that city governments behave strategically in making spending decisions regarding 
environmental protection. This paper finds that a city government appears to cut its own 
spending as a response to a rise in environmental protection spending by its neighbours. 
Revelli (2003) uses English data; he finds positive spatial patterns in environmental 
spending at district government levels in English local government. However, after 
75 
 
taking into account higher level government spending, the spatial pattern of 
environmental spending at district level is fading. Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) find 
strategic behaviour on the part of US states in setting their environmental policies. They 
find that states are “pulled” toward higher abatement costs by improvements by 
neighbours with already higher relative abatement costs, and are much less responsive 
to changes in states with initially lower abatement costs.  
Since the main purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the presence and 
pattern of spatial interdependence in decision making on environmental spending 
among local governments in Sumatera and Kalimantan, the study adopts expenditure 
spillover as the underlying theoretical argument to explain potential spatial interaction 
in environmental expenditure. Brueckner (2003) also suggests that the spillover 
framework fits the environmental model.  
As noted by Revelli (2007), under expenditure spillover models, the welfare of 
jurisdiction i depends apart from private consumption of residents ci, a vector of the 
district’s own characteristics Xi = [xi1, xi2, . . .], and is also affected both by its own 
expenditure for local public services (si) and on spending in a neighbouring jurisdiction 
n(sn): 
ui = u[ci (yi, si, gi), si, sn, Xi]; 
where private consumption ci also depends on income (yi), on the level of public 
spending (si) and on the amount of fiscal transfer from central government (gi). 
Depending on the type of spillover, sn can either raise or diminish the marginal utility of 
own spending (∂ui/∂si), therefore leading either to positive correlation for 
complementary public goods provided by jurisdictions i, or negative correlation for 
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substitute public goods.14 Although the reaction function is that jurisdiction i can take 
either sign, the theory is silent about the sign and channel of expenditure in spatial 
interaction. 
In spillover models, the benefit of neighbours’ environmental spending will reduce own 
environmental spending, leading to negative spatial interaction. Free riding behaviour is 
the main factor of this behaviour. On the other hand, positive spatial interaction occurs 
when one jurisdiction’s policies impose costs to its neighbours. In other words, a 
jurisdiction spends more funds to mitigate the environmental costs resulting from 
neighbours’ environmental impact. Transboundary or pollution spillover can be a 
channel of positive spatial interaction in environmental spending. 
A previous study with sample firms in China from Duvivier and Xiong (2012) shows 
that border counties are more attractive destinations for polluting firms than interior 
counties, and border county residents are more highly exposed to pollution. They argue 
that it could be very profitable for a firm to locate its plants on the border of multiple 
jurisdictions to avoid stringent environmental regulations. With regard to the nature of 
transboundary pollution, the neighbouring districts will be affected when environmental 
efforts are lax. In the same vein, Lipscomb and Mobarak (2015) provide evidence that 
counties behave strategically in deciding where and how much to pollute. Hence, river 
pollution increases between neighbouring jurisdictions due to pollution spillover. 
                                                 
14 The positive or negative effect can also occur through districts’ environmental and non-environmental 
expenditure policy. In the regression equation, the error term captures non-environmental expenditure 
policies.  The positive interaction from non-environmental spending arises from the specific economic 
policies of neighbouring districts. When the neighbour promotes industry with lack of environmental 
standard and supervision of waste management, the polluted natural amenity will adversely affect the 
life of communities in other districts. Hence, the affected districts will be required to provide extra 
spending to recover this damage. The negative interaction can occur through greater awareness on 
environmental issues which refrain community from further environmental damage. Hence, the better 
preserved environment prevents the neighbouring districts from disbursing greater environmental 
spending. 
77 
 
Following Lipscomb and Mubarak (2015), pollution spillover will be greater when 
polluting firms exist in a neighbouring jurisdiction. Consider two districts, i and n, with 
one polluting sector (e). Pollution, P, is transboundary and depends on the total 
pollution in the two districts, ai and an, and c is abatement cost. It is assumed that 
abatement cost is known and similar in the two districts. Thus, P= ai + an gives the total 
pollution level in the two districts as a function of the individual pollution levels, and 
total environmental spending is c*= cai + can.  The environmental spending must be 
greater in districts where the polluting sector is located, or cae > ca to cover additional 
pollution from the polluting sector, otherwise total environmental spending c* will be 
below the optimum level to cover the pollution cost. The below optimum total 
environmental spending results in pollution spillover and makes the neighbouring 
district bear the external pollution cost. The natural resource exploitation brings 
consequences toward environmental quality. A district hosting polluting sectors will 
face greater environmental consequences when the effort to mitigate this impact is 
insufficient. Greater ecological damage or pollution will also adversely impact 
neighbouring districts. 
The positive interaction of environmental spending results from the own district’s 
response to its neighbours’ lack of environmental spending. Hence, a district may 
expend greater environmental spending to mitigate costs incurred due to pollution 
spillover. Previous studies have shown strong linkages between pollution and health 
conditions (see Resosudarmo 2003; Lelievald et al. 2015). Air pollution causes chronic 
respiratory diseases and premature mortality and imposes greater health spending to 
mitigate the impacts (Narayan & Narayan 2007). Hence, a lack of environmental 
conservation will impose greater health spending on neighbouring districts. 
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3.3 Environmental conservation and fiscal transfers in Indonesia 
Indonesia is a country rich in natural wealth, where 45 per cent of natural wealth is 
subsoil assets while crop land accounts for 36 per cent of natural wealth. Based on 
World Bank estimation, natural capital constitutes a share of 25 per cent of total 
national wealth, the highest among East Asia and Pacific countries. However, this figure 
does not include fishery wealth (World Bank 2009). With almost 52 per cent of land 
having forest cover, forests not only provide an important source of living for local 
communities, but are home to many crucial important sectors. The natural resource 
abundance has made agricultural land resources an important source for development.  
Due to their high value endowment, both under and on the soil, forests in Indonesia are 
suffering from deforestation and land degradation. This brings consequences, i.e. 
environmental impacts resulting from forest exploitation. Forest loss is the main 
environmental issue in Indonesia because of the high deforestation rate over decades 
and its complex and far-reaching effects. However, the impact of forest loss is more 
than just tremendous biodiversity loss; the impact of haze pollution from forest fires has 
sparked both economic and health concerns.  
Environmentally destructive activity includes land use and land use change in forestry 
and the agricultural sector, including deforestation. Indonesian forests are threatened by 
logging and agricultural clearance that results in deforestation. In addition, forest fires, 
illegal logging, illegal mining, and land clearing for plantations have posed further 
pressure on forest resources. Land degradation has not only caused more frequent floods 
due to soil erosion, but also adds to significant adverse effects on climate change. In 
addition, air pollution from both energy use and transportation has become a major 
environmental problem in Indonesia.  
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ADB (2009) estimates that by the end of this century, the annual economic cost for 
Indonesia could reach 2.5 per cent of GDP if only market impacts are considered; 6.0 
per cent of GDP if non-market impacts are included; and 7.0 per cent of GDP when 
catastrophic risks are taken into account. The high concentration of people living in 
coastal areas, a high dependence on agriculture and natural resources, a relatively low 
adaptive capacity, and a tropical climate are some factors contributing toward climate 
vulnerability in Indonesia.  
The environmental degradation not only impacts the economic dimension, but also the 
health dimension of affected people. With regard to human excreta management and 
hygiene, a recent World Bank report  has estimated that major health, water, tourism 
and other welfare costs associated with poor sanitation had economic impact amounting 
to about $7.6 billion in 2007, or almost 2 per cent of GDP the same year (World Bank 
2007a). The summarized environmental degradation cost is displayed in Table 3-1. 
Table 3-1 Summary of economic costs from environmental degradation 
SOURCE OF 
DEGRADATION  
ECONOMIC COST ($ 
billion 2007) 
ANNUAL GDP 
LOSS** (%) 
Climate change  N/A* 2.5–7.0 (by 2100) 
Water, sanitation and hygiene 7.7 2+ 
Outdoor air pollution 3.9 1.2 
Indoor air pollution 1.6 0.4 
Forest degradation N/A N/A 
Soil degradation $562 million (Java, 
1985) 
0.13 
Coastal and marine 
environment 
N/A N/A 
Source: World Bank (2009, p. 13) 
*The economic cost of climate change is increasing over time. It represents estimated total cost incurred 
due to environmental degradation.  The negative effects of climate change include reduced crop 
production, sea-level rise, greater risks of flooding, coral reef bleaching, and further spread of vector-
borne diseases. The economic cost of these impacts is projected to reach 2.5–7.0 per cent of GDP by 
2100. Using current GDP 2007, it is estimated the economic cost reached $102 billion. 
** Annual GDP loss represents the economic cost to Indonesia’s economy annually. 
Table 3-1 also shows that environmental degradation due to climate change contributes 
greater economic impact than other sources. For Indonesia, the increased levels of 
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atmospheric carbon dioxide are mostly produced by land use and land use change 
(LULUC). A recent study from Margono et al. (2014) reports a spatially and temporally 
explicit quantification of Indonesian primary forest loss totalling over 6.02 Mha from 
2000 to 2012 and increasing on average by 47,600 ha per year. By 2012, annual primary 
forest loss in Indonesia was estimated to be higher than in Brazil (0.84 Mha and 0.46 
Mha, respectively).  
3.3.1 The decentralization of environmental management 
The fiscal decentralization introduced in 2001 brought greater involvement of local 
governments in environmental management in Indonesia. Local environmental agencies 
have received a comprehensive mandate to upgrade the scope and quality of their 
services and performance. Through Law number 38 year 2007, the central government 
stipulated policy on the delegation of authority to both provincial and 
regency/municipality governments for the purpose of environmental development 
implementation. Further, law number 41 year 2007 sets out basic principles for 
establishing environmental institutions, and describes the function of environmental 
officers between tiers of governments. 
Based on law number 32 year 2004 about local government administration, the 
administrative functions which fall under central government authority are foreign 
policies, defence, security, judicial, national fiscal and monetary, and religion. The areas 
under the authority of local governments include planning and control of development; 
planning, utilization, and oversight of land use/ zoning; the conduct of public order and 
security; provision of public facilities and infrastructure; public health; education; social 
problems; services in the labour sector; the development of cooperatives and small- and 
medium-scale enterprises; environmental management; agrarian services; population 
and civil registry services; general government administrative services; investment 
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administration services; and other basic services. Considering the externality impact, 
accountability and efficiency factor, thirty one public service areas are split and jointly 
coordinated between tiers of local governments, including environment, forestry, sea 
and marine, energy and natural resources. 
Among the area under the authority of local governments, it is expected that 
environmental and forest decentralization will bring benefits to better forest 
conservation as local governments can closely monitor forestry issues in their region. 
The role of local government in forest conservation is carried out through many aspects, 
including infrastructure for forest conservation and the enforcement of rule of law. In 
addition, the management of forest fire problems. The literature suggests that 
decentralization in forest management will result in more cost effective forest 
conservation. 
Through intergovernmental fiscal transfer mechanisms, central government provides 
financing support to local governments to comply with national environmental policies. 
One of them is the environmental special allocation fund for certain districts aiming to 
boost participation of local governments in environmental conservation efforts. 
Specifically, this special allocation aims to address one of the biggest issues, that is, that 
district governments have few incentives for sustainable environmental management, 
and inadequate financing to achieve environmental objectives at the local level (World 
Bank 2007, p. 27). 
Based on Internal Minister Decree no 16 year 2006, local government public spending 
is classified into eleven functions, including local government spending for 
environmental functions. This spending covers various programs, including waste 
management, programs addressed to control pollution and environmental degradation, 
natural resource conservation, protection, restoration and rehabilitation (forest, coral 
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reef), forest fire control programs, and marine ecosystem rehabilitation. Other 
environment-related spending is forestry which is classified as an economic function. 
The forestry spending aims to address the rehabilitation of forests and land, programs 
aimed at forest resource conservation, and forest production management.  
Although it can be difficult to calculate the sufficiency of environmental spending to 
cover environmental degradation, previous studies show huge environmental costs as a 
result of current environmental policy and practice. The lowlands of Sumatera and 
Kalimantan were the site of more than 70% of total forest clearing; over 40% of the 
lowland forests of these island groups were cleared from 1990 to 2005 (Hansen et al. 
2009). Subsequently, Henstridge et al. (2013) estimate Indonesia may have lost around 
US$160 billion, or around 5% of GDP per year, between 1990 and 2005 from 
deforestation.  
Not only at sub-national level, the World Bank (2009, p.30) has raised concern over the 
relatively low spending for environmental purposes for most of the decade at national 
level. Two reasons account for this trend. First, traditionally the government prioritizes 
other sectors under its national development plans. Secondly, the low level of 
environmental expenditure points to inadequate environmental revenue collection, and 
the under-pricing of environmental resources.   
Public spending for environmental functions at sub-national level is very low compared 
to other spending functions. Table 3-2 displays the percentage of local governments’ 
selected spending in Sumatera and Kalimantan as a function over total spending. On 
average, education ranks top of local government spending composition, followed by 
general administration and infrastructure spending. However, the portion of 
environmental spending is very low compared to other types of spending, averaging 
only two per cent of total expenditure. In addition, unlike education spending with its 
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upward trend, environmental expenditure shows a constant stable trend during the 
period of observation. Moreover, infrastructure spending also shows an upward trend 
compared to other types of spending. The allocation of environmental spending at 
district level is not much different from average provincial and central government 
levels.  
Table 3-2 The percentage of expenditure by function over total expenditure  
  District Province Central 
Expenditure 
function  
2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 
Education   25 26 30 21 21 22 13 11 10 
Environment  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Health  7 7 9 1 2 2 3 2 2 
Infrastructure   14 13 16 22 20 20 12 13 14 
Source: Own calculation based on MoF published annual budget note and World Bank-Indodapoer.  
Note: Figures are rounded. Central government total expenditure excludes intergovernmental fiscal transfer. Environmental 
spending includes forestry spending. 
Central government supports local governments’ spending for specific and prioritized 
sectors through the provision of earmarked transfers aiming to help to finance activities 
under local governments’ authority which align with national priorities. The size of 
special allocation grants is complicated and based on certain formula leading to limited 
eligibility for conditional grant allocation.    
Since 2006, the central government has provided special allocation grants for the 
environment, including for environment DAK, aimed to improve the environmental 
quality of air, water and land through promoting a higher role of local governments15.   
                                                 
15 There were 19 sectors (22 subsectors) prioritized for DAK allocation in 2012. DAK calculation uses a top-down 
approach where central government allocates the funding and assigned local governments provide the plans. The 
eligibility criteria for DAK allocation is based on three criteria. The first criterion is a general criterion, this is related 
to local fiscal capacity. Every year the MoF issues Net Fiscal index which is obtained from local fiscal capacity over 
average national fiscal capacity of local governments. The second criterion is special criterion which places local 
characteristics, such as disadvantageous districts and sea side districts. Based on the relevant regulations and local 
characteristics, the MoF issues what is called regional index. The third one is technical criterion which is determined 
by relevant technical departments. Local governments must submit DAK is transferred in three tranches: the first is 
allocated after the budget is submitted to the central government; the next two tranches depend on the depletion 
of the previous tranche. Based on law number 33 year 2004 that local governments need to allocate matching fund 
(dana pendamping) at least 10% of allocated DAK for each sector.  
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Table 3-3 shows the composition of the special allocation fund (DAK) where DAK for 
education reaches almost half of total DAK. This reflects the commitment of central 
government to support local governments to reach at least 20% of budgets allocated for 
education. The declining trend of road DAK results from additional infrastructure 
sectors, such as irrigation and drinking water. However, DAK for environment is still 
low, only 2% on average of total DAK. This figure was persistently stable over the 
period of study. Another environment-related special grant is the forestry special grant 
which was introduced in 2008. This transfer aims to particularly support reforestation 
programs in assigned districts. The Ministry of Forestry issues technical guidance for 
the fund usage every year, with most funds directed to programs to prevent further 
forest damage. Despite its importance, the portion is very low, despite an upward 
trend.16 
Table 3-3 DAK composition for selected sector (in percentage of total DAK 
allocation) 
Year Environment  
 
 
Forestry 
 
 
Education  
 
 
Road 
   
  
 
  
2006 1.0 0 25.3 33.0 
2007 2.1 0 30.4 18.2 
2008 1.7 0.5 33.1 19.1 
2009 1.5 0.5 39.8 16.2 
2010 1.7 1.2 46.0 11.8 
2011 1.7 1.6 42.0 13.9 
2012 1.9 1.9 40.5 13.8 
Source: Ministry of Finance. Figures are rounded. 
Note: Forestry DAK started in 2008. 
Although the provision of environmental DAK shows the central government’s 
commitment toward environmental conservation, the persistent low fraction of 
environmental DAK compared to other sectoral conditional grants suggests education 
                                                 
16 Local governments’ expenditures for forest preservation are recorded at economy expenditure function.  
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and infrastructure ranks top among central government priorities. Given the significant 
economic loss due to environmental degradation, larger environmental special grants 
will be required.  
3.3.2 Environmental quality and extractive industries  
Mining sites in the forestry area reach more than 15 million hectares or around 15% of 
total forest size (FWI 2010). Although mining contributes an important portion of 
national revenue, it unfortunately contributes toward environmental devastation. Abood 
et al. (2014) find oil palm plantation, logging, fibre plantation (pulp and paper), and 
coal mining concessions accounted for 44.7% (6.6 Mha) of forest loss in Kalimantan, 
Sumatera, Papua, Sulawesi, and Moluccas between 2000 and 2010. Illegal mining and 
illegal logging have plagued this sector and lead to massive devastation. 
Previous studies have found that regions which are dependent upon the mining sector 
and rich in the forest sector have imposed significant environmental destruction (see 
Resosudarmo et al. 2009). The extent of the role of natural resource extraction in 
environmental degradation, proxied by deforestation, can be seen in Figure 3-1. Using 
the forest clearing index from Wheeler et al. (2012), the positive trend between shared 
natural resource revenue and deforestation rate is shown. The positive fitted line shows 
that larger shared natural resource revenue leads to a bigger deforestation rate. 
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Figure 3-1 Two way graph forest clearing and shared natural resource revenue 
 
Source: Stata estimation based on data from Wheeler et al. (2013). 
Note: Forest clearing data covers the year of 2006–2010 for 193 districts in Indonesia. Data is in log form. 
3.4 Data and empirical specification 
3.4.1 Data 
This study uses data from regencies and municipalities in Sumatera and Kalimantan 
Island for the period of 2009–2012. For the whole paper, district implies regency or 
municipality. District level is the third layer of government after national and provincial 
levels. District is classified into two groups, kabupaten (regency) and kota 
(municipality). This classification is based on the demography, land area and income 
source. A regency has a wider area but lower population density and is more dominated 
by the agricultural sector. A municipality has a smaller area and generally is the capital 
of a province.  
The analysis draws mainly on three sources of data. At the core is panel data on 
Indonesian local governments’ public finances, which is obtained from the Directorate 
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General of Finance Balance at Ministry of Finance. This study also benefits from the 
World Bank’s INDODAPOER database. The other financial data sources are mainly 
obtained from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Internal Affairs, publications by the 
statistics office and the Ministry of Forestry and Environment. The non-economic and 
fiscal data, including regional gross domestic product and population characteristics, are 
obtained from the INDODAPOER database. Data on district borders and neighbouring 
districts are obtained from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.  
All economic and fiscal data are real term data, where nominal data are deflated by each 
district’s RGDP deflator. This aims to minimize data distortion due to price movements. 
Table 3-4 displays the descriptive statistics of data used in this study for all districts.  
Table 3-4 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observ
ations 
Mean Std. 
Dev 
Min    Max 
Environmental expenditure 796 0.034   0.040          7.45e-10 0.487 
Other transfer 796 1.22 1.94 0.03 28.23 
Conditional grant (environment and 
forestry) 
796 0.003 0.003 2.09e-10 0.02 
Own revenue 796 0.081 0.132 0.003 2.67 
GRDP/capita 796 10.18     12.87    1.07    173.10 
Poverty rate (%) 796 11.69    5.86           2.17   30.75 
Population density (per km2) 796 488 1,210        1 8992 
Literacy rate 796 95.67
4 
3.617 67.79 100 
The share of extraction sector/GRDP 796 0.422 0.221 0.003 0.920 
Province environmental spending 796 0.006 0.007 0.0003 0.025 
Note: All fiscal and economic variables are measured in million rupiah in constant 2000 term and in per 
capita term.  For districts with missing data due to no transfer or zero data, I impute the data by dividing 
the smallest observed value. 
4.2. Estimation model  
In spatial econometrics, the two main data generating processes that incorporate spatial 
dependence into a regression specification are spatial lag and spatial error models 
(Anselin 1988).The spatial dependence reflects a situation where values observed at one 
location or region, say observation i, depends on the values of neighbouring 
observations at nearby locations, say j (LeSage & Page 2009).  Hence, an econometric 
estimation with the value of a dependent variable y in region i or yi, does not depend 
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only on the explanatory variables (vector Xs), but also depends on the y value of its 
neighbours (yj…).  This model is called the spatial autoregressive model or spatial lag 
model. Formally, spatial dependence exists when Corr(yi, yj)=E(yi, yj) – E(yi) E(yj) ≠ 0. 
The standard panel model takes the form: 
yit = ρ Wijyjt  + Xit β + єit ,        (1) 
yit and Xit are dependent and explanatory variables respectively, ρ is the scalar 
parameter obtained from the multiplication of weighting matrix W and yij and is called 
the spatial autoregressive coefficient. ρ describes the strength of spatial dependence of 
the data. Wijyjt is a weighted average of neighbouring districts’ real per capita 
environmental expenditures (W is a geographical weighted matrix). Xit represents the 
vector of controlling variables, while µi denotes a unit specific effect and tt denotes time 
dynamic effect. The error term єit satisfies the classical assumptions of independent 
identical distribution (i.i.d) with constant variance 2. 
As LeSage and Page (2009) explain, the additional term Wijyjt is called a spatial lag, 
since it represents a linear combination of values of the variable y constructed from 
observations/regions that neighbour observation i. It should be noted that the term lag in 
this case is lag between spatial units, not in terms of time dimension. This is 
accomplished by placing elements Wij in the n×n spatial weight matrix W, such that 
Wijyit results in a scalar that represents a linear combination of values taken by 
neighbouring observations.  
On the other hand, spatial effect or spatial heterogeneity is incorporated in the error 
structure, called a spatial error model. This model posits that the dependent variable 
depends on a set of observed local characteristics and that the error terms are correlated 
across space. In the empirical literature, the spatial error model is consistent when 
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dealing with a situation where expenditure determinants on specific public goods are 
omitted from the model and are spatially auto-correlated (Elhorst 2010). One example 
has been elaborated in the theoretical consideration section. Instead of finding the 
spatial correlation through the dependent variable or from the error term, the spatial 
interaction with independent variables is of interest in some studies. For example, the 
level of environmental spending in district j depends on the poverty rate in district j as 
well as on the poverty rate in neighbouring districts. This model can be combined with 
the spatial autoregressive of the explanatory variables, as well as spatially dependent 
disturbances.17 
This study uses explanatory variables which have been used by previous studies to 
explain the environmental spending equation. Previous studies examining the 
determinants of environmental spending use advanced economies as their research 
samples (Newmark & Witko 2007; Bacot & Dawes 1996) emphasizing the role of 
political pressure over state environmental policies. In addition to political pressure, 
Newmark and Witko (2007) employ population and fiscal health of sub-national 
governments as explanatory variables in their econometric estimation. Wang and Di 
(2002) use income per capita and industrial employment levels among other explanatory 
variables which influence the environmental performance of city government in China. 
Boyce (1994) argues that inequality in power and wealth leads to more environmental 
degradation. This study also employs the poverty rate as an independent variable to 
capture the imbalance of wealth in a community, which leads to higher levels of 
environmental degradation. Hence, the poverty rate will be associated with lower 
environmental spending.  
                                                 
17 The spatial error model is as follows: yit = Xit β + µi + tt + φit, where φit = δWij  φit + єit .   
This model suggests spatial dependence between omitted variables and dependent variables, where the 
error term has two components, Wij φit and  єit.  The spatial Durbin with following model is as follows: 
yit = δWijXit  + Xit β + μi +tt +  єit . The spatial Durbin model can contain both a spatially autoregressive 
dependent variable and spatially autoregressive independent variable. 
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Population density plays an important role in affecting environmental quality. Greater 
population density leads to an increased need and competition for resources, including 
environmental resources, which in turn, leads to detrimental impacts when this problem 
is not well managed. Greater own-source revenue at district level indicates greater fiscal 
capacity. With regard to special grants for the environment (DAK), local governments 
need to provide matching funds for environmental DAK. For this purpose, it is 
reasonable to expect a positive association between own-source revenue and 
environmental spending because greater environmental spending encourages greater 
own-source revenue to provide the required matching funds. Theoretically, the 
substitution effect from conditional grants reduces the price of subsidized public 
services, hence it stimulates higher spending. Conversely, the effects of other types of 
fiscal transfers are inconclusive as theory suggests.   
In his study, Revelli (2003) finds that when vertical expenditure externalities among 
upper- and lower-tier authorities are explicitly taken into account (because of 
complementarity/substitutability between public expenditures at the two levels of 
government), the estimated magnitude of between-districts interaction is substantially 
reduced. He concludes that the observed positive spatial autocorrelation among district 
expenditures can be attributed to a large extent to common reaction to county 
expenditures, rather than to actual strategic interaction. Hence, the exclusion of 
provincial level spending leads to omitted variables in the econometric equation.  
Although the interaction channel can occur through covariates in error variables as in 
the spatial error model, as the main purpose of this study is to examine the presence of 
spatial interaction among local governments in decision making for environmental 
spending, this study uses a spatial autoregressive model to estimate spatial interaction. 
The basic estimating model with spatial effects can be written as follows: 
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yit = ρWijyit  + β0+ β2 Xit +  єit ,  (2) 
yit represents a district’s environmental spending,18 ρ represents the spatial 
autoregressive coefficient of environmental spending per capita, and W represents a 
spatial contiguity weight matrix. X is a vector of control variables, comprising fiscal 
transfers, covering the general purpose transfer (DAU) and shared revenues (tax and 
natural resource-revenue sharing) and conditional environmental transfer, real per capita 
gross regional domestic product (GRDP), population density per kilometre2, poverty 
rate, and own-source revenue in per capita terms, and literacy rate and provincial 
environmental spending per capita. εit is an error term capturing all other omitted 
factors, with E(εit) = 0 for all i. 
3.4.2  Econometrics result discussion  
The first step in assessing the spatial correlation is to develop a weight matrix, defining 
the neighbourliness of spatial units. The weight matrix is based on the number of spatial 
units and a symmetry matrix. The weight matrix can be constructed in a large number of 
ways, for example based on classification or group, distance, or contiguity. With 
contiguity, the underlying structure of neighbourliness is 0–1 values. If two spatial units 
have a common border of non-zero length, they are considered contiguous and assigned 
value 1, or otherwise zero. Under distance structure, matrix weight is based on distance 
between units, which can use longitude and latitude (see Getis & Aldstadt 2004) for a 
detailed discussion). 
This study employs two approaches to determining the extent to which two districts are 
neighbours, the geographical proximity criteria and natural resource revenue 
endowment group. With geographical criteria, districts which share a physical border 
                                                 
18 Based on accounting principles, the disbursement of a conditional grant is recorded under related 
expenditure account. For estimation purposes, environmental spending is net spending after subtracting 
environmental and forest special allocation grants.   
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are treated as neighbours. In this case, the neighbouring districts will share the adverse 
impact of environmental degradation resulting from a lack of environmental policies. 
Hence, isolated districts or non-physical shared border districts are excluded.19 The 
second approach is to split the districts based on natural resource endowment, into non-
mineral-producing and mineral-producing districts. This assumes that the districts 
falling into the mineral producer group will have similar environmental challenges, and 
they may imitate the neighbours’ fiscal policy, environmental spending in this case. 
Hence, a local government will refer to its neighbours’ environmental spending as 
argued in the correlated effect hypothesis. This study uses a contiguity basis where 
neighbouring districts which share a common border or fall under the same natural 
resource endowment group are assigned 1, then wij = 1 or otherwise zero. 
The first step of analysis is to run Moran’s I and Geary’s C test to formally investigate 
the spatial autocorrelation among districts with the null hypothesis that there are no 
spatial effects. Both of these tests produce an index used to detect the pattern of 
observed variables, whether they disperse, converge or cluster, or are random. The 
Moran's I statistic provides an indication of the degree of linear association between the 
observed variable and a vector of spatially weighted averages of neighbouring values 
(Wx). The Moran’s I index values range from −1 to +1. The negative value of Moran’s 
I index indicates the tendency of the observed variable toward dispersion, suggesting an 
inverse association of environmental spending among units or districts. A positive value 
of Moran’s I suggests a tendency in the data toward clustering, or that a district’s 
environmental spending is positively associated with its neighbours’ environmental 
spending. The Moran’s I index can be calculated from the following formula: (n/S0) (∑i 
∑j wij zi zj / zi2), where n is number of observations, S0 is an aggregate of all the spatial 
                                                 
19 The excluded districts are Simeulue, Mentawai, Karimun, Batam, Lingga, Anambas and Natuna.  
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weight or ∑i ∑j wij, and zi, zj are deviations of the variable of interest from the mean 
(Anselin 1995). 
On the other hand, Geary’s C test is inversely related to Moran’s I. The value of Geary-
C lies between 0 and 2. A value of 1 means no spatial autocorrelation. Values lower 
than 1 demonstrate increasing positive spatial autocorrelation, whilst values higher than 
1 indicate increasing negative spatial autocorrelation. The formula for the Geary’s C test 
is as follows: (N-1)∑i ∑j wij(Xi-Xj)2/ 2W∑I (Xi- j), where N is the number of spatial 
units indexed by i and j, X is the variable of interest; bar X is the mean of X; wij is a 
matrix of spatial weights; and W is the sum of all wij (Jeffers 1973). The inference of 
Moran’s I and Geary’s C are based on a z-value of C-1/sd(C) for Geary-C, where C 
represents observed Geary value and sd is the standard deviation.  The z-value for 
Moran-I is obtained by (I-E (I)/sd(I)), where I represents observed Moran-I value, E (I) 
denotes expected I value and sd (I) denotes the standard deviation of observed I value. 
Detecting the spatial correlation of environmental spending data among districts, I 
employ both Moran-I and Geary-C tests for comparing the results. Because Moran-I and 
Geary-C test spatial autocorrelation for cross section data, I undertake the test for each 
year of observation. Table 3-5 shows the results. Both Moran-I and Geary-C confirm 
the presence of spatial correlation of environmental spending among districts in 
Sumatera and Kalimantan with border share matrix, although the Geary test does not 
confirm the year 201020. The statistically significant spatial autocorrelation tests provide 
evidence about the clustering pattern in environmental spending at local governments in 
Sumatera and Kalimantan. It should be noted that the results of the Moran-I and Geary-
C tests only inform about data spatial patterns, but cannot say what is driving the spatial 
pattern. The econometric regression will explain this spatial pattern and provide 
                                                 
20 Cliff and Ord (1981) have shown that Moran’s I is consistently more powerful than Geary’s C. 
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evidence about whether there is environmental spending interdependence through 
spatial lag, as argued in this paper.  
Table 3-5 Spatial autocorrelation test: Environmental spending per capita 
 W=border share W= Natural resource producing group 
Year Moran-I 
value 
z-score Geary
-C 
value 
z-score Moran-I 
value 
z-score Geary-
C value 
z-score 
2009 0.158 3.15*** 0.865 -1.42* -0.009     -0.564 1.004 0.564 
2010 0.224 4.51*** 0.888 -1.02 -0.009 0.531 1.004 -0.531 
2011 0.245 5.52*** 0.790 -1.28* -0.007 -0.394 1.002 0.394 
2012 0.424 8.50*** 0.640 -3.17*** -0.005 -0.037 1.000 -0.037 
 
The natural resource endowment weight matrix does not suggest the presence of spatial 
interaction of environmental spending data. In other words, a natural resource producing 
district in Sumatera will not consider environmental spending of districts in Kalimantan, 
although they are classified in the same group. This seems to be in line with Brueckner 
(2003) who found that close-by jurisdictions are more likely to affect each other than far 
away ones. 
3.4.3 Econometric estimation result discussion 
The formal spatial correlation tests in the previous section find evidence of 
interdependence among local governments in environmental spending policies. Two 
main approaches have been suggested in the literature to estimate models that include 
spatial interaction effects. One is based on the maximum likelihood (ML) principle and 
the other on instrumental variables or generalized method of moments (IV/GMM) 
techniques (Elhorst 2003). Based on the spatial correlation test above, the econometric 
estimation will use only the border share weight matrix. Table 3-6 displays the 
estimation results.21  
                                                 
21 LeSage and Pace (2009) demonstrate that the effects of individual variables in a model are comprised of a partial derivative of a 
combination of all model coefficients. The spregdpd command does not provide direct, indirect and total effect, but only partial 
derivative effects for explanatory variable spillover. 
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Table 3-6  Econometric estimation results: Dependent variable = Environmental 
spending per capita 
Independent variables 
 
Generalized 
spatial two-
stage 
least squares  
(GS2SLS) 
Spatial 
IV/GMM 
(Spatial 
autoregressive
) 
Mineral and 
timber 
producing 
districts only  
 (Generalized 
spatial two-
stage 
least squares) 
Mineral and 
timber 
producing 
districts only  
 Spatial 
IV/GMM  
(Spatial 
autoregressive) 
 1 2 3 4 
Temporal Lag- 
Environment 
spending 
N/A 0.100***   
(0.010)  
N/A 0.042***    
(0.012) 
W*Environment 
spending  
0.271***   
(0.068) 
0.298***  
(0.062)      
0.339***   
(0.079) 
0.334***   
(0.091) 
Other fiscal transfer 0.011***  
(0.0008) 
0.006***   
(0.0005)     
0.010***   
(0.0008) 
0.007***    
(0.0008 
Special grant for 
environment and 
forestry 
1.145 **  
(0.397) 
0.275 
(0.593)      
0.715*    
(0.370) 
1.222*    
(0.692) 
Own revenue 0.059*  
(0.031) 
0.332***   
(0.074)      
0.050 
(0.034) 
0.417***   
(0.089) 
RGDP growth 0.0002 
(0.0001) 
-0.0004   
(0.0003) 
0.0002*   
(0.0001) 
0.0001   
(0.0005) 
Poverty rate -0.0002    
(0.0002) 
-0.0006   
(0.0007) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0005 
(0.001) 
Population density 3.21e-06 **  
(1.30e-06) 
1.66e-06   
(7.13e-06) 
7.47e-06 *  
(3.92e-06) 
0.00003   
(0.00004) 
Literacy rate 0.0001  
(0.0001) 
0.0002   
(0.0002) 
0.0001   
(0.0002) 
0.00068 
(0.0007) 
Provincial 
environmental 
spending 
1.82e-07   
(2.19e-07)   
2.75e-07   
(2.31e-07) 
5.84e-08   
(2.66e-07) 
1.28e-07    
(2.54e-07 
No. observation 796 597 596 447 
No. group 199 199 149 149 
R2 (Raw Moments) 0.78 0.82 0.77 0.79 
F-test 42*** 133*** 34.2*** 54*** 
Log likelihood  1897 1420 1353 1017 
Sargan over-
identification test( p-
value) 
N/A 24.1(0.51) N/A 20(0.74) 
Note: All fiscal variables are measured in real per capita terms. The figure in brackets is standard error. The signs 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, 10 per cent respectively.  
Because the y variable appears in the right and left sides of the equation, the spatially 
lagged variable (Wy) on right hand side is treated as endogenous. Besides, the potential 
simultaneity can result from a special transfer allocation (DAK). The disbursement of 
this fund is allocated into three tranches which depend on the extent of the use of the 
fund. As such, total DAK allocations in one fiscal year are a function of local 
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government environmental spending during the related year. Hence, the DAK must also 
be considered as endogenous (see Lewis 2013).22  
The obvious question in the previous analysis is that of endogeneity of the explanatory 
variables owing to Wy (the spatially lagged dependent variable). To overcome the 
possible endogeneity bias, Kelejian and Prucha (1998) suggest an instrumental variable 
method obtained from internal variables, known as the generalized spatial two-stage 
least squares (GS2SLS) procedure.23 The GS2SLS estimation confirms the presence of 
spatial interaction in environmental spending in these districts. The coefficient of the 
spatially autoregressive dependent variable is interpreted as the degree of interaction 
among jurisdictions (Elhorst & Freret 2007). The GS2SLS estimation shows an 
interaction coefficient of 0.271, suggesting that a district will increase its own 
environmental spending by 0.271 million IDR (or 271.000 IDR) in response to a one 
million rupiah increase in its neighbours’ environmental spending in per capita terms, 
ceteris paribus. The positive and significant spatial correlation provides evidence that 
environmental spending becomes complementary to a district’s own environmental 
spending over its neighbours.  
Own-source revenue and fiscal transfers, covering shared revenue and general purpose 
grants (in per capita terms), are important sources of environmental spending as 
expected. Nevertheless, the positive and greater effect of own-source revenue than 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers for environmental spending suggests the absence of 
the flypaper effect in environmental spending in these districts.  
                                                 
22 In addition, one of the components in other transfer revenue, unconditional grant (DAU) can be simultaneous. The DAU formula 
allocation is based on past actual local expenditures (including environmental expenditures). Therefore, local governments’ 
environmental spending in one period affect DAU allocation in a subsequent period. Thus, the DAU is treated as predetermined or 
weakly exogenous according to the definitions employed in the GMM regression analysis. 
23 The GS2SLS procedure proceeds as follows. In the first step, the regression model in Equation (4) is estimated by two-stage least 
squares using a set of instrument variables, H (X, WX, W2X). That is, we regress Wy on X, WX, W2X and use the fitted values of 
Wy as instruments for Wy. In the second step, we estimate the autoregressive parameter ρ by generalized method of moments using 
the residuals obtained in the first step. In the final step, we use the estimates of ρ to perform a spatial Cochrane–Orcutt 
transformation of the data and obtain efficient estimates of β and λ. However, some potential instrumental variables for conditional 
grant are not valid. Hence, the internal instruments will be employed as GMM approach suggests. 
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Interestingly, the conditional grant for environment and forestry does not have a 
stimulative effect on environmental spending. One potential explanation is due to the 
fungibility of conditional grants (Shah 2007), meaning spending in the specified area 
increases by less than the amount of the grant. All of the grant funds are expended on 
environmental spending, but some own-source revenues are diverted into other uses. 
The fungibility of conditional grants depends on both the level of spending on assisted 
public services and the relative priority of such spending. If the recipient’s own-
financed expenditure in the assisted category exceeds the amount of the conditional 
grant, the conditionality of the grant may not have any impact on the recipient’s 
spending behaviour, which is the case for districts where own environmental spending 
is greater than conditional grants for the environment. Among non-fiscal variables, only 
poverty has a significant positive effect on environmental spending. Although the 
coefficient sign is negative as expected, the poverty rate is not significantly associated 
with environmental spending.  
To take into account the potential endogeneity of conditional grants for environment 
and forestry, the dynamic panel data (DPD) model with systems generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimation procedures is employed.24 Column 2 in Table 3-6 shows 
the estimation results. After taking care for the endogeneity issue, the spatial coefficient 
sign (rho) rises to 0.30 from 0.27, suggesting a greater spillover impact from 
neighbours’ environmental spending decisions. The Sargan test for testing the validity 
of the over-identification restriction indicates that the employed instruments are valid. 
                                                 
24 The GMM procedure is preferred approach because it can deal with endogeneity and small T and large N. The GMM takes 
differenced approach to eliminate the time invariant unobserved heterogeneity. For the instrument variables, the differenced 
equation uses lagged levels of the endogenous and predetermined variables and differences of the exogenous variables. 
Instruments for the level equation can also be employed and these comprise lag differences of endogenous and predetermined 
variables, as well as all exogenous variables. Two-step estimation is employed. 
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The magnitude of the stimulative effect of own-source revenue is consistently greater 
than fiscal transfers in promoting environmental spending. It is interesting to note that 
despite the limited revenue base, own-source revenue has a significant positive effect on 
environmental spending in both estimation approaches. One potential explanation for 
significant positive effects of own-source revenue over environmental spending is that 
local government revenue bases are characterized by the consumption of goods and 
services. Local governments have power to tax restaurants, hotels, entertainment, 
advertising, street lightning, certain minerals, parking, ground water, swallow birds’ 
nests. Local governments also have power to collect charges or retribution from 
government-provided services. Hence, the bigger consumption from economic activity, 
the bigger potential own-source revenue, and consequently, the greater waste produced 
and the greater environmental spending needed.  
Following Revelli’s (2003) finding, the inclusion of provincial spending in all models 
shows a persistent positive spatial coefficient; reflecting that strategic interactions 
among local governments determine their environmental spending, rather than reactions 
toward environmental spending from the provincial level. Moreover, all models do not 
provide evidence of the role of the provincial level’s environmental spending toward 
districts’ environmental spending. 
Because polluting sectors contribute toward greater pollution in hosting districts, it is 
obvious that the interaction magnitude will be greater. I estimate the district sample for 
mineral and timber producing districts only. The estimation result in columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 3-6 show that the spatial coefficient in mineral and timber producing districts 
remains significantly positive with a magnitude of 0.33. This greater coefficient size 
results suggests the dominant role of this group of districts in the presence of spatial 
interaction. 
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3.4.4 Does pollution serve as the source of spatial interactions? 
The lack of environmental spending makes the mineral and timber producing districts 
unable to mitigate the environmental consequences associated with activities in 
polluting sectors. The negative effects of uncontrolled pollution spread across 
boundaries, affecting the welfare of residents in neighbouring jurisdictions (Case et al. 
1993; Revelli 2006). This situation undermines the environmental condition and forces 
the affected neighbouring districts to expend greater environmental spending to mitigate 
the impacts, leading to positive interaction. Following the argument developed in the 
previous section, the uncontrolled polluting becomes the channel of this spatial 
interaction.  
There is a vast literature highlighting the potential for extractive industries, such as 
mining, to pollute the environment. Rau et al. (2013) find that children living in 
proximity of mineral wastes had higher concentrations of lead in their blood, and worse 
academic performance. Aragón and Rud (2015) study the effect of pollution from gold 
production on agriculture in Ghana. They find evidence that cumulative gold production 
(a measure of the stock of pollution) is associated with a significant reduction in 
agricultural productivity. Previous studies have found a negative impact of the mining 
sector on the environment in Indonesia. Fatah (2007) finds the detrimental impact of the 
Indonesian coal sector in South Kalimantan. Carlson et al. (2013) estimate the 
plantation expansion in Kalimantan alone is projected to contribute 18–22% (0.12–
0.15 GtC yr−1) of Indonesia’s 2020 CO2-equivalent emissions. 
Extractive and agricultural industries, such as mining, oil extraction and forest logging, 
have potential to pollute the environment. Mining industries can generate significant 
amounts of air pollutants such as nitrogen oxides (NOx) and sulphur dioxide (SO2). 
Agricultural expansion, accompanied by forest clearing, can damage forests and release 
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emissions and particulate matter, impacting the quality of air, water and soil. I 
investigate whether neighbours’ pollution levels affect a district’s environmental 
spending. However, district level data of pollution are not available. Some previous 
studies (see Aragón & Rud 2013) proxy the pollution level in the gold mining sector 
with cumulative gold production. On the other hand, van der Goltz and Barnwal (2014), 
and Rau et al. (2013) use the distances from affected communities to the mine sites or 
pollution sources.  
This study uses shared natural resource revenue as a proxy for pollutant stock. Greater 
shared natural resource revenue requires greater natural resource exploitation, leading to 
greater consequences to the environment (see Abood et al. 2012). Following 
Resosudarmo et al. (2009), the extractive sector has significantly contributed toward 
environmental degradation in Indonesia. In addition to the extractive sector, 
deforestation in the forestry sector is also considered as pollution. The bigger the size of 
the natural resource extraction sector, the greater environmental consequences which 
require greater environmental spending. Besides, the use of shared natural resource 
revenue can cover all potential sources of pollution.    
To investigate the presence of pollution spillover, proxied by shared natural resource 
revenue, the econometric estimation will be undertaken with the following model: 
yit = β1 Wij*Shared natural resource revenueit  + β2 Xit + ρt+ αi + єit ,  (3) 
With similar explanatory variables to model (2), I use a fixed effect approach to 
estimate the effect of neighbours’ shared natural resource-revenue sharing over a 
district’s environmental spending. Column 1 in Table 3-7 shows the significant and 
positive impact of neighbours’ shared natural resource revenue over a district’s own 
environmental spending. This result suggests that a district increases its environmental 
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spending by 10.000 IDR per capita for every one million IDR increase in natural 
resource-revenue sharing in neighbouring districts. This explains the arguments 
developed in the previous section, that when pollution spillover occurs, the 
neighbouring districts must spend greater environmental spending, leading to positive 
correlation between these two variables.  
Table 3-7 Econometric estimation results: Dependent variable= (Environmental 
spending) 
Independent variables/ (All 
districts) 
Fixed 
effect 
Mineral 
and timber 
producing 
district 
Group 
(All 
districts) 
Fixed effects 
2SLS 
Neighbours are 
Mineral and 
timber 
producing 
district 
 1 2 3 4 
Neighbours’ shared natural resource 
revenue 
 
0.010**   
(0.005) 
0.010**    
(0.005) 
0.010*    
(0.006) 
0.009*     
(0.005) 
Total transfer revenue 0.024***  
(0.003) 
0.024** *   
(0.002) 
0.025***    
(0.002) 
0.024***  
 (0.002) 
Own-source revenue  0.086    
(0.066) 
0.126    
(0.077) 
0.113 
(0.085) 
0.075    
(0.075) 
Literacy rate 0.00003   
(0.0001) 
-0.00003 
(0.00013) 
0.004 
(0.0004) 
0.0003*  
  (0.0001) 
Poverty rate -0.0003   
(0.0003) 
-0.00006   
(0.0005) 
-0.0004    
(0.002)   
-0.0007*   
(0.0003) 
Population density 9.50e-08   
(0.00001) 
-0.00003   
(0.00002)   
0.00002    
(0.00005) 
4.31e-06   
(0.00002) 
RGDP -0.0001   
(0.0007) 
-0.0002   
(0.0008) 
-0.00002     
(0.0006) 
-0.0001  
  (0.0007) 
Provincial environmental spending 2.26e-08   
(3.50e-07) 
2.71e-08   
(3.74e-07) 
3.98e-07  
(9.81e-07) 
-5.37e-07   
(6.46e-07)   
Special grant for environment and 
forestry 
-0.297   
(0.631) 
-0.244   
(0.831) 
0.354    
(0.153) 
0.430    
(0.675) 
Mineral and Timber producing district 
group dummy 
-0.007    
0.022 
N/A -0.022    
(0.082) 
N/A 
Number observation 789 596 612 596 
No. group 199 149 173 149 
R2  (within) 0.38 0.23 0.39 0.23 
First stage F-test N/A N/A 16.23 N/A 
Time controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: 1.All fiscal variables are measured in real per capita terms. Figure in bracket is standard error. The signs ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, 10 per cent respectively. Robust standard error is clustered at district level.  
The econometric estimation on mineral and timber producing districts only in columns 
2 and 3 consistently shows positive effects of neighbours’ natural resource revenue over 
their districts’ environmental spending. To take into account the potential endogeneity 
with conditional grants for the environment, the two-stage least square is applied with 
102 
 
the number of rainy days in a year as the instrumental variable. The special criterion for 
conditional grant allocation is the lagged region where rain area is one of the indicators 
for determining the criteria of the lagged region. The two-stage estimation shows a 
slightly greater effect of neighbours’ natural resource-revenue sharing on own 
environmental spending. This finding provides evidence that neighbours’ pollution 
spillover serves as a channel for positive spatial interactions of environmental spending.    
3.4.5 Does the pollution impose cost? 
The positive response of a district over its neighbours’ shared natural resource revenue 
implies the existence of a cost it bears. One associated cost is that a district must 
provide greater health spending to cope with greater pollution impact. This study uses 
health spending to represent the environmental cost where the greater the damage, the 
greater the health cost needing to be covered by a local jurisdiction (Chen et al. 2016). 
Hence, a district’s environmental spending can impose a positive externality on its 
neighbouring districts through affecting its neighbours’ health expenditure. Previous 
studies (Chen et al. 2016; Narayan & Narayan 2007), have found that environmental 
quality plays a significant role in determining health care expenditure. The pollution 
spillover causes detrimental health effects to the residents of a district. It is reasonable 
to expect the positive correlation between pollution spillover and health spending.  
Specifically, this section examines whether a district’s environmental conditions have 
any effect on the public health spending of its neighbouring’ districts. The empirical 
model is specified as follows:    
hit = β1 Wij*Shared natural resource revenueit  + β2 Xit + ρt+ αi + єit ,  (4) 
where hit denotes a district’s health expenditure, w represents a spatial contiguity weight 
matrix. X is a vector of control variables which have been used in previous studies (see 
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Narayan & Narayan 2007), comprising total fiscal transfer revenue, percentage of 
population over 65 years old, unemployment rate, percentage of people in rural area, 
own-source revenue, poverty rate and literacy rate. εit is an error term with E(εit) = 0 for 
all i. αi denotes district fixed effects or districts’ unobserved heterogeneity, and ρt 
represents the time fixed effect which accounts for government policy change which 
may affect the health spending size. 
Table 3-8 shows the results of fixed effect estimation for health spending. Column 1 
shows estimation results for all districts. The positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for neighbours’ shared natural resource revenue implies that pollution by 
neighbours generates substantial losses for a district in terms of health costs. Every one 
million IDR increase in neighbouring districts’ shared natural resource revenue leads to 
23.000 IDR per capita higher health spending in own district. This result suggests and 
corroborates the argument that environmental quality in neighbouring districts imposes 
costs on own district. Fiscal transfers and own-source revenue play an important role in 
determining spending size as expected. However, among other demographic variables, 
only the percentage of population in rural areas significantly negatively affects health 
spending, suggesting that districts with greater sized rural areas have lower health 
expenditure.  
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Table 3-8 Econometric estimation results: Dependent variable (Health spending) 
Independent variables All districts 
  
Neighbours are 
mineral and timber 
producing districts 
Mineral and timber 
producing districts 
 1 2 3 
Neighbours’ Shared natural 
resource revenue 
 
0.023 **   
(0.009) 
0.024***  
(0.009) 
0.022**   
(0.009) 
Total transfer revenue 0.022**    
(0.009) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.022**   
(0.010) 
Own-source revenue  0.274***    
(0.044) 
0.299*** 
(0.055) 
0.264***   
(0.036) 
Literacy rate 0.0004    
(0.0005) 
-0.0003 
 (0.0003) 
0.001**    
(0.0004) 
Poverty rate -0.002    
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.006)   
Percentage of population 
over 65 
-0.010  
(0.067) 
-0.023 
(0.075) 
0.0002 
(0.070) 
Unemployment rate 0.003   
 (0.006) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.005    
(0.009) 
Percentage people in rural 
area 
-0.003*    
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.0009 
(0.0012) 
Number observation 764 570 574 
No. group 197 148 150 
R2  (within) 0.19 0.20 0.34 
Time controlled Yes Yes Yes 
Note: All fiscal variables are measured in real per capita terms. Figure in bracket is standard error. The signs ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at 1, 5, 10 per cent respectively. Robust standard error is clustered at district level. 
Column 2 in Table 3-8 shows the estimation only for districts neighbouring mineral-
producing districts. The effect on the magnitude of health costs is slightly greater when 
the neighbours are classified as mineral and timber producing districts25. Following 
Duvivier and Xiong’s (2012) findings that border jurisdiction residents are more highly 
exposed to pollution than inland jurisdictions, I estimate for mineral and timber 
producing districts only. Column 3 shows the estimation among mineral and timber 
producing districts with practically similar effects from neighbours’ shared resource 
revenue on a district’s own health spending.  
3.4.6 Is environmental spending in mineral and timber producing districts too low? 
The previous econometric estimations have found evidence of positive correlation in 
environmental spending among districts in Sumatera and Kalimantan Island, suggesting 
                                                 
25 Districts which do not have mineral and timber producing districts are excluded from this estimation.  
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a district will increase its own environmental spending in response to neighbours’ 
environmental spending. Given the low proportion of environmental spending in 
spending composition, and the importance of the extractive sector in the economy, the 
low environmental spending can be a potential channel of interaction for negative 
externality of spending spillover. Hence, districts with greater sized mining sectors must 
exert greater environmental spending to mitigate the environmental consequences 
caused. The lack of environmental spending makes districts unable to control 
environmental degradation. Worse environmental quality affects neighbouring districts 
and causes them to increase environmental spending to mitigate the environmental 
impacts.  
To investigate whether districts hosting extractive industries experience a lack of 
environmental spending, I split the districts based on the natural resource endowment. 
This follows the mineral-producing criteria by the Ministry of Energy and Mining and 
the Ministry of Forestry. I examine whether there is a systematic difference in average 
environmental expenditure between the mineral and timber producing districts group 
and non-producing ones with a t-test. Because natural resource exploitation in mineral-
producing districts can result in environmental problems, it is plausible to expect these 
districts would expend greater environmental spending than non-producing districts. 
However, the t-test results in a t-value of –0.33 with a p-value of 0.74, suggesting that 
there is no difference in environmental spending size. In this case, the average 
environmental spending in per capita term is 26.930 IDR per capita for mineral and 
timber producing districts, and 25.865 IDR per capita in non-producing districts.  
This suggests that although mineral and timber producing districts increase their 
environmental spending every year, the size of the increase does not cover the 
environmental conservation needed. One potential explanation for the lack of 
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environmental spending follows Qian and Roland (1998), that under a fiscal 
decentralization system, capital competition among local governments motivates them 
to provide growth-promoting infrastructure and not to offer socially inefficient services. 
Despite the lack of environmental spending in mineral-producing districts, this study 
does not argue that non-mineral and timber producing districts have allocated 
appropriate amounts of environmental spending. One important point is that the 
statistically insignificant difference in environmental spending between these two types 
of districts suggests that the lack of environmental spending makes the mineral-
producing districts unable to mitigate the environmental consequences associated with 
the extractive sector.  
3.5 Conclusions and policy implications 
This study finds positive and significant spatial interaction in environmental spending 
decisions among local governments in Sumatera and Kalimantan Island. The presence 
of pollution spillover, proxied by neighbours’ shared natural resource revenue, serves as 
the channel for positive spatial interaction. When a district suffers from pollution 
spillover from neighbouring districts, it must exert greater environmental spending to 
mitigate the impacts.  
This study provides evidence that neighbours’ pollution levels are strongly associated 
with increases in a district’s health spending. The lack of environmental spending in 
mineral and timber producing districts makes these districts unable to overcome the 
environmental consequences effectively. It worsens the environmental problems and 
adversely affects its sharing border-neighbours, forcing the neighbouring districts to add 
extra environmental spending to counteract the worse environmental impact.  
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The fact that spatial interdependence plays an important role in the setting of 
environmental policy and the lack of environmental spending may pose challenges for 
local governments in paying for environmental conservation. To ensure local 
governments play their strategic role in conserving the environment, central government 
can do some policies, including (1) providing greater support to local government to 
address better environmental protection efforts, (2) taxing the polluter consistent with 
its cross-border impact and using these monies to compensate the “victim” jurisdiction 
and (3) adopting a Coasean solution between the polluting and the victim jurisdictions 
for the polluter to make such a compensation without any central government 
involvement. 
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4. EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF REGIONAL INCENTIVE 
FUNDS TO DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS IN INDONESIA 
Abstract 
 
This study aims to examine whether the recipients of Indonesian government’s fiscal 
incentive, Regional Incentive Fund, increase their education spending. The concern of 
likely perverse impact of intergovernmental fiscal transfer on local governments’ fiscal 
behavior has motivated this study. Using difference in difference approach for three 
periods of analysis, 2009–2010, 2009–2011 and 2009–2012, this study finds evidence 
that the RIF allocation has positive impact on education spending in recipient districts. 
However, the increase in education spending is smaller in the subsequent years. The 
smaller increment in education spending suggests the potential presence of the 
fungibility, where the recipient local governments substitute their budget for education 
spending with the money from the RIF. This study highlights the importance of 
designing the appropriate conditionalities embedded in the fund.  
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4.1 Introduction 
The Indonesian government has put great attention on the education sector and allocated 
significant fiscal transfers to promote the education sector at the local level. In addition 
to conditional grants for the education sector, the fiscal incentive provision through the 
Regional Incentive Fund (abbreviated as RIF in this paper) has been allocated to 
selected local governments. Through this incentive, the central government helps to 
promote greater investment in the education sector. However, the literature indicates 
negative effects of fiscal transfers on local governments’ fiscal behaviour (Gamkhar & 
Shah 2007; Shah 2007). Due to the fungibility of grants, diversion of transfer funds to 
other unintended spending is commonly found and will dampen the effectiveness of the 
fiscal transfers. Hence, carefully designed fiscal transfers are crucial to successfully 
achieving the objectives of the fiscal transfers 
Central government, as the grantor of money to local governments, demands optimum 
output from the transfer, which requires recipient local governments use the funds with 
high effectiveness in supporting their education spending. This can be done by 
conditioning or earmarking fiscal transfers with certain criteria or reference to ensure 
proper use. For RIF, it is tied to the education function. Despite the conditions imposed, 
both on access to and use of the funds, previous studies in the literature suggest the 
potential of fungibility in conditional grants (see Smart & Bird 2009; Shah 2007; Islam 
1998). The presence of fungibility can lower the provision of public services because 
the reallocation of funds does not increase the targeted spending (see Dieleman et al. 
2015).  
Given its features, the regional incentive fund can be classified as a conditional block 
grant, where recipients have discretion over the use of the fund. This grant is earmarked 
to education spending of recipients. Since its introduction in 2010, the central 
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government had allocated more than one trillion IDR of RIF every year. On average, 
each RIF recipient district receives almost 20 billion IDR every year of allocation, 
which is slightly lower than total conditional grants for the education sector, amounting 
to 22 billion IDR per district. For some districts this amount is almost the same size as 
their own-source revenue, or around 4% of total fiscal transfers, and around 3% of total 
revenue. The Binjai city collected around 19 billion IDR from its own-source revenue 
but received 21 billion IDR from RIF in 2010. Interestingly, Jombang regency received 
RIF in three consecutive years, 2010, 2011 and 2012. Compared to other RIF recipients, 
the amount of RIF this district received remained around 19 billion IDR, but the 
percentage of RIF over own-source revenue declined from around 17% in 2010 to 12% 
in 201226. 
Whether this type of transfer can successfully achieve its expected target, leveraging 
investment in the education sector, is mostly unknown. In particular, the presence of 
fungibility can hamper the optimum benefit of this fund. Given the significant amount 
of money compared to other types of conditional transfers, and the strategic role of the 
education sector in promoting economic development, government needs to ensure that 
the recipients use this transfer effectively. Hence, this study aims to investigate whether 
RIF encourages recipients to make greater education expenditure27. The findings of this 
study will highlight whether this earmarked grant model is effective in promoting 
greater education spending. 
Because the composition of RIF recipients is changing every year of allocation, the 
estimation is conducted for each year of allocation to ensure the consistency of the 
estimation for education spending by RIF recipients. Using a difference in difference 
                                                 
26 The consistent increase in own-source revenue contributed to the ability of Jombang regency to 
maintain its recipient status. 
27 The RIF can only be used to support the recipients to perform their education function, which has broad 
coverage. This education function does not only cover school and student related expenditures, but also 
for non-students, such as training for drop out children and for literacy program for the elderly.  
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approach, this study analyses three periods of RIF allocation, 2009–2010, 2009–2011 
and 2009–2012, where 2009 is treated as the baseline year, and other years serve as the 
allocation year of RIF or treatment year. By splitting the analysis by period of allocation 
year, this can maintain consistency of analysis and find the increment of education 
spending for every year of allocation. By looking at how education spending increases 
in RIF recipients, the issue of fungibility can be investigated (see van de Walle & Mu 
2008; Gordon 2004). The findings of this study can contribute to enrich the literature on 
fiscal transfer design which is still limited for the case of Indonesia, and provide an 
analysis to the Indonesian government for use in designing its fiscal incentives to local 
governments.   
This paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a literature review about 
conditional fiscal transfers and fungibility. The third section elaborates fiscal transfers 
in Indonesia and section four elaborates the regional incentive fund. Section five 
focuses on data and methodology and is followed by interpretation. Section six 
discusses the results and output-based fiscal transfers. Section seven provides 
conclusions and policy considerations. 
4.2 Literature review 
One dimension of fiscal decentralization is concerned with the degree of spending 
autonomy granted to local governments in financing local governments’ public services. 
Three types of transfers are commonly found in practice, general purpose transfers, 
specific or special purpose transfers, and sectorally limited block allocations (Schroeder 
& Smoke 2002). General purpose grants or unconditional grants enlarge local 
governments’ resources and impose no specific purposes. This type of transfer is 
classified as a non-earmarked transfer or grant, where local governments can use them 
based on their discretion. By contrast, with conditional or earmarked transfers, central 
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government can ensure local governments use the funds as expected to achieve national 
service delivery targets in certain sector areas, such as education and health, and ask 
local governments undertake specific programs in implementing national programs. 
Smart and Bird (2009) distinguish earmarked transfers into three classifications, (i) 
open-ended matching for which the transfer amount paid is a fixed share of the amount 
spent on assisted spending, (ii) closed-ended matching grants earmark spending to 
certain limits, and (iii) categorical block grants, which are conditional on the recipient 
government meeting certain conditions with respect to its spending in the targeted 
category. Sectorally limited block allocation allows the recipient government to choose 
how funds are to be used, but only within a particular sector; hence this transfer is less 
restrictive than specific transfers. Therefore, this transfer can be classified as a 
conditional grant.  
Both earmarked and non-earmarked grants can be either mandatory or discretionary 
(OECD 2006). Mandatory grants are ruled by laws and lay out specific size and rules-
based obligations for central government to provide this type of grant. Under the 
discretionary basis, the sizes of discretionary grants, and the conditions under which 
they are given, are decided on an ad hoc basis. Discretionary grants are often temporary 
and are not usually aimed at addressing fiscal imbalances.   
Unconditional and conditional grants can have perverse effects on local governments’ 
fiscal behaviour. Although unconditional transfers provide greater flexibility for local 
governments to use, they can dampen local revenue mobilization and local spending, 
called the flypaper effect (Smart 2007). Similarly, conditional transfers do not guarantee 
local governments’ greater spending due to the fungibility effect. Hence, the proper 
design of fiscal transfers is crucial to ensure efficient service delivery. As Smart (2007) 
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argues, the results of intergovernmental grants, whether they are positive or negative, 
depend on the incentives embedded into the grants system. 
4.2.1 Fungibility in intergovernmental fiscal transfers  
In order to get local governments to implement specific programs with high national 
priority, the central government provides special fiscal transfers aimed to support local 
governments to implement the programs. However, different objectives and preferences 
between central government and local governments, as recipients of fiscal transfers, can 
lead to unintended use of the fiscal transfers. Local governments reallocate certain fiscal 
transfers, intended to support national priorities, to other spending which is considered 
to have greater priority at local level, leading to fungibility, Hence, the fiscal transfer is 
fungible when it substitutes rather than supplements local spending. 
The World Bank (1998) states that fungibility is less likely to occur when the amount of 
aid is large relative to the recipient's budget. In line with this argument, Shah (2006) 
posits the fungibility of conditional grants depends on both the level of spending on the 
assisted public service and the level of priority of the assisted spending. If the 
recipient’s own-financed expenditure exceeds the amount of the conditional grant, the 
conditionality of the grant may not influence the recipient’s spending behaviour.  
Concern about fungibility emphasizes the importance of conditioning or earmarking 
grants to ensure effectiveness. Information asymmetry between central and local 
governments, risk mitigation, coordination efforts among tiers of governments, and the 
promotion of performance of lower governments are some reasons which support the 
need for conditionality (Spahn 2012). In the context of international aid, Collier et al. 
(1997) identify four rationales for conditionality: (a) inducement, where the donor offers 
aid as an incentive to reform the recipient’s policies, (b) paternalism, where the donors 
believe they know the right policies for the recipient’s welfare, (c) restraint, the need for 
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instruments to safeguard the commitments of recipients, (d) signalling, indicating 
commitment to reform.  
Two theoretical approaches have been used to conceptualize conditionality (see the 
World Bank 2005). The first approach is through a principal-agent framework where the 
principal offers a contract that provides the agent with an appropriate incentive to align 
their respective objectives but the agent has private information on the ability, 
opportunities, and intentions that affect the action it takes and ultimately the principal’s 
objective. In this framework, the principal (the central government) can unilaterally 
alter any existing arrangements it may have with its agents (local governments) in order 
to overcome familiar agency problems of information asymmetry and differences in 
objectives between its agents and itself. 
The second approach is through the political economy framework. The imposition of 
conditionality is needed to counteract domestic conflicting interests between the 
government and special interest groups. These groups can affect the government’s 
ability to use reform through several actions, such as strikes. In this framework, the 
central government (as the donor) needs to bind local governments with a set of rules 
which ensure the local governments allocate the transfers to targeted sectors or 
activities. The practice of collusion is commonly found in project procurement which 
involves parties close to local government officials.  
The same principle also applies in the area of intergovernmental fiscal transfer. Bird and 
Smart (2002) suggest that conditionality must be attached in the fiscal transfer feature. 
The main motivation to add conditionality in transfer design is money fungibility28. 
                                                 
28 Morrissey (2006, p. 334) distinguishes three elements of fungibility: (i) general fungibility, which 
arises where aid intended for a general purpose is used for another (for instance, consumption instead of 
investment expenditure); (ii) categorical fungibility, describing the use of aid intended for a particular 
sector or budget heading for another, for example, use on defence instead of health; and (iii) additionality, 
which describes the possibility that even if aid resources are used for the intended expenditure, they might 
115 
 
There is no guarantee the recipient local governments will in fact use the funds they 
receive as the central government might wish. Therefore, some conditionalities are often 
desirable to ensure the proper use of fiscal transfer funds. This is in particular for 
national priorities, including education and environment, which are delivered by local 
governments. The introduction of conditionalities is applied for conditional grants 
which can bring elements of local involvement, accountability and responsibility. Bird 
and Smart (2002) suggest the use of matching components as conditionality.  
The literature in public finance suggests two types of conditionality can be imposed in 
conditional or earmarked fiscal transfers. Input-based conditionality specifies the type 
of expenditure that can be financed, and output-based conditionality requires the 
attainment of a certain level of service delivery (Shah 2009). However, input-based 
conditionality is considered to be unproductive because it distorts local government 
priorities. On the other hand, an output-based model conditions the transfer on the 
results to be achieved. Local governments have discretion in the activities implemented 
using the transfer monies, but they must achieve certain output-related measures.  
Although the purpose of making fiscal transfers conditional is to ensure the intended 
use, previous studies have found fungibility in conditional grants (see Duan & Zhan 
2011; Wagstaff 2008; Gordon 2004; Islam 1998). The findings of these studies suggest 
that the right design of conditionalities is needed to ensure the effectiveness of fiscal 
transfers. The lack of effectiveness of input-based conditionality has highlighted the 
importance of monitoring the targeted sector or spending. As Morrissey (2006) argues, 
conditionality should not be the focus, but it should be on monitoring of the 
effectiveness of spending. The lack of monitoring on the use of grants opens 
opportunities for fungibility. Chatterjee et al. (2007) argue that the high cost of 
                                                                                                                                               
free up the recipient government’s own resources allocated to that area to be used elsewhere so that 
allocations to the intended purposes do not increase by the full amount of aid. 
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monitoring drives greater potential for fungibility. The literature on intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers has suggested linking fiscal transfers with certain measurements or 
performances to ensure effectiveness (see Shah 2007, 2010). In this way, central 
government can monitor the results of transfers and ensure the effectiveness of the 
transfers. 
4.3 Fiscal Transfer in Indonesia 
In general, there are two types of central government transfers to local governments in 
Indonesia. They can be done through balancing funds and adjustment funds. Unlike the 
balancing fund, which aims to reduce horizontal and vertical inequality in fiscal 
capacity among layers of governments, the adjustment fund serves as an additional 
support to local governments by taking into account the strategic nature of certain 
regions and sectors. The balancing funds are the major source of revenue for local 
governments, averaging 80% of total revenue. Figure 4-1 below shows trends in the size 
of each type of revenue source in RIF recipients and non-recipients.  
The average composition of fiscal transfers in RIF recipients accounts for 70% of total 
revenue, which is lower than non-recipients, accounting for around over 80%. This 
suggests significant transfer dependency in non-RIF recipients. The average own-source 
revenue over total revenue is higher in RIF recipients compared to non-RIF recipients, 
accounting for 12% and 7% respectively. With regard to spending size, the composition 
of education spending over total spending in RIF recipients is greater than non-RIF 
recipients. In 2010, education spending accounted for 36% in RIF recipients, which is 
greater than non-RIF recipients accounting for 30%. However, the increase in education 
spending has been slowing down in RIF recipients. From 2010 to 2011, education 
spending increased from 36% to 39.7%, almost 4%, compared to around 3% in non-RIF 
recipients. From 2011 to 2012, the increment in education spending between RIF and 
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non-RIF recipients was practically identical, around 2%. On the other hand, the size of 
RIF over total revenue in RIF recipients is quite significant, accounting for 3% of total 
revenue. 
Figure 4-1 The composition of revenue and education spending in RIF and Non-
RIF recipients 
 
Source: Own calculation based on MoF data. Education spending is the percentage of total spending. 
4.4  Regional Incentive Fund 
The Indonesian government has invested sizable funding in the education sector to 
enhance the quality of its human capital. The commitment to education was realized by 
passing a constitutional mandate to allocate at least 20 percent of the total government 
budget to the education sector. Law number 20/2003 about the National Education 
System requires governments to allocate at least 20% of their budget for education 
spending. Table 4-1 displays the average ratio of education expenditure over total 
spending. The average ratio of education spending accounts for 36% in RIF recipients, 
which is greater than non-recipients, accounting for 29% in 2010. The ratio was still 
greater in RIF recipients in 2012.  
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 Table 4-1 Average education spending over total spending (in million IDR per 
capita) 
Group 2010 2011 2012 
RIF recipients 0.36 0.38 0.39 
Non-Recipients 0.29 0.33 0.35 
Source: Own calculation based on data from Indodapoer and MoF. 
The World Bank (2013) reports that with the 20% rule, the percentage of education 
spending over total spending makes Indonesia one of the top spenders among peer 
countries, such as Norway and Singapore. However, in terms of total gross output, at 
3.7 per cent of GDP, Indonesia spends less than Thailand, Vietnam or Malaysia in the 
region, and spends half as much as high-income, high-performing countries such as 
Norway. There is concern about a greater portion of education spending going to 
primary education.  
Dana Insentif Daerah or Regional Incentive Fund (RIF), is a type of transfer, called an 
adjustment fund, allocated to certain regions taking into account certain criteria to 
perform the functions of education. This fund aims to provide broad support in the 
education sector while the recipients have discretion in allocating its use to specific 
purposes, as long as it is supporting the education function. The expenditure falling into 
the education function covers a broad area, from formal education to non-formal. The 
formal sector includes primary to high school education. On the other hand, non-formal 
education includes programs such as vocational training, literacy programs for elders, 
and life skills training. The literature recognizes this transfer as a block grant, where it 
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provides budget support with no strings attached in a broad but specific area of 
subnational expenditure.29  
Among central government’s fiscal incentives to local governments, only Dana Insentif 
Daerah or Regional Incentive Fund (RIF) clearly specifies criteria for grant eligibility. 
This model adopts a selectivity model where local governments with better scores or 
indexes will be eligible for RIF. These criteria apparently serve two functions, (i) to 
incentivize local governments to compete to produce good performance, as shown by 
the good score for each indicator, and (ii) to screen eligible recipients in a more 
objective approach. Hence, a local government must meet the aggregate criteria or 
indicators and rank highly to be eligible for this transfer. The benefit of the multi 
indicators approach is that central government can target local governments’ better 
public services in specific areas. In the literature, this approach is known as a 
‘selectivity index’, rewarding local governments to race to the top. Zinnes (2009) coins 
this approach as pure tournaments, as while all eligible players may compete, only those 
with the best performances win the rewards. 
At the first introduction, certain criteria are defined as the basis for determining the 
receiving area and calculating the amount of the allocation of RIF, covering an area of 
achievement that meets the criteria of financial and economic performance and welfare, 
as well as considering clean and good governance. The criteria set out include primary 
criteria and performance criteria and the provision of a minimum allocation. The 
primary criteria include at least getting a qualified opinion from the financial audit 
office, and timely annual budget approval. The performance criteria include financial 
                                                 
29 In literature, the regional incentive fund can be classified as block grant, where the recipients are 
granted discretion over the use of the fund as long as the fund used for education sector. However, the 
demarcation between block grant and conditional grant is vaguely defined (Shah 2006). For the analysis, I 
consider RIF as conditional grant. 
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performance criteria, education performance, economic and welfare performance 
criteria.   
Financial criteria are established to assess regions’ performance. The criteria include the 
capacity to improve and maintain the quality of local government finance reports from 
the Audit Board, the timely completion of annual regional budgets, increasing own-
source revenue above the national average, and conveying local government finance 
reports to the Audit Board in a timely manner each year. 
The education performance criteria are defined as an element of assessment of the 
performance and efforts of the education sector. The criteria is the districts which are 
able to achieve gross elementary enrolment above the national average and/or areas that 
are able to achieve a Gross Enrolment Ratio in Junior Secondary above the national 
average, and districts which are able to reduce their distance on the Human 
Development Index from the Human Development Index base (100) above the national 
average. 
Economic Performance and Welfare are the established criteria as an element of 
assessment of the economic growth rate which is above the average rate of national 
economic growth, the reduction in the poverty rate above the average national poverty 
reduction, reduction of the unemployment rate above the average national 
unemployment rate reduction, and the higher Human Development Index above or 
below the national average.  
The regional incentive fund is not classified as a type of balancing fund, but serves as a 
reward for well-performing districts and provides incentives to support recipients in 
performing the education function. The use of this fund is not only aimed at providing 
better school infrastructure, but also improving non-student and school spending. The 
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city of Gresik allocated funding for school renovation and built new schools for both 
private and public schools. The city of Yogyakarta used this fund to provide training for 
youth labour to support business development.  
Unlike other types of fiscal transfer, the regional incentive fund (RIF) is allocated to 
only the selected local governments and is earmarked for restricted use in the education 
sector only. The use of this approach follows previous studies suggesting the need to 
earmark the fund with conditionality to reduce the fund’s fungibility. RIF provision 
aims to encourage regions to manage their finances better, as demonstrated by the 
acquisition of Audit Board opinion on the financial statements of local government, and 
to encourage the region to strive to budget in a timely manner. This transfer is 
considered a reward from central government to recipient local governments for above-
standard performance, both economic and social performance. This incentive is 
intended to support education expenditure, or other types of spending related to 
education. Activities which cannot be financed by this incentive include matching funds 
for Special Allocation Grants or Dana Alokasi Khusus (DAK), DAK-financed activities, 
School Support Assistance, bureaucratic training, and grants to locally owned 
companies. Hence, this transfer is allocated through an ad hoc model and can be 
classified as a specific transfer. 
The RIF has allocated more than 1 trillion IDR every year, with each recipient receiving 
around 20 billion IDR. It is apparent that to maintain this significant amount, the fund is 
allocated to only a few districts, which are strictly selected. Table 4-2 shows the 
increase in RIF in 2011 compared to 2010, from 960 billion IDR in 2010 to more than 1 
trillion IDR in 2011. The number of recipients also increased in tandem with the 
increase in RIF allocation, from 45 in 2010 to 55 in 2011.   
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Table 4-2 The development of RIF allocation 
Year District/Municipalities Provinces Total  
 Number Amount (in 
IDR trillion) 
Number Amount 
(in IDR 
trillion) 
Number Amount (in IDR 
trillion) 
2010 45 0.9 9 0.3 54 1.2 
2011 55 1.2 5 0.2 60 1.4 
2012 55 1.2 10 0.2 66 1.4 
Source: Audited fiscal transfer report for various years 
Note: Figures in IDR are rounded 
4.5 Data and Methodology 
The analysis draws mainly on three sources of data. At the core is the panel data on 
Indonesian local governments’ public finances, which is obtained from the Directorate 
General of Finance Balance at the Ministry of Finance. This study also benefits from the 
World Bank INDODAPOER database and Statistics Office publications for various 
years. All economic and fiscal data are real term data, where nominal data are deflated 
by each district’s RGDP deflator. Districts are defined as the third level of government, 
the kabupaten or regency, and kota or municipality. Special Region Jakarta is excluded 
from the sample. 
The variables used for analytical purposes are listed in Table 4-3 and split into RIF 
recipient and non-RIF recipient districts. The districts included are those which existed 
between 2009 and 2012. This table provides summary statistics for all variables used in 
the analysis. Spending, transfer and economic variables are in rupiah. Table 4-3 
indicates significant differences in both education spending and eligibility variables. 
The average education spending per capita in RIF recipient districts was 392.301 IDR 
for the period 2009–2012. The recipient districts had a greater average increase in own-
source revenue, audit opinion status, and poverty rates. Smaller gaps with ideal values 
on the Human Development Index were found in RIF recipients. This description 
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appears to give early insights into positive effects of education spending in RIF 
recipient districts. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-3 Descriptive Statistic (2009–2012) 
 Variable RIF Recipient  Non-RIF Recipient  
 
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Education 
spending 
155 0.401 0.249 0.066 1,502 1741 0.363 0.462 0 13,707 
Total transfer 155 0.924 1.342 0.151 12.543 1778 1.268 2.031 0.046 34.472 
Own-source 
revenue 
Increase (%) 
155 24.45 28.89 
–
53.11 
168.67 1778 24.02 51.20 0.3 231.2 
RGDP Per 
capita (in IDR 
million) 
155 8.68 6.68 1.71 47.48 1778 8.03 11.01 0.89 173.11 
Audit opinion 155 2.9 0.4 1.0 3.0 1778 2.5 0.8 1.0 3.0 
HDI gap 142 –38.6 27.8 –100 –19.49 1789 –40.2 26.3 –100 20 
Economic 
growth (%) 
155 7.2 2.2 2.7 18.9 1775 5.9 8.7 0.7 120.57 
Timeliness of 
delivery of 
approved 
budget 
155 1.8 2.4 1 3 1778 2.1 2.6 1 3 
Poverty rate 
decline (%) 
155 –0.54 0.87 –3 2.85 1785 –0.74 4.32 
–
29.17 
47.82 
Unemployme
nt rate gap 
155 –0.40 1.3 –6.9 4.3 1753 –0.33 3.85 
–
88.52 
52.79 
Student 
enrolment rate 
152 92.2 3.7 77.2 99.25 1731 92.2 8.2 6.6 100 
People 15–
64(% of 
population) 
155 83.4 65.6 75.5 96.0 1775 94.3 56.6 89.2 98.6 
People in 
urban (%) 
155 55.5 34.4 0.0 100.0 1775 34.3 30.4 0.0 100.0 
Population 155 630671 
58534
2 
62580 2765487 1778 
45856
4 
55335
3 
6144 4989939 
Note: Education spending and total fiscal transfer are measured in IDR million in constant (2000) per 
capita terms, converted using the implicit GDP deflator.  
4.5.1 Methodology 
It is an objective of policy makers to ensure that programs are designed to achieve 
expected outcomes in an effective manner. The central impact evaluation question is 
124 
 
what would have happened to those receiving the intervention if they had not in fact 
received the program. Hence, the basic question is whether the participants in the 
program, or the treated group, achieve expected outcomes.  
Estimating the impact of a program only on a treated group will make a biased 
estimation because the results are independent of other factors which may affect the 
result, and there is non-randomness. Random treatment is crucial to ensure to avoid self-
selection bias and other factors which may affect the selection of program participants, 
called purposive program placement (Khandker et al. 2010, p.25). For selection of RIF, 
districts’ participation is not random, because the selection is based on certain 
indicators. Hence, districts with better scores have a greater chance of participating in 
the program. Estimating the effect of participation in the RIF program is confounded by 
possible correlation between outcomes and the district’s economic and financial 
performance. It has also been argued that selection bias would disappear if one could 
assume that whether or not households or individuals receive treatment (conditional on 
a set of covariates, X) was independent of the outcomes they have. This assumption is 
called the assumption of unconfoundedness, also referred to as the conditional 
independence assumption (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1985).  
To address the problem of selection bias, one needs to compare the situation of a treated 
group against a situation where the program had not existed, called a counterfactual. 
However, we cannot observe two situations simultaneously. Hence, we need to create a 
convincing and reasonable comparison group for the treated group. This comparison 
group or control group has similar characteristics to the treated group, such that the 
outcome of the treated group would be similar to the comparison group in the absence 
of treatment. Hence, the crucial role of the control group is to mimic the treated group if 
the treated group had not been exposed to the program. The literature recognizes several 
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approaches to identifying a control group for a program. The most widely used type of 
matching is propensity score matching, in which the comparison group is matched to 
the treatment group by using the predicted probability of participation given observed 
characteristics, called the propensity score. This method allows one to find a 
comparison group from a sample of non-participants closest in terms of observable 
characteristics to a sample of program participants. 
An estimate of program impact can then be derived by comparing the levels of expected 
outcomes between comparison/control groups and the treated group. It is possible to 
apply a framework with two potential outcomes YT, an outcome for treated districts, and 
YC representing the control group, or group which does not receive the incentive. The 
observed outcome for individual district i can be written as Yi =TiYi
T + (1-Ti) Yi
C, 
where T∈{0,1} indicates treatment status, with T=1 if treated and 0 if non-treated.  
This study uses difference in difference (DiD) methodology to evaluate the impact of 
RIF. DiD essentially compares treatment and comparison groups in terms of outcome 
changes over time relative to the outcomes observed for a pre-intervention baseline. The 
difference is calculated between the observed mean outcomes for the treatment and 
control groups before and after program intervention. A simple framework to estimate 
program impact with difference in difference approach can use the following matrix: 
Group Base year Treated year Difference 
Treated group (1) Y0
T Y1
T ∆YT = Y1T  - Y0T   
Control group (0) Y0
C Y1
C ∆YC = Y1C – Y0C 
Difference   ∆∆Y= ∆YT - ∆YC 
The DiD approach compares outcomes between treatment and comparison groups over 
time relative to the outcomes observed for a pre-intervention baseline. That is, given a 
two-period setting where t = 0 before the program or baseline, and t = 1 after program 
implementation, letting Yt
T and Yt
C be the respective outcomes for a program treated 
and non-treated groups in time t, the DiD method will estimate the average program 
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impact as follows: DiD= E(Y1
T – Y0T │T=1) - E(Y1C – Y0C │T=0), where T denotes 1 
for treatment, and 0 for non-treatment.  
Following Angrist and Krueger (1999), the rationale of the difference in difference 
approach lies in terms of restrictions on the conditional mean function for potential 
outcomes in the absence of the program. Let Y0i be district i’s education spending in the 
absence of the regional incentive fund (RIF), and Y1i be i's education spending with the 
presence of RIF. The DiD method identifies causal effects by restricting the conditional 
mean function of district i in time t, E[Y0i |i, t]. Suppose that E[Yoi (i,t)] = β0 +ui , that 
is, in the absence of RIF, education spending can be written as the sum of a year effect 
that is common to all districts and a district effect that is fixed over time. Suppose the 
effect of RIF on audit opinion is simply to add a constant (γ ) :E[Y1i (i,t)] = E[Yoi (i,t)] 
+ γ. 
Hence, the audit opinion between the treated and control groups between two periods 
can be written as: 
Yit = β0 +β1 Tit + β2 Ti + β 3 ti + εit ; 
where T is the dummy of treated districts, t is a time dummy variable suggesting the 
change in expected outcome over the periods, and the coefficient of the interaction of T 
and t gives the estimate of the impact of treatment on outcome Y. The expected change 
due to intervention in the econometric model can be decomposed as follows: 
Group Base year Treated year Difference 
Treated group (1) β0 + β2 β0 + β1 + β2 + β3 ∆YT = β1 + β3 
Control group (0) β0 β0 + β3 ∆YC = β3 
Change   ∆∆Y= β1 
Unlike the control group, which consists only of an initial condition in a base year, the 
treated group includes both initial condition and intervention status. In a treated year, 
the expected change of outcome in the control group consists of the initial condition and 
the policy carried out during the period of interest. For the treated group, the expected 
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change in the mean outcome consists of the intervention effect and the time effect. The 
total effect is shown by the interactive variable between the year and a treatment 
dummy, which is the variable of interest. This interaction variable suggests the 
treatment effect of the program. Hence, β1 is the causal effect of the program over the 
expected outcome, or similar to β1 = (Y1T  - Y0T ) -  (Y1C – Y0C). 
To account for endogeneity from unobserved effects, this model can be estimated with 
fixed-effects regression controls for households’ unobserved and time-invariant 
characteristics that may influence the outcome variable. A fixed-effects or difference 
estimator can account for such unobserved heterogeneity, and observed heterogeneity 
can also be accounted for through methods such as propensity score matching before 
making the pipeline comparison (Galasso & Ravallion 2004). 
Propensity score matching (PSM) 
The changes over time in the outcome indicator will result in heterogeneity in 
observables, which would bias an unmatched difference in difference approach 
(Ravallion 2003). Hence, combining PSM for selecting the comparison group with DiD 
can reduce the bias found in other evaluation methods, including single difference 
matching. This approach constructs a comparison group by modelling the probability of 
participating in the program on the basis of observed characteristics unaffected by the 
program. The propensity score of each district is obtained from a probit estimation 
depicting the probability of receiving RIF (treated group) given the explanatory variable 
vector. The treated districts are matched with non-treated districts based on the 
estimated propensity score; the closer the score, the better the match: 
𝑃𝑆 (i) = Probability (Treated district) = 1│ 𝑿 = i 
where 𝑿 is a vector of pre-exposure control variables which determine the probability of 
receiving RIF. 
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These explanatory variables are employed to explain the characteristics of districts 
which can be classified as treated districts. The variables used in the matching 
procedure are based on variables in the selection criteria in determining RIF eligibility. 
Applying PSM could help match treatment units with observationally similar control 
units before estimating the DiD impact. Specifically, the PSM estimates the base year 
and then conducts a DiD on the units that remain in the common support. Studies show 
that weighting the control observations according to their propensity score yields a fully 
efficient estimator (Hirano, Imbens, &Ridder 2003).  
The three important assumptions in the PSM approach are the Conditional 
Independence Assumption (CIA), which follows unconfoundedness, and common 
support. Common support requires the positive predictability of participation for both 
groups given X is as follows: 0 < P(T = 1|X) < 1. It ensures that persons with the same 
X values have a positive probability of being both participants and non-participants 
(Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 1999). Hence, the validity of PSM depends on two 
conditions: (a) conditional independence (namely, that unobserved factors do not affect 
participation) and (b) sizable common support or overlap in propensity scores across the 
participant and nonparticipant samples. 
The core assumption to identify the treatment effect in difference-in-difference 
estimators is the so-called common trend assumption or parallel path, which posits that 
the average change in the comparison group represents the counterfactual change in the 
treatment group if there were no treatment. In other words, that the average change in 
outcome for the treated group in the absence of treatment equals the average change in 
outcome for the non-treated. 
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4.5.2 Econometric estimation results 
Before estimating the impact of RIF on education spending with the DiD method, 
propensity score matching is conducted to derive a control group to ensure that the 
control group is comparable to treatment group on which it is based. Non-recipient 
districts whose propensity scores are within similar ranges as recipient districts are 
considered as the matched comparison. The propensity score is a measure of the 
probability of a district to receive the RIF. The score is estimated on the set of 
observable covariates, which determine the propensity to receive RIF. Hence, districts 
with better criteria have greater propensity scores and greater probability of receiving 
the funds. Because the RIF eligibility criteria and scoring system are clearly defined, the 
unobservable covariates do not influence the probability of receiving RIF30.  
The propensity score is derived by regressing the eligibility variables in the base year 
for non-RIF recipients. The variables used are audit opinion, the timeliness of the 
annual budget report, the change in poverty rate, own-source revenue, the Human 
Development Index, unemployment rate, economic growth and student enrolment rate. 
Over three consecutive years of annual planned budget reporting, districts are scored 1 
for timely reporting, and 0 for late submission. The ideal value (100) applies for HDI, 
and the national average standard applies for student enrolment rates and unemployment 
rates. The growth variable applies for own-source revenue and economic output 
(economic growth). The gap from the national average applies for HDI, student 
enrolment rates, and poverty rates.   
The next step in propensity score estimation is to check if the balancing property is 
satisfied. The propensity scores of receiving RIF for non-RIF recipient districts are 
grouped with a similar range of propensity scores with RIF recipients or treated 
                                                 
30 One potential unobserved covariate is the subjectivity of financial audit results. However, given the 
professionality of the auditors, this assumption can be neglected. 
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districts. Districts in a similar group or block have similar characteristics for receiving 
the RIF. This ensures that the same treatment and control observations are compared. 
Hence, we can use non-recipient districts with similar blocks as recipient districts as 
control groups. Those districts whose scores fall out of the range are dropped. The PSM 
is conducted through districts in the base year, the year 2009, for every period of 
analysis. The periods of analysis include 2009–2010, 2009–2011 and 2009–2012. 
For 2009–2010 45 districts received RIF and 440 did not receive the RIF as shown in 
Table 4-4. The PSM estimation excludes 78 non-RIF recipient districts in the base year 
and split the score into three blocks. The t-test value suggests that the scores between 
recipients and non-recipients (in 2010) were not different. In block 3, the estimation 
does not find a match between recipients and non-recipients. The PSM estimation result 
shows that the propensity score balancing property is satisfied and non-recipient 
districts with propensity scores falling into a similar range as the treated districts are 
treated as a control group. 
Table 4-5 shows that the PSM estimation drops 402 non-recipient districts for the period 
of 2009–2011 with three blocks of propensity scores ranges. 28 non-RIF recipients are 
excluded and 402 districts are used for control groups for DiD estimation for the period 
of 2009–2011. Table 4-6 shows PSM estimation for the period 2009–2012. 69 non-
treated districts in the base year are dropped and only 361 districts are used as a control 
group in this period. The t-test value confirms the propensity score average in each 
block is not different. The sizable unit in the control group has met the common support 
assumption.  
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Table 4-4 Propensity score balancing property-2009–2010 
Block Group Observation Mean t-test 
1 Control 329 0.089 
(0.002) 
 
 Treated 30 0.095 
(0.007) 
t =  –1.55 
2 Control 33 0.264 
(0.008) 
 
 Treated 13 0.244 
(0.009) 
t =   1.32 
3 Control 0 n.a n.a 
 Treated 2 n.a n.a 
Total Control 362   
 Treated 45   
 
 
Table 4-5 Propensity score balancing property-2009–2011 
Block Group Observation Mean t-test 
1 Control 361 0.123 
(0.001) 
 
 Treated 36 0.122     
(0.005) 
t =  0.112 
2 Control 40 0.299    
(0.004) 
 
 Treated 18 0.318    
(0.008) 
t =  –1.62 
3 Control 1 n.a. n.a 
 Treated 1 n.a n.a 
Total Control 402   
 Treated 55   
 
Table 4-6 Propensity score balancing property 2009–2012 
Block Group Observation Mean t-test 
1 Control 349 0.123     
(0.001) 
 
 Treated 52 0.125     
(0.004) 
t =  –1.2656 
2 Control 12 0.243 
(0.010) 
 
 Treated 3 0.212     
(0.034) 
t =  –0.892 
3 Control 0 n.a n.a 
 Treated 1 n.a n.a 
Total Control 361   
 Treated 55   
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Difference-in-difference estimators assume that in the absence of treatment the 
difference between control and its counterfactual groups would be constant over time. 
Although the counterfactual is not observable, the derived control group from 
propensity score serves as counterfactual. Following Gertler et al. (2011), one way to 
assess the common trend by comparing changes in outcomes for the treatment group 
and comparison groups before the program is implemented. If the outcomes moved in 
tandem before the program started, we can believe that outcomes would have continued 
to move jointly in the post-intervention period.  
Testing this assumption, I graph the trend of education spending per capita to estimate 
whether there is any difference in education spending prior to respective RIF allocation 
year. Figure 4-2 to 4-4 display the common trend starting from 2007 to each year of RIF 
allocation. In the graphs of common trend, generally they do appear to be relatively 
similar trends in the previous years prior to RIF allocation. These results give credibility 
to the control group selection.  
Figure 4-2 Parallel path 2007–2010 (Education spending per capita) 
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Figure 4-3 Parallel path 2007–2011 (education spending per capita) 
 
 
 
Figure 4-4 Parallel path 2007–2012 (Education spending per capita) 
 
After deriving a control group for each period of study, the analysis begins to 
investigate the impact of RIF on education spending for the three periods. Because the 
allocation of RIF is on an annual basis, DiD application is more suitable to estimate 
whether there are differences on outcomes in the following year. The allocation of RIF 
is based on certain formula, where districts will receive the allocation after scoring 
highly on predetermined indicators. Hence, the composition of recipient districts 
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changes every year, although some districts consistently receive the RIF allocation 
when they manage to maintain the highest composite score. RIF is announced in the 
previous year (t–1), and is disbursed next year (t). To ensure the accuracy of DiD 
estimation, the participants in the program evaluated need to be consistent. Hence, this 
study uses 2009 as the base year, when the RIF program was absent. This study splits 
the analysis into three periods, 2009–2010, 2009–2011 and 2009–2012.  
The benefit of DiD is that the model can control unobserved time-invariant variables 
which may lead to biased results which are present in before-after estimators by 
sweeping out time-invariant effects on dependent variables. DiD assumes this 
unobserved heterogeneity is time invariant, so the bias cancels out through a fixed effect 
approach. The fixed-effects estimation is applied to see whether RFI allocation affects 
education spending in recipient districts. Each entity has its own time constant 
individual unobserved characteristics or heterogeneity that may affect the investigated 
variable. The existence of unobserved heterogeneity, including area size and district 
geography, may correlate with other control variables, intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers, leading to omitted variables when the regression model does not take it into 
account, and making the estimators biased and inconsistent. Following the requirements 
attached to the use of RIF, this study attempts to estimate the impact of RIF on 
education spending. The estimation model is as follows:  
yit = a + β1Tit + β2 Ti + β3 ti + β4 ui +β5 Xit +  εit     (1) 
The dependent variable is education spending. Ti is a dummy variable for treated 
districts with a value of 1 for RIF recipients and 0 for non-RIF recipients. The use of the 
RIF recipient dummy aims to find out whether those districts holding the status of RIF 
recipients have greater education spending than non-RIF recipients. In this way, I can 
capture the extent to which education spending is incremented in RIF recipients. The 
135 
 
increments show whether RIF recipients use all of the RIF they receive for education 
spending, otherwise fund fungibility is indicated. tt represents time dummies for the base 
year and treatment year with the value of 0 and 1 respectively, and Tit is the interaction 
between time and the treatment dummy, which is the main variable of interest. This 
interaction estimates whether districts receiving RIF have greater increases in education 
spending. ui represents the time-invariant variables of each district. The vector of X is 
the relevant strictly exogenous explanatory variable used to estimate the effect of RFI 
on education spending. These variables include total fiscal transfer (excluding RIF), 
percentage of people living in urban areas, percentage of people of active age, 
population and GRDP per capita. εit is an error term where Cov (εit , Tit) = 0. 
The average real RIF allocation is around 5% of total education spending or around 9 
billion IDR for the three years of the allocation period, which is small compared to RIF 
recipients’ average education spending, which accounted for 144 billion IDR. For the 
period 2009 to 2012, the average education spending in recipient districts was almost 
400.000 IDR per capita and the average RIF allocation was around 39.000 IDR per 
capita. Hence, it was expected that recipient local governments would increase their 
education spending by at least 39.000 IDR per capita if the transfers were fully used. 
Column 1 in Table 4-7 shows the baseline estimation of RIF impact on education 
spending for the period 2009 to 2012. The fixed effect estimation with dummy 
variables, where 1 is a district receiving RIF and 0 a non-RIF recipient, shows positive 
significant effects on education spending when a district is an RIF recipient. On 
average, RIF recipient districts spend 76.000 IDR per capita more on education than 
non-RIF recipients. This figure suggests that all RIF allocation is fully spent on 
education spending. The dummy island shows that districts in Java and Bali and 
Sumatera have higher education spending per capita compared to other islands.  
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When the treatment assignment is not random, the use of a dummy variable for 
treatment assignment leads to selection bias because of the following factors: (a) 
purposive program placement, and (b) self-selection into the program (Khandker et al. 
2012). In this case, the RIF allocation is explicitly aimed to target local governments 
with better performance. Besides, the main interest of this study is to examine whether 
the increase in education spending in RIF recipients is due to RIF allocation rather than 
other factors. The difference in difference estimation attempts to ensure that the increase 
in education spending is due to the presence of RIF.  
The difference in difference approach estimation results are displayed in columns 2 to 
10 in Table 4-7. These represent the before and after mean change in education 
spending in RIF recipients over the before and after mean change in the non-RIF 
recipients. The use of the treatment dummy implies the impact of participation in the 
RIF program on education spending.  
Columns 2, 5 and 8 show the most parsimonious specification, including only district 
dummies, year effects and interactive variables of recipient districts and treated years. 
This model indicates an increase in education spending among RIF recipient districts 
for the years 2010 and 2011, but not for 2012. Given the variable of interest is an 
interactive dummy variable, the point estimate of 0.111 suggests that compared to 
education spending in 2009, in 2010 RIF recipient districts increased their education 
spending by 111.000 IDR more than non-RIF recipients. It should be noted that the 
treatment effect is a dummy variable suggesting the expenditure size per capita of RIF 
recipient in treatment year. Hence, this coefficient suggests an increment in education 
spending in RIF recipient districts in 2009 and 2010. The difference in difference 
estimations show strong and positive increases in education spending for the period 
2009–2011, but statistically insignificant increases for the period 2009–2012. Although 
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the estimations suggest positive results, this specification is not appropriate since they 
do not control the other covariates which determine education spending.  
To compare the sensitivity of the effect with regard to control group selection, I test the 
difference in difference estimation with matching and non-matching. Columns 3, 6 and 
9 in Table 4-7 employ additional covariates which explain the education spending and 
use all non-RIF recipients as a control group. The difference in difference estimation 
without matching shows consistently significantly greater education spending in RIF 
recipients compared to the previous dummy only estimations. The effect of the regional 
incentive fund on education expenditure in RIF recipients is statistically positive and 
significant for all periods of analysis. The magnitude is slightly smaller, which results 
from the additional covariates. The non-matching double difference estimation shows 
the RIF recipients allocated 82.000 IDR of education spending per capita more than 
non-RIF recipients in 2010 compared to 2009. The increment of education spending in 
2012 compared to 2009 is also greater in RIF recipients compared to non-RIF 
recipients, but the increment size is smaller, accounting for only 30.000 IDR per capita. 
Total fiscal transfers in general play a crucial role in determining the size of education 
spending, as expected. Other demographic variables and the working age population do 
not become significant factors in determining the size of education spending. Only the 
percentage of people in urban areas, representing the urban characteristic, becomes an 
important factor in determining education spending. One plausible reason is that the 
provision of education services supports the business sector.   
The double difference estimations with matching in columns 4, 7 and 10 confirm the 
previous models, i.e. that RIF allocation encourages recipient districts to increase their 
education spending, on average by 77.000 IDR per capita greater than non-recipient 
districts in 2010 compared to 2009. In other words, the increase in education spending 
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in RIF recipient districts from 2009 to 2010 was greater than in non-RIF recipient 
districts and statistically significant. Given the average RIF allocation, accounting for 
32.000 IDR per capita in RIF recipients in 2010, almost 45.000 IDR per capita comes 
from districts’ own budget. 
Compared to education spending in 2009, RIF recipients increased their education 
spending by 58.000 IDR per capita in 2011. This impact was slightly lower compared to 
RIF recipients’ education spending in 2010. With the average RIF allocation accounting 
for 27.000 IDR per capita in 2011, this increase suggests that around 31.000 IDR per 
capita of increased education spending came from RIF recipients’ own budgets. The 
lower role of RIF recipients’ budgets in education spending can also be seen in 2012. 
Although RIF recipients increased their education spending, the increase in 2012 was 
much smaller than in previous years. With 26.000 IDR per capita in RIF allocation, on 
average local budgets only contributed 5.000 IDR per capita toward the 31.000 IDR per 
capita increase in education spending. Alternatively, these estimations can be 
interpreted to say that the difference in the increase in education spending was getting 
smaller in subsequent periods of RIF allocation.  
To ensure the robustness of these results, I estimate the impact of RIF based on the 
characteristics of local governments, which may influence their policies around using 
the RIF. I use the classification of mineral and non-mineral-producing districts where 
shared natural resource revenue serves as one component of fiscal capacity. The 
mineral-producing districts have greater fiscal capacity due to their shared natural 
resource revenue. The RIF recipients with greater fiscal capacity will not rely on RIF 
for their education spending. Hence, whether these characteristics affect the dissipating 
size of education spending can contribute further to understanding the dynamics of RIF 
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in recipient districts. The minerals classification includes oil, geothermal, coal and other 
type of extractive commodities.  
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Table 4-7 DiD Estimation results: education spending 
 
 
Variables 
2009–2012 2009–2010 2009–2011 2009–2012 
Pooled panel 
data 
 
DiD-No 
covariates 
DiD-Non 
Matching 
DiD With 
matching 
DiD-No 
covariates 
DiD-Non 
Matching 
DiD With 
matching 
DiD-No 
covariate
s 
DiD-Non 
Matching 
DiD With 
matching 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Treatment effect 
(RIF*treatment year) 
n.a 0.111*** 
(0.038) 
0.082*** 
(0.020) 
0.077***   
(0.019) 
0.079*** 
(0.042) 
0.064**    
(0.032) 
0.058**    
 (0.032) 
0.041 
(0.033) 
0.030*   
 (0.002) 
0.031***    
(0.011) 
Total transfer 
0.046*   
(0.024) 
n.a 0.048 
(0.045) 
0.040    
(0.036) 
n.a 0.085 
(0.065) 
0.081  
(0.063) 
n.a 0.040   
0.031 
0.120***    
(0.023) 
GRDP per capita 
5.45e-10  
(3.43e-09) 
n.a –0.007   
0.0111627 
–0.007   
(0.005) 
n.a –0.004 
(0.005) 
0.007**   
(0.003) 
n.a –0.0005    
0.003 
–0.001   
(0.002) 
Population 
–1.37e-07   
(9.72e-083) 
n.a –1.61e-07   
(1.12e-07) 
–2.00e-08   
(4.33e-08) 
n.a –2.42e-08    
(9.83e-08) 
4.43e-08   
(8.41e-08) 
n.a –9.81e-08   
(8.13e-08) 
–1.27e-08   
(8.07e-08) 
People in urban area 
(%) 
0.0008   
(0.0009) 
n.a 0.0004  
(0.0007) 
0.001 
(0.0008) 
n.a 0.002**    
(0.0009) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
n.a –0.035  
 (0.083) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
People age 15–64(%) 0.0007   
(0.0006) 
n.a –0.00006 
(0.00005) 
–0.00009 
(0.00006) 
n.a 0.065 
(0 054) 
0.065 
(0.054) 
n.a 0.0006   
(0.0005) 
–0.00002   
(0.00002) 
RIF Recipient 0.076***   
.012 
n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Java and Bali 0.086** 
(0.039) 
         
Sumatera 0.022* 
(0.12) 
         
Papua 0.086 
(0.068) 
         
Sulawesi -0.034 
(0.028) 
         
R2 (within) 0.22 0.01 0.16 0.19 0.007 0.31 0.31 0.005 0.33 0.35 
Observation 1864 943 896 768 939 922 885 958 928 815 
Number of group 485 484 484 406 485 484 456 484 484 423 
Note: All fiscal and economic variables are measured in constant (year 2000) per capita terms and written in million IDR for the convenience of reading. The year variable is 
controlled for full panel estimation. The time and treatment dummy are not displayed. The t-statistic is based on robust standard errors. ***,** and * show statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. 
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Table 4-8 shows the results of DiD estimation with matched control groups from their 
own group of mineral or non-mineral-producing districts  
Table 4-8 DiD estimation based on natural resource wealth 
Variables 2009–2010 2009–2011 2009–2012 
Education spending 
(Dependent variable) 
Mineral-
producing 
districts 
Non 
Mineral-
producing 
districts 
Mineral-
producing 
districts 
Non 
Mineral-
producing 
districts 
Mineral-
producing 
districts 
Non 
Mineral-
producing 
districts 
Treatment effect (RIF 
* treatment year) 
0.035    
(0.030) 
0.088***   
(.027) 
0.058**   
(0.029) 
0.076*   
(.045) 
0.024*   
(0.015) 
0.033**   
(0.034) 
Total transfer 
0.210*** 
(0.041) 
0.006    
(0.005) 
0.140***    
(0.024) 
0.049   
(0.051) 
0.113**    
(0.013) 
0.005   
(0.005) 
GRDP per capita 
–0.16* 
0.009 
0.066   
(0.025) 
–0.005  
(0.004) 
0.062   
(0.063) 
–0.001   
(0.002) 
0.044   
(0.030)   
Population 
–1.51e-08   
9.54e-08 
–2.01e-08   
7.54e-08 
6.86e-09   
9.76e-08 
2.35e-07   
2.87e-07 
–7.34e-08   
6.17e-08 
5.56e-08   
1.70e-07   
People in urban area 
(%) 
–0.0006   
(0.0008) 
0.0008   
(0.0006) 
0.002**   
(0.0008) 
0.002*   
(0.001) 
0.127*   
(0.071) 
–0.051   
0.114 
People age 15–64(%) –0.00003   
(0.00007) 
–0.00004   
(0.00005) 
–0.002   
(0.014) 
0.070   
(0.057) 
0.007    
(0.005) 
0.072   
0.057 
R2 (within) 0.42 0.23 0.38 0.34 0.38 0.36 
Observation 537 359 555 377 560 368 
Number of group 294 188 294 194 294 190 
Note: All fiscal and economic variable are measured in constant (year 2000) and per capita terms, 
converted using the implicit GDP deflator from Indonesia’s national accounts. The t­statistic is based on 
robust standard errors. 
The overall result is that the RIF recipients’ greater education spending had mixed 
significance. Although the trend over the three years of the analysis period shows 
declining size of the increment in education spending, the size is greater in non-mineral-
producing districts. Further, fiscal transfers play a more important role in determining 
education spending in mineral-producing districts, but not in non-mineral-producing 
districts. The urban characteristic also plays an important role, but the roles of other 
variables are muted. Overall, the estimation based on districts’ characteristics 
demonstrates similar results, that is, the impact of RIF on education spending is 
dissipating regardless of fiscal capacity. 
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4.5.3 Sensitivity analysis 
Ensuring the robustness of DiD results above, a different time specification is applied. 
Instead of using 2009 as the base year, the next estimation uses the previous year of 
treatment as the base year. Hence, the periods of analysis are 2010–2011 and 2011–
2012. As before, the PSM method is used to derive matched non-RIF recipient districts 
for both periods. To ensure the treated and control groups have similar characteristics 
and conditions in the base year, the estimations for 2010–2011 only use treated districts 
which received RIF in 2011 and exclude districts which received RIF in 2010 or both 
years. Non-treated districts which received RIF in 2010 are also excluded. The same 
approach also applies for the period 2011–2012. The balancing property for the two 
periods of time is shown in Tables 4-9 and 4-10.  
Table 4-9 Propensity score balancing property 2010–2011 
Block Group Observation Mean t-test 
1 Control 275 0.083      
(0.002) 
 
 Treated 26 0.091     
(0.006) 
t =  –1.2330 
2 Control 0 n.a n.a 
 Treated 1 n.a n.a 
Total Control 275   
 Treated 21   
 
Table 4-10 Propensity score balancing property 2011–2012 
Block Group Observation Mean t-test 
1 Control 289 0.105      
(0.001) 
 
 Treated 40 0.107     
(0.004) 
t =  –0.4064 
2 Control 2 n.a n.a 
 Treated 1 n.a n.a 
Total Control 291   
 Treated 41   
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Although the treated districts are reduced, the fixed effect estimation for the pooled 
period of 2010 to 2012 in column 1 of Table 4-11 shows greater education spending in 
RIF recipients. Columns 2 and 4 show the double difference estimation with dummy 
variables only. There is no significant difference in education spending in RIF 
recipients. The estimations with additional covariates and previous years as base years 
show a generally positive impact of RIF allocation on education spending in recipient 
districts, but insignificant for the period 2011–2012 as shown in column 5 in Table 4-
11. The RIF allocation induced recipient districts to increase their education spending 
by 56.000 IDR per capita from 2010 to 2011, although at a 10% level of significance. 
The estimations with previous years as baseline also show a positive effect of RIF 
allocation on education spending in RIF recipients. A previous study with yearly 
analysis also finds declining impact of federal transfers on education spending (Gordon 
2004). 
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Table 4-11 DiD Estimation results-2010–2011 and 2011–2012 
 
Variables 
 
Full panel data 
(2010 to 2012) 
2010–2011 2011–2012 
DiD-No 
covariates 
DiD-with 
covariates 
DiD-No 
covariate
s 
DiD-with 
covariates 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Treatment effect (RIF 
* treatment year) 
n.a 0.024 
(0.038) 
0.056*   
(0.033) 
0.005 
(0.034) 
0.027    
(0.042) 
Total transfer 
0.025    
 (0.023) 
n.a 0.059    
(0.062) 
n.a 0.143       
(0.111) 
GRDP per capita 
0.006***    
(0.002) 
n.a 0.003    
(0.003) 
n.a 0.009    
(0.013) 
Population 
–1.01e-06***   
(2.83e-07) 
n.a –8.23e-07   
(5.39e-07) 
n.a 1.60e-07   
(3.28e-07) 
People in urban area 
(%) 
0.098**   
 (0.031) 
n.a –0.102     
(0.222) 
n.a –0.161.    
(0.310) 
People age 15–64(%) 0.00005 
(0.0004) 
n.a –0.005    
(0.006) 
n.a 0.001   
(0.001) 
RIF Recipient 0.022***   
(0.010) 
n.a n.a n.a n.a 
R2 (within) 0.06 0.03 0.14 0.007 0.01 
Observation 1418 848 641 829 514 
Number of group 485 439 333 445 263 
Note: All fiscal and economic variables are measured in constant (year 2000) and per capita terms, 
converted using the implicit GDP deflator from Indonesia’s national accounts. The t­statistic is based on 
robust standard errors.  
4.6 Discussion  
The plausible argument of the positive impact of RIF on education spending is that the 
conditionality, the legal restrictions on the use of the fund, has ensured recipients use 
the fund for education spending. The fund’s feature giving discretion to recipients on 
the programs implemented in the education sector appears to contribute to achieving the 
objective of the fund. However, the magnitude of effect is diminishing over subsequent 
years. Although the recipients used up all the RIF in each allocation year, the 
dissipating increment of education spending in RIF recipients provides evidence of 
displacement of education spending to other functions, known as non-additionality 
fungibility. Following Shah (2007) and World Bank (1998) we find that smaller sizes of 
RIF allocation compared to recipients’ education spending contribute to potential 
fungibility in recipients’ education spending. Because the recipients have already 
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allocated education spending as the greatest portion of their budget, the effect of RIF is 
insignificant in enlarging their education spending. Hence, they divert their own 
resources for education spending to other spending and substitute with RIF. Besides, the 
lack of monitoring of education spending has weakened expected benefits. Although 
internal audits have been carried out to verify whether RIF recipients have used the fund 
as required, information on the overall impact on education spending is absent. This 
suggests that a mechanism for monitoring the targeted output should be in place to 
ensure the RIF is not treated as substitute resource for education spending. An 
alternative approach is to link output performance with payments, known as output-
based conditionality (Shah 2007).  
4.6.1 Output-based transfer 
The rationale of output-based transfers is to provide incentives to subnational 
governments to improve their performance by linking their access to grants and/or the 
amount disbursed to delivery performance in predetermined areas (UNCDF 2010). This 
transfer still imposes conditionalities, including the type of expenditure that can be 
financed, on the results to be achieved while providing full flexibility in the design of 
programs. Hence, the crux of output-based grants is to promote positive change in 
aspects of the performance of local governments by conditioning access to grants on the 
achievement of certain desirable goals. By linking transfers with specified outputs or 
results, this model can improve result accountability, which is commonly weak at local 
government level. Previous studies in the literature also advocate output-based systems 
as a way to increase accountability, efficiency, quality and equity of service delivery 
(Eldridge & Palmer 2009).  
146  
  
 
 
Many countries have embedded fiscal incentives in intergovernmental fiscal transfers to 
stimulate local governments to achieve specific targets, and in many cases they must 
meet requirements to get access to the transfer. Although the features of performance-
based transfer can take many innovative designs, the basic principle is that there needs 
to be a match between funding and predetermined outputs. The discussion below draws 
heavily from UNCDF (2012).  
Subnational governments need to show that their performance complies with certain 
criteria to access grants. International experience uses two indicators for transfer access. 
Firstly, minimum conditions, which serve as the basic conditions which must be met for 
transfer access or eligibility. Secondly, performance measures which serve as the trigger 
for payment when local governments meet pre-specified measures.  
The design of output-based transfers varies in many countries and is flexible toward the 
situation in each country. The Danish system of local government features a 
reimbursement scheme in which the percentage reimbursed depends on the extent to 
which local government spending is consistent with specific policy aims. In Japan, for 
example, road grants come with certain minimum standards, such as the number of 
lanes that must be built.  
The principle of output-based transfer can be used with RIF to promote education 
spending. The existing conditionality, use restricted to education functions but with 
discretion over programs, can be continued and equipped with additional specific 
performance measurements. One approach to measure education expenditure 
performance uses the percentage of RIF over education spending in the year of RIF 
allocation. The percentage of RIF over education spending in the RIF allocation year 
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must not be bigger than the percentage of RIF in a certain allocation year over its 
previous year’s education spending.31 The education spending must exclude RIF to 
avoid double counting. Payment can be done in two tranches. The second payment can 
be made when the evaluation of the first tranche shows a satisfactory result. 
4.7 Conclusion and policy implications 
This paper studies the impact of earmarked fiscal transfers in Indonesia, the regional 
incentive fund, on recipients’ education spending. The empirical estimation is carried 
out through combining a difference in difference approach with propensity score 
matching on RIF eligibility variables. The main finding of this study is that the RIF 
does induce recipient local governments to increase their education spending. There is 
evidence that the conditionality embedded in the fund, which legally requires recipients 
to use the fund for education functions only, has ensured the recipients use the fund as 
intended. However, the estimations show declining size in the increment of education 
spending. The increase in education spending is greater only in the first year of RIF 
allocation, but is smaller in the subsequent years of allocation. This diminishing 
increment in education spending provides evidence of the potential presence of non-
additionality fungibility in RIF. Although the RIF grants were fully used for the 
education function, recipients substituted their own resources for education spending 
with the money they received from RIF. Therefore, the RIF contributes more to the 
increment in education spending than the recipients’ own budgets. The absence of a 
mechanism to monitor recipients’ education spending appears to contribute to the 
weakening effect of the RIF. 
                                                 
31 The increase in education spending in RIF allocation year compared to previous year’s education 
spending makes the ratio of RIF over education spending smaller in RIF allocation years than in previous 
years. 
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This finding suggests the need to redesign the conditionalities embedded in this fund. 
As an alternative design, the literature suggests an output-based approach which links 
post intervention indicators with the fund’s objective. The link between transfer 
payments with certain output measures is a key feature driving greater accountability in 
the use of grant monies. The existing conditionality can be equipped with impact 
monitoring through measuring performance in education spending. The alternative 
measurement is the use of the percentage of RIF over education spending in the 
allocation year, which must not be greater than the percentage in previous years. 
Because the nature of RIF allocation is to top up recipients’ education expenditure, the 
central government can monitor the impact of the use of the fund on recipients’ 
education spending. 
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5. Conclusion 
This thesis has investigated three aspects of fiscal policies. The first study investigated 
the impact of shared-mining revenue on own-source revenue in mineral-producing 
districts. The second study examined spatial interaction in environmental spending and 
potential channels of pollution spillover. The third study evaluated the impact of 
regional incentive funding on recipients’ education spending. 
Countries with natural resource endowments are facing greater challenges in ensuring 
the benefits of the natural resources increase their citizens’ prosperity. The multi-
dimensional aspects of natural resource management, from wealth distribution to 
environmental management, require sound policies and quality institutions. Many 
studies in the literature have suggested fiscal decentralization as an important policy to 
achieve better natural resource management.  
Indonesia adopted fiscal decentralization in 2001 and accompanied it with 
environmental policy decentralization. Nevertheless, concern about sub-standard fiscal 
management in many local governments has emerged, and environmental degradation 
has increased demand to revamp environmental policies. This thesis has studied the 
fiscal performance of natural resource producing districts in Indonesia. The study has 
resulted in some important findings and contributions to the literature. The thesis also 
provides insights about the design of fiscal transfers to promote environmental 
spending in districts.  
The first study argues that under the shared natural resource revenue system, mineral-
producing districts do not have control over revenue collection for their natural 
resource endowment. Hence, they cannot substitute own-source revenue with natural 
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resource revenue. This study constructed a dataset of479 districts, with particular focus 
on 302 mineral-producing districts, for the period 2001–2012. The fixed effect 
estimations provide evidence that shared-mining revenue is not associated with lower 
own-source revenue in mineral-producing districts. This is a different situation to that 
which is commonly found at national level. Because of the ability to substitute 
between tax revenue and natural resource revenue, national governments have the 
opportunity to substitute revenue sources and prefer to mobilize greater natural 
resource revenue and neglect tax revenue.  
This study also provides evidence of a negative correlation between the poverty rate 
and retribution revenue in mineral-producing districts. It suggests that the higher 
poverty rate in mineral-resource producing districts has contributed to the lower own-
source revenue. The literature has pointed out that higher poverty rates suggest weak 
institutions in natural-resource wealth jurisdictions. This demands more stringent 
supervision on mining practice to ensure a more sustainable extractive sector in 
mineral-producing districts in Indonesia. 
This study contributes to the literature on fiscal policies in natural resource wealth 
jurisdictions by giving a different perspective about the interaction between natural 
resources and revenue efforts at local government level. The findings give insights to 
Indonesian policy makers on policies to promote greater own-source revenue in 
mineral-producing districts. Specifically, the findings suggest implementation of more 
vigorous policies to ensure optimal benefits of resource revenue to reduce poverty. 
The second study in this thesis analyzed environmental spending, including 
environmental and forestry functions, in physically neighbouring districts in Sumatera 
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and Kalimantan Island. Using district level data for the period of 2009–2012, the 
spatial econometric estimations find strong evidence of positive spatial interaction 
through spending spillover among local governments in these islands. The positive 
correlation suggests that a district will increase its own environmental spending when 
its neighbours increase their environmental spending. This study argues the pollution 
spillover from districts hosting polluting sectors, in this case mineral and timber 
producing districts, imposes environmental costs in neighbouring districts. Hence, 
districts affected by pollution spillover will have to increase their environmental 
spending to mitigate the impacts. This study uses shared natural resource revenue as a 
proxy for pollution spillover and finds a positive association between shared natural 
resource revenue in mineral-producing districts and neighbours’ health spending, 
suggesting the natural resource sector in mineral-producing districts has imposed 
environmental costs on neighbours. This study also finds a lack of environmental 
spending, in per capita terms, among mineral-producing districts in Sumatera and 
Kalimantan Island. The average environmental spending in mineral-producing districts 
is not significantly different that of from non-mineral-producing districts.  
For policy implications, this finding attempts to draw attention from stakeholders and 
policy makers in Indonesia, in particular in the environmental policy area. The lack of 
environmental spending in mineral-producing districts will bring greater consequences 
to human life and Indonesia’s commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Central government needs to encourage local governments to mitigate environmental 
consequences due to natural resource exploitation, through greater environmental 
spending in their jurisdiction. The provision of environmental fiscal transfers to local 
governments can be a viable option.  
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This is the first study to investigate the spatial interaction of environmental spending in 
Indonesia. Although the negative effect from fiscal externality is acknowledged in the 
literature, this issue is still under-explored. This study also contributes to the literature 
on environmental policies by shedding light on the mechanism of positive spatial 
correlation in the environmental spending.   
The third study assesses what the central government can do, using the fiscal transfer 
system, to help achieve desirable outcomes in resource-rich districts. There is no 
targeted fiscal transfer system in place to address environmental spending in mineral-
producing districts, but the fiscal transfer system could potentially be used for this. In 
order to assess the prospects of such a mechanism, this study evaluates the existing 
fiscal incentive which provides fiscal transfers earmarked for education spending. The 
third study in this thesis provides insights into the design of fiscal transfer through 
examining the impact of the regional incentive fund (RIF) on recipients’ education 
spending. 
This study uses a difference in difference approach combined with propensity score 
matching with three periods of analysis, 2009–2010, 2009–2011 and 2009–2012. The 
main finding of this study is that the RIF does induce recipient local governments to 
increase their education spending in recipient districts. This finding suggests that the 
conditionalities imposed on RIF, legally restricting the use of the funds to education 
functions, have ensured the recipients use the funds as intended. However, the 
magnitude of impact is diminishing over subsequent years of the allocation of regional 
incentive fund. This raises concerns about non-additionality fungibility in education 
spending, where the recipients substitute their budget for education spending with the 
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money they receive from the regional incentive fund. The absence of any mechanism 
to assess recipients’ performance in education spending apparently weakens the benefit 
of this fund.  
In addition to being the first study undertaken to analyze the central government’s 
existing fiscal incentive, the findings of this study provide both an analytical 
evaluation of RIF and an insight into the design of fiscal incentives for environmental 
policies. A mechanism for monitoring the performance in education spending of RIF 
recipients is needed to ensure optimum benefits for local citizens. The literature 
suggests the use of output-based transfers, which link certain education spending 
performance with disbursement of funds. Through this approach, central government 
can ensure the impact of fiscal transfers on targeted spending.  
The findings of this thesis highlight the interaction between natural resource 
endowment and fiscal policies at sub-national level in Indonesia. There are three points 
can be drawn from this thesis. Firstly, the low own-source revenue suggests greater 
reliance on fiscal transfers among mineral-producing districts in Indonesia to manage 
challenges in the natural resource sector, including environmental impacts from natural 
resource exploitation. There appears to be a need for central government intervention 
to promote greater efforts in own-source revenue mobilization. Secondly, the lack of 
environmental spending in resource-rich districts can result in further environmental 
degradation. One approach central government can take is to promote greater 
environmental spending through the provision of environmental fiscal incentives. 
Thirdly, with regard to fiscal incentives, central government needs to impose 
conditionality, where local governments agree to not substitute their environmental 
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spending with respect to environmental fiscal transfers. Central government can use 
conditional output-based transfers to monitor agreements by linking certain 
measurement in environmental spending with transfer disbursement. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
155  
  
 
 
Bibliography  
Abood, S, Lee, J, Burivalova, Z, Burivalova1 Z, Ulloa J-G, Koh, L P 2015, ‘Relative contributions of the 
logging, fiber, oil palm, and mining industries to forest loss in Indonesia’, Conservation Letters, xxx 
2014, 0(0), 1–10. 
Ahmad, E, Mottu, E 2002,’ Oil revenue assignment: country experiences and issues’, IMF Working Paper 
WP 02/03, viewed 16 November 2014: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp02203.pdf> 
Angrist JD, Krueger, AB 1999,’Empirical strategies in labor economics, in: O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, 
(eds.), Handbook of Labor economics, Vol. 3A. North-Holland, Amsterdam.  
Anselin, L 1995,’ Local Indicators for spatial association,’ Geographical Analysis, volume 27 number 2. 
Anselin, L, Julie L G, and Hubert J 2008,’ Spatial panel econometrics’, in L. Matyas and P. Sevestre 
(eds), The Econometrics of Panel Data, Fundamentals and Recent Developments in Theory and Practice, 
3rd Edition, Dordrecht, Kluwer. 
Aragon, F M, Rud, Pablo 2013,’ Polluting industries and agricultural productivity: evidence from mining 
in Ghana,’ The Economic Journal, Doi: 10.1111/ecoj.12244. 
Asian Development Bank, 2001, Improving Public Administration in a Competitive World, Edited by. S. 
Schiavo-Campo and P.S.A. Sundaram. ADB Press. 
_________________, 2009, The Economics of Climate Change in Southeast Asia: A Regional Review, 
ADB, Manila. 
__________________, 2015 ‘Republic of Indonesia: tax revenue administration modernization and 
policy improvement in local governments’, ADB Project report 48294-001,seen 1 April 2015 at: 
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-document/154486/48294-001-tar.pdf. 
Bacarezza, G, Espinoza, N 2010, ‘Fiscal transfers a curse or blessing? Evidence of their effect on tax 
effort for municipalities in Sinaloa, Mexico’, GSU Working Paper 10-30, viewed August 2013, 
http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/files/ispwp1030.pdf. 
Bacot, H. A., & Dawes, R. A. (1996). Responses to federal devolution: Measuring state environmental 
efforts,’ State and Local Government Review, 28(2), 124–135. 
Bappenas, BPS, UNPF 2013, Indonesia Population Projection: 2010-2035, Indonesia Statistics Office, 
Jakarta. 
Bardhan, P,  Mookherjee, D 2006,’ Pro-poor targeting and accountability of local governments in West 
Bengal,’ Journal of Development Economics 79 (2006) 303 – 327. 
Barr, C., Resosudarmo, I.A.P., Dermawan, A., McCarthy, J., Moeliono, M., Setiono, B., 2006, 
Decentralization of Forest Administration in Indonesia—Implications for Forest Sustainability, Economic 
Development and Community Livelihood, Centre for International Research, Bogor. 
Bedner, A 2010,’ Consequences of Decentralization: environmental Impact Assessment and Water 
Pollution Control in Indonesia,’ Law & Policy, volume 32, issue 1, pp 38-60. 
156  
  
 
 
Besley, T, Case, A 1995,’ Does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices? evidence from 
gubernatorial term limits,’ The Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1995. 
Bhattacharyya, S, Resosudarmo, P B, 2013,’ Growth, growth accelerations and the poor: lessons from 
Indonesia, World Development Vol. 66, pp. 154–165, 2015. 
Bird, RM, Smart, M 2002,’ Intergovernmental fiscal transfer: international lessons for developing 
countries,’ World Development, volume 30, number 6, pp, 899-912.  
Bird, RM, Vazquez, JM, Torgler, B 2008, ‘Tax Effort in Developing Countries and High Income 
Countries: The Impact of Corruption, Voice and Accountability’, Economic Analysis & Policy, vol. 38 
Number 1, March 2008. 
Bjornestad, L 2009,’ Fiscal Decentralization, Fiscal Incentives, and Pro-Poor Outcomes: Evidence from 
Viet Nam,’ ADB Working paper number 168. 
Boadway, R 2001,’Inter-governmental fiscal relations: the facilitator of fiscal decentralization,’ 
Constitutional Political Economy 12, no. 2 (2001): 93-121. 
Bolthole, T, Adjaye, J, Carmignani, F 2012, ‘Natural resource abundance, institutions and tax revenue 
moibilization in Sub Sahara Africa’, South African Journal of Economics, Vol.80:2, June 2012. 
Book, L 2003,’ The Poor and tax compliance: one size does not fit all’, Kansas Law Review 51: 1-51, 
seen 28 April 2015 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=439920##. 
Bordignon, M., F. Cerniglia and F. Revelli. (2004). “Yardstick competition in intergovernmental 
relationships: Theory and Empirical Predictions,” Economics letters, 83, 325–333. 
Borie, M, Mathevet, R, Letourneau, A, Ring, I, Thompson, D and Marty, P 2014,’ Exploring the 
contribution of fiscal transfers to protected area policy,’ Ecology and Society 19(1): 9. 
Bornhorst, F, Gupta, S,Thornton, J 2012, ‘Natural resource revenues and the domestic revenue effort’, 
Economic Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 25, pp.439-446. 
Boyce, J 1994,’ Inequality as a cause of environmental degradation,’ Ecological Economics 11 (1994) 
169-178.  
Brennan, D, Buchanan, J 1980,The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Brosio, G 2006, ‘The assignment of revenue from natural resources’, in Ehtisham A and Giorgio B (eds), 
Handbook of Fiscal Federalism, Edward Elgar, Northhampton, USA. 
________, Singh R J 2014,’ Revenue sharing of natural resources in Africa: reflections from a review of 
international practices’, The World Bank Background Paper 90252, viewed 11 November 2014: 
http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/08/28/000470435_20140828105
256/Rendered/PDF/902520WP0P1437000Final00April020140.pdf. 
Brueckner, J 2003,’ Strategic interaction among governments: an overview of empirical studies,’ 
International Regional Science Review, 26(2), 175-188. 
157  
  
 
 
Carlson, K M, Curran, L, Asner, P, Pittman, S, Trigg, S and Marion, J 2013,’Carbon emissions from 
forest conversion by Kalimantan oil palm plantations,’ Nature Climate Change, volume 3,March 3 2013. 
Case, A, Hines, J and Rosen, H 1993,’ Budget spillover and fiscal policy interdependence,’ Journal of 
Public Economics 52, 285–307. 
Cason, A, Obidzinski, K 2002,’ From New Order to Regional Autonomy: Shifting Dynamics of ‘‘Illegal’’ 
Logging in Kalimantan, Indonesia,’ World Development Vol. 30, No. 12, pp. 2133–2151, 2002. 
Cevic, S, Teksoz, K 2014,’ Deep roots of fiscal behaviour,’ IMF Working Paper WP 14/45, seen on 5 
December 2016 at: ‘https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp1445.pdf’. 
Chatterjee, S, Giuliano, P & Kaya, I 2007,’ Where has all the money gone? foreign aid and the quest for 
growth,’ IZA Discussion Papers 2858. Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). 
Chaudury, IS, Munir, F 2010,’ Determinants of low tax revenue in Pakistan,’ Pakistan Journal of Social 
Sciences (PJSS) Vol. 30, No. 2 (December 2010), pp. 439-452 
Chen, X, Shao, B, Tian, Z, Xie Z and Ying, P 2016,’ Impacts of air pollution and its spatial spillover 
effect on public health based on China's big data sample,’ Journal of Cleaner Production xxx (2016) 1-
11. 
Cliff, A. D, Ord, J. K. 1981, Spatial processes - models and applications, London: Pion. 
 
Crivelli, E, Gupta, S 2014,’ Resource blessing, revenue curse? domestic revenue effort in resource-rich 
countries,’ IMF Working Paper WP 14/5. 
 
Collier, P, Hoeffler A 2005, ‘Democracy and Natural Resource Rents,’ Working paper GPRG-WPS-016 
(Department of Economics, Oxford University), viewed 16 November 2014: 
http://www.gprg.org/pubs/workingpapers/pdfs/gprg-wps-016.pdf. 
Collier, P., P. Guillaumont, S. Guillaumont, and J. W. Gunning. 1997. ‘Redesigning conditionality,’ 
World Development, vol. 25, number 9: 1399-1407. 
Curran LM, Trigg SN, McDonald AK, Astiani D, Hardiono YM, Siregar P, Caniago, I, Kasischke, E 
2004,’ Lowland forest loss in protected areas of Indonesian Borneo,’ Science. 2004 Feb 
13;303(5660):1000-3. 
Dahlby, B 1996,’ Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants,’ International Tax and 
Public Finance, 3:397-412 (1996). 
Davoodi, H, Grigorian, DA, 2007,’ Tax potential vs. tax effort: a cross-country analysis of Armenia’s 
stubbornly low tax collection,’ IMF Working Paper WP 07/206. 
Deng, H., Zheng, X., Huang, N. and Li, F 2012,’ Strategic interaction in spending on environmental 
protection: spatial evidence from Chinese cities,’ China & World Economy, 20: 103–120. 
doi: 10.1111/j.1749-124X.2012.01304.x. 
Dieleman, J. L. and Hanlon, M 2014,’Measuring the displacement and replacement of government health 
expenditure,’ Health Economics. 23 (2014): 129–140. Web. 22 Nov. 2015. 
Dioda, L 2012, ‘Structural determinants of tax revenue in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1990-
2009,UN, ECLAC, viewed 2 September 2014: 
158  
  
 
 
http://www.cepal.org/mexico/noticias/documentosdetrabajo/8/48538/2012-041_Structural-
determinants_of_tax_revenue-L.1087.pdf. 
Drummond, P, Daal, W, Srivastava, N & Oliveira, L 2012, ‘Mobilizing revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
empirical norms and key determinants’, IMF Working Paper WP/12/108, viewed 20 September 
2013:<www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12108.pdf>. 
Dziobek,C, Gutierrez, C, Kufa, P 2011,’ Measuring fiscal decentralization – exploring the imf’s 
databases,’ IMF Working Paper WP 11/126. 
Duan, H, Zhan J V 2011,’ Fiscal Transfer and Local Public Expenditure in China: A Case Study of 
Shanxi Province,’ The China Review, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring 2011), 57–88 
Duvivier, C, Xiong, H 2012,’Transboundary pollution in China: a study of polluting firms’ location 
choices in Hebei Province, CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.17. 
Egger P.H., W. Eggert and Winner, H. 2010,’ Saving taxes through foreign plant ownership,’ Journal of 
International Economics, 81(1), 99–108.  
Ehrhart, H 2009, ‘Assessing the relationship between democracy and domestic taxes in developing 
countries’, CEDIS Working Paper, E2009.30, viewed 5 July 2014: 
<http://publi.cerdi.org/ed/2009/2009.30.pdf>. 
Eldridge, C, Palmer, N 2009,’Performance-based payment: some reflections on the discourse, evidence 
and unanswered questions,’ Health Policy and Planning 2009;24:160–166. 
Ellhorst, J 2003,’ Specification and estimation of spatial panel data models,’ International Regional 
Science Review, vol- 26, 3: 244–268. 
Ellhorst, J 2010, ‘Applied spatial econometrics: raising the bar,’ Spatial Economic Analysis 5 (2010):9–
28. 
Ellhorst, J, Freret,S 2007,’ Social expenditures and yardstick competition: French evidence using a two-
regimes spatial panel data model,’ Paper prepared for presentation at the 47th Congress of the European 
Regional Science Association in Paris, August 29th to September 2nd 2007. 
Esty D,C and Geradin, D 1998,’ Environmental protection and international competitiveness: A 
conceptual framework, Journal of World Trade, 32, 5–46 (1998), seen at 10 November 
2015:http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1444&context=fss_papers 
Eyraud, L, Lusinyan L 2012,’ Decentralizing spending more than revenue: does it hurt fiscal 
performance?,’ IMF Working Paper, WP 11/226, access on January 15, 2016 at: 
‘https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11226.pdf’.  
Fadliya, McLeod, R 2010,‘Fiscal transfers to regional governments in Indonesia’, Arndt-Corden 
Department of Economics, Australian National University, ACDE Working Paper No. 2010/14. 
Farley,J, Aquino , A, Daniels, A, Moulaert, A, Krause, A 2010,’Global mechanisms for sustaining and 
enhancing PES schemes,’ Ecological Economics 69 (2010) 2075–2084. 
Farzanegan,M.R, Mettel, T 2012,’ Fiscal decentralization and Pollution: Institutions Matter,’ MAGKS 
Working paper  22-2012, seen at 25 May 2015 at: http://www.uni-
marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/22-2012_farzanegan.pdf. 
159  
  
 
 
Fatah, L 2007,’ The Impacts of coal mining on the economy and environment of South Kalimantan 
Province, Indonesia,’ Research Report Number 2007-RR2-Economy and Environment Program for 
Southeast Asia. 
Fenochietto, R,  Pessino, C 2014,’Understanding countries’ tax effort,’ IMF Working Paper WP 13/244.  
Feyzioglu, T, Swaroop, V,  Zhu,1998,’ A panel data analysis of the fungibility of foreign aid,’ The World 
Bank Economic Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), pp. 29-58. 
Fiscal Affair Department 2012, Fiscal Regimes for Extractive Industries: Design and Implementation, 
IMF, viewed  6 September 2014: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/081512.pdf. 
Forest Watch Indonesia, 2014,’ Potret keadaan hutan Indonesia: 2009-2013,’ Forest Watch Indonesia, 
Bogor, Jakarta.  
Fredrikson, G, Millimet, DL 2002,’ Strategic interaction and the determination of environmental policy 
across u.s. states,’ Journal of Urban Economics, Volume 51, Issue 1, January 2002, Pages 101-122 
Freinkman, L, Plekhanov, A 2009. ‘Fiscal decentralization in rentier regions: Evidence from Russia’, 
World Development ,Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 503–512, 2009. 
Gaertner, F B 2014,’ CEO After-Tax Compensation Incentives and Corporate Tax Avoidance,’ 
Contemporary Accounting Research,  Vol. 31 No. 4 (Winter 2014) pp. 1077–1102. 
Galasso, E, Ravallion, M 2004,’Social protection in a crisis: Argentina’s plan jefes y jefas,’ World Bank 
Economic Review 18 (3): 367–400. 
Gamkhar, S, Shah, A 2007, ‘The impact of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: a synthesis of the 
conceptual and empirical literature,’ in Boadway R, Shah, A (eds), Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer: 
Principles and Practice, the World Bank,Washington DC. 
Gamu, J, Le Billon, A, and Spiegel, S 2015,’ Extractive industries and poverty: A review of recent 
findings and linkage mechanisms,’ The Extractive Industries and Societies,  2 (2015) 162–176. 
Gertler, PJ, Martines, S, Premand, P, Rawling, R, Veermersch, CM,2011,  Impact Evaluation in Practice, 
The World Bank, Washington DC, the USA. 
Getis, A, Aldstadt, J 2004,’ Constructing the spatial weight matrix using local statistics,’ Geographical 
Analysis, vol-36, number 2.  
Gordon,N 2004,’ Do federal grants boost school spending? Evidence from Title I.” Journal of Public 
Economics 88 (9–10):1771–92. 
Gupta, AS 2007, ‘Determinants of Tax Revenue Efforts in Developing Countries’, IMF Working Paper 
WP/07/184, viewed 1 November 2013: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07184.pdf>. 
Hamilton, B 1983,’The Flypaper Effect and Other Anomalies,’ Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 22 
(December), pp. 347-362. 
Hamilton, J 1986, ‘The Flypaper Effect and the Deadweight Loss from Taxation,’ Journal of Urban 
Economics, Vol. 19 (March), pp. 148-155. 
160  
  
 
 
Hansen, M.C., Stehman, S.V., Potapov, P.V., Arunarwati, B., Stolle, F., and Pittman, K 2009,‘ 
Quantifying changes in the rates of forest clearing in Indonesia from 1990 to 2005 using remotely sensed 
data sets’, Environmental Research Letters, Volume 4 (Issue 3) doi: 10.1088/1748-9326/4/3/034001. 
Heckman, J., R. LaLonde, and J. Smith (1999): ‘The Economics and Econometrics of Active Labor 
Market Programs,’ in Handbook of Labor Economics Vol.III, ed. by O.  Ashenfelter, and D. Card, pp. 
1865–2097. Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
Henstridge, M, Chiappe, F, Crawford, L 2013,’ Growth in Indonesia: is it sustainable? The environmental 
sustainability of growth,’ Oxford Policy Management, seen at October 1, 2015: 
<http://www.opml.co.uk/sites/default/files/Growth%20in%20Indonesia_The%20environmental%20sustai
nability%20of%20growth.pdf>. 
Hirano, Keisuke, Guido W. Imbens, and Geert Ridder. 200,’Efficient Estimation of Average Treatment 
Effects Using the Estimated Propensity Score,’  Econometrica 71 (4): 1161–89. 
Ho, D, Kosuke I, King G, and Stuart EA 2007, ‘Matching as nonparametric preprocessing for reducing 
model dependence in parametric causal inference’, Political Analysis 15 (3): 199–236. 
Ilmma, A, Wai Poi, M 2014,’ Patterns of regional poverty in the new Indonesia,’ in Hill, H (ed), Regional 
Dynamics in a Decentralized Indonesia, pp (98-132), INSEAD, Singapore. 
Imam, PA, Jacobs, DF 2007, ‘Effect of corruption on tax revenues in the middle east,’ IMF Working 
Paper No.07/270, viewed 1 November 2013: 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07270.pdf>. 
International Monetary Fund, 2012 ,’ Fiscal Regimes for Extractive Industries: Design and 
Implementation,’ Washington DC, seen on 15 March 2014 at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/081512.pdf. 
 
Indrarto, GB, Murharjanti, P, Khatarina, J, Pulungan, I, Ivalerina, F., Rahman, J., Prana, M. N., 
Resosudarmo, I. A. P. and Muharrom, E. 2012,’ The Context of REDD+ in Indonesia: drivers, agents and 
institutions’, Working Paper 92. CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia, seen at June30 2014 at: 
<http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/WPapers/WP92Resosudarmo.pdf>. 
Inman, R 2008.’ The Flypaper Efect.’ NBER Working Paper No. 14579: 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14579.pdf. 
International Energy Agency, 2011,’ CO2 emission form fuel combustion: Highlight,’ viewed 26 August 
2012, <http://www.iea.org/c./o2highlights/co2highlights.pdf>. 
Islam,  M N 1998,’ Fungibility of matching conditional grants to local governments,’ Paper in Regional 
Science, 4, pp. 261-373. 
James, A 2013, ‘US state fiscal policy and natural resources’, OxCarre Research paper 126, Oxford centre 
for the Analysis of Resource-rich Economics. 
James, A, Aadland, D 2011,’ The curse of natural resources: An empirical investigation of U.S. counties’, 
Resource and Energy Economics 33: 440–453. 
Jeffers, A 1973,’ A basic subroutine for Geary's Contiguity ratio,’ Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 
(Series D) (Wiley), 22 (4). 
161  
  
 
 
Jotzo, F 2012,’ Can Indonesia Lead on Climate Change?’ in Reid, A.S (ed), Indonesia Rising: The 
Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant, ISEAS, Singapore. 
Keen, M, Marchand, M 1997,’ Fiscal competition and the pattern of public spending,’ Journal of Public 
Economics, vol- 66, 33–53. 
Kelejian, H, Prucha, I 1998,’A generalized spatial two-stage least squares procedure for estimating a 
spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive disturbances,’ Journal of Real Estate Finance and 
Economics, 17, 99-121. 
Khandker, S R, Koolwal, G, Samad,H A  2010, Handbook Impact on Evaluation, World Bank, 
Washington Dc. 
Konisky, D 2007,’ Regulatory competition and environmental enforcement: is there a race to the 
bottom?,’ American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Oct., 2007), pp. 853-872. 
Kumar S, Managi, S 2009,’ Compensation for environmental services and intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers: the case of India,’ Ecological Economics 68 (2009), pp.3052–3059. 
Le, M.T, Moreno-Dodson, B., and Bayraktar, N., 2012, “Tax capacity and tax effort”: extended cross-
country analysis from 1994 to 2009,’ World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper  6252 
Leite, C, Weidmans, J, 1999,’ Does mother nature corrupt? Natural resource, corruption and economic 
growth,’ IMF Working Paper WP/99/85. 
Lelieveld, J, Evans, J, Fnais, M, Giannadaki, M & Pozzer, A 201,’ The contribution of outdoor air 
pollution sources to premature mortality on a global scale,’ Nature 525, 367–371. 
LeSage, J. P and Pace, K. R 2009,’ Introduction to Spatial Econometrics,’ CRC Press. 
Lewis, B 2003,’Indonesia’, in Paul, S, Yun, K (eds), Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Asia: Current 
Practice and Challenges for the Future, Asian Development Bank, Philippine. 
Lewis, B 2005, ‘Indonesian local government spending, taxing and saving: An explanation of pre- and 
post-decentralization fiscal outcomes’, Asian Economic Journal, vol. 19 (3), pp. 291-317. 
Lewis, B 2013, ‘Local government capital spending in Indonesia: Impact of intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers,’ Public Budgeting & Finance / Spring 2013. 
Lewis, B, Smoke, P 2015,’ Incentives for Better Local Service Delivery,’ in Directorate General of Fiscal 
Balance (ed), Fiscal Decentralization in Indonesia a Decade after Big Bang, Ministry of Finance 
Republic of Indonesia. 
Lewis, B, Smoke, P 2015,’Intergovernmental fiscal transfers and local incentives and responses: the case 
of Indonesia,’ Fiscal Studies, forthcoming, doi: 10.1111/1475-5890.12080. 
Lipscomb, M. and A.M. Mobarak 2015, ‘Decentralization and pollution spillover: evidence from the re-
drawing of county borders in Brazil’, Mimeo, Yale, downloaded at 13 may 2016 at: 
http://faculty.som.yale.edu/mushfiqmobarak/papers/decentralization.pdf. 
Liu, Y, Zhiao J 2011, ‘Intergovernmental fiscal transfers and local tax efforts: evidence from provinces in 
China’, Journal of Economic Policy Reform, vol. 14, No. 4, December 2011, 295–300 
162  
  
 
 
Ma, J 1997,’ Intergovernmental fiscal transfer in nine countries: lessons for developing countres,’ World 
Bank Research Policy Paper number WPS1822, downloadable in July 16, 2016 at: 
‘http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/LearningProgram/Decentralization/ITFNineCountries.pdf’. 
Mahdavi, S.2008, ‘The level and composition of tax revenue in developing countries: evidence from 
unbalanced panel data,’ The International Review of Economics and Finance, vol.  17: 607-617. 
Manski, CF 2000,’ Economic analysis of social interaction,’ Journal of Economic Perspective, volume 
14, number 3, pp:115–136. 
Margono, BA, Potapov, P,  Turubanova, S,  Stolle, F and Hansen, M, 2013,’ Primary forest cover loss in 
Indonesia over 2000–2012,’ Nature Climate Change 4, 730–735 (2014). 
McGuirk, EF 2013, ‘The illusory leader: natural resources, taxation and accountability’, Public Choice 
(2013) 154:285–313. 
Ministry of Finance, 2009, ‘Ministry of Finance Green Paper: Economic and Fiscal Policy Strategies for 
Climate Change Mitigation in Indonesia,’ Ministry of Finance and Australia Indonesia Partnership, 
Jakarta. 
________________, 2012, ‘Nota Keuangan APBN 2013,’ Ministry of Finance, Jakarta, Indonesia 
Mogues, T, Benin, S 2011, ‘Do External Grants to District Governments Discourage Own-source 
revenues Generation? A Look at Local Public Finance Dynamics in Ghana’, World Development, vol. 40, 
No. 5, pp. 1054–1067, 2012. 
Morissey, O 2006,’ Fungibility, Prior Actions,and Eligibility for Budget Support,’ in Koeberle,S 
StavreskiZ, and Walliser, J (eds), Budget Support as More Effective Aid? Recent Experiences and 
Emerging Lessons, the World Bank. 
Moore, M 2007,’ How Does Taxation Affect the Quality of Governance?,’ Institute of Development 
Studies Working Paper 280. 
Morrissey, O 2002,’Making Debt Relief Conditionality Pro-poor’, Helsinki (Discussion Paper / UNU-
WIDER 2002/04). 
Narayan, P, Narayan, S 2007,’ Does environmental quality influence health expenditures? Empirical 
evidence from a panel of selected OECD countries,’ Ecological Economics,  65 (2008) p.367– 374. 
Newmark, A, Witko, C 2007,’ Pollution, politics, and preferences for environmental spending in the 
States,’ Review of Policy Research, Volume 24, Number 4 (2007). 
Oates, WE 1999,’ An essay on fiscal federalism,’ Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37, No. 3. (Sep., 
1999), pp. 1120-1149, 
___________2002,’ A reconsideration of environmental federalism,’ in John, AL;Aart deZeuw (2002) 
eds, Recent advances in environmental economics, Edward Elgar, the USA. 
____________2005,’ Toward a second generation theory of fiscal federalism,’ International Tax and 
Public Finance, 12, 349–373, 2005. 
163  
  
 
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006, Intergovernmental Transfers And 
Decentralised Public Spending, Working paper number  COM/CTPA/ECO/GOV/WP(2006)/3, 
accessed at 10 September 2016, https://www.oecd.org/tax/federalism/37388377.pdf. 
_______________, 2008, Promoting Performance: Using Indicators to Enhance The Effectiveness of Sub 
Central Spending, OECD Working Paper No. 5, accessed on August 9, 2016 
at:https://www.oecd.org/tax/federalism/40832141.pdf. 
Ohler, H, Nunnenkamp, P, Dreher, A, 2012,’ Does conditionality work? A test for an innovative US aid 
scheme’, European Economic Review 56 (2012) 138–153. 
Ossowski, R, Gonzales, A 2012, ‘Manna from Heaven: the Impact of Non-renewable Resource Revenues 
on Other Revenues of Resource Exporters in Latin America and the Caribbean’, IADB Working Paper 
IDB-WP-337, the Inter-American Development Bank, viewed 10 October 2013: 
<http://www.iadb.org/en/research-and-data/publication-details,3169.html?pub_id=IDB-WP-337> 
Panda, KP 2009, ‘Central Fiscal Transfers and States' Own-Revenue Efforts in India: Panel Data 
Models’, Margin: The Journal of Applied Economic Research,  2009 3: 223. 
Papyrakis, E, Reyer G, 2007, ‘Resource abundance and economic growth in the United States’, European 
Economic Review 51 (4) (05): 1011-39. 
Partridge, M Beth, M, Lobao, M 2012,’Natural Resource Curse And Poverty In Appalachian America,’ 
MPRA Working Paper 32890. 
Paulo Drummond, Wendell Daal, Nandini Srivastava, Luiz Edgard Oliveira, Mobilizing Revenue in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Empirical Norms and Key Determinants, IMF Working Paper, seen at 7 July 2014: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12108.pdf. 
PEACE (PT Pelangi Energi Abadi Citra Enviro) , 2007’ Indonesia and Climate Change, PEACE, Jakarta. 
Prud'homme, R 1995, ‘The dangers of decentralization,’ The World Bank Research Observer, vol-
10(2):201. 
Purnamasari, RS 2010,’ Dynamics of small-scale deforestation in Indonesia: examining the effects of 
poverty and socio-economic development,’ Unasylva 234/235, Vol. 61, 2015 at: 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/i1507e/i1507e04.pdf. 
Qian, Y, Roland, G 1998,’ Federalism and the soft budget constraint,’ American Economic Review, vol  
88, 1143–1162. 
Rau, T, Loreto R, and Sergio S 2013,’The long-term effects of early lead exposure: evidence from a case 
of environmental negligence,’ NBER Woking Paper 18915, accessed on March 12, 2016 at: 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18915.pdf. 
Ravallion, M, Galasso, E, Lazo T, and Philipp, E 2005. ‘ What can exparticipants reveal about a 
program’s impact?,’ Journal of Human Resources 40 (1): 208–30. 
Ravallion, M 2003,’Assessing the poverty impact of an assigned program,’ in Bourguignon, F. and 
Pereira da Silva,L.(eds.) The Impact of Economic Policies on Poverty and Income Distribution: 
Evaluation Techniques and Tools, Volume 1. New York: Oxford University Press, seen on July 28, 
164  
  
 
 
at:’http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPSIA/Resources/490023-
1121114603600/12928_toolkit_chapter5.pdf’. 
Resosudarmo, B 2003,’ Computable general equilibrium model on air pollution abatement policies with 
Indonesia as a case study,’ The Economic Record, vol. 79, special issue, June, 2003, S63–S73. 
Resosudarmo, B, Resosudarmo, IAP, Sarosa, W, Sumiban, N 2009,’ Socioeconomic conflicts in 
Indonesia’s mining industry,’ in Cronin, R and Pandya, A (eds), Exploiting Natural Resources Growth, 
Instability, and Conflict in the Middle East and Asia, The Henry L. Stimson Center. 
Revelli, F 2003,‘Reaction or interaction?: spatial process identification in multi-tiered government 
structures’, Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 53, pp. 29–53. 
_________, 2005,’ On spatial public finance empirics,’ International Tax and Public Finance,’ 12(4), 
475-492. 
__________, 2006,’ Spatial interactions among governments,’ in Ahmad, E and Brosio, G (eds),  
Handbook of Fiscal Federalism, Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc, the USA, pp.106-130. 
Ring, I 2002,’Ecological public functions and fiscal equalisation at the local level in Germany.’ 
Ecological Economics, 42, 415‐427. 
Ring, I 2008,’ Integrating local ecological services into intergovernmental fiscal transfer: the case of 
ecological ICMS in Brazil,’ Land Use Policy 25 (2008), pp. 485-497. 
Ring, I, Schlaack, C S 2010,’ Instrument Mixes for Biodiversity Policies,’ POLICYMIX – Deliverable 
D2.1,Issue No. 2/2011, seen on July 11, 2016 
at:http://policymix.nina.no/Portals/policymix/POLICYMIX%20Report_No%202_2011.pdf. 
Rodden, J. 2002.’ The dilemma of fiscal federalism: intergovernmental grants and fiscal performance 
around the world,’ American Journal of Political Science, 46(3): 670-687 
Rodríguez, P A, Sandall, R 2008,’From identity to the economy: analysing the evolution of the 
decentralisation discourse’, Environment and Planning: Government and Policy, 26, 1, 54-72. 
Rosenbaum, Paul R., and Donald B. Rubin,1985,’The bias due to incomplete matching,’ Biometrics 41 
(1): 103–16. 
Santos, R., I. Ring, Antunes, P, and Clemente, P 2012,’ Fiscal transfers for biodiversity conservation: the 
Portuguese Local Finances Law,’ Land use policy 29(2): 261-273. 
Sauquet,A, Marchand, S, Feres, G 2012,’Ecological fiscal incentives and spatial strategic interactions: the 
case of the ICMS-E in the Brazilian state of Parana,´CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2012.19, seen on 
July 14 at: http://cerdi.org/uploads/ed/2012/2012.19.pdf. 
Schroeder L, Smoke, P 2002,’ Intergovernmental fiscal transfers: concepts, international practice and 
policy issues,’ in Smoke P and Kim HP (eds), Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Asia: Current 
Practice and Challenges for the Future, ADB, Manila. 
Shah, A 2007,’A practitioner’s guide to intergovernmental fiscal transfer,’ in Boadway, R and Shah, A 
(eds), Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer: Principle and Practice, The World Bank, Washington DC. 
____________2009,’ The Principles of intergovernmental transfers,’ in Boadway, R and Shah, A (eds), 
Fiscal Federalism: Principles and Practices of Multiorder Governance, Cambridge University Press. 
165  
  
 
 
_____________2010,’ Sponsoring a Race to the Top The Case for Results-Based Intergovernmental 
Finance for Merit Goods,’ The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper WP5172. 
Shah, A, Qibthiyyah, R, Dita, A 2012, ‘General purpose central-provincial-local transfers (DAU) in 
Indonesia: from gap filling to ensuring fair access to essential public services for all’, Policy Research 
Working Paper 6075, seen at 12 February 2015 at: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-
9450-6075. 
Sigman, H 2014,’ Decentralization and enviromental quality: an Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: 
Principles and Practice international analysis of water pollution levels and variations,’ Land Economics, 
volume 90, number 1, pp.114-130 
Smart, M. (2007), ‘The incentive effects of grants’, in R. Boadway and A. Shah (eds), in 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer: Principle and Practice, Washington, DC: The World Bank, pp. 207-
223. 
______________, Bird, R 2009,’ Earmarked grants and accountability in government,’ in Kim,Lotz & 
Mau (eds), General Grants versus earmarked Grants theory and Practice:  the Copenhagen Workshop 
2009, The Korea Institute of Public Finance and the Danish Ministry of Interior and Health 
Smith, J, Obidzinski, K, Subarudi and Suramenggala,I 2003,’ Illegal logging, collusive corruption and 
fragmented governments in Kalimantan, Indonesia,’ The International Forestry Review, Vol. 5, No. 3, 
Special Issue: Illegal Logging (September 2003), pp. 293-302  
Somanathan, E., Rabhakar,R, Mehta, B.S.2009,’Decentralization for cost-effective conservation,’ 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 106, 4143–4147. 
Spahn, PA 2012,’ Conditioning Intergovernmental Transfers and Modes of Interagency Cooperation for 
Greater Effectiveness of Multilevel Government in OECD Countries,’ OECD workshop on Effective 
Public Investment at Sub-National Level in Times of Fiscal Constraints: Meeting the Co-ordination and 
Capacity Challenges, accessed on October 26 at https://www.oecd.org/gov/regional-policy/Conditioning-
Intergovernmental-Transfers-paper.pdf. 
Statsna, L 2009,’ Spatial interdependence of local public expenditures: selected evidence from the Czech 
Republic,’ Czech Economic Review , issue: 1 / 2009, pages: 725. 
Stein, E 1999,’Fiscal decentralization and government size in Latin America’, Journal of Applied 
Economics, vol 2(2), pps:357-91. 
Tacconi, L 2007,’ Decentralization, forest and livelihood: theory and narrative,’ Global Environmental 
Change, 17 (2007), pp: 338-348. 
The World Bank 1998, Assessing Aid :What Works, What Doesn’t and Why, A World Bank Policy 
Research Report, Oxford University Press. 
_______________, 2001,’ Indonesia: environment and natural resource management in a time of 
transition,’ The World Bank. Washington D.C, seen at 24 May 2015 at: http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/11/28/000094946_01110804163
281/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. 
_________________, 2007,’Selectivity and performance: IDA’s country assessment and development 
effectiveness,’ International Development Association, development Economics, Office of the Chief 
166  
  
 
 
Economist (DECVP), Washington, DC. Accessed on August 1, 2016 
at:http://www.worldbank.org/ida/papers/IDA15_Replenishment/PBAEffectiveness.pdf. 
_________________, 2005,’Review of world bank conditionality: the theory and practice of 
conditionality: a literature review,’ Development Economics, The World Bank, Washington DC, seen on 
October 12 at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-
1114615847489/conditionalityliteraturereview07-21.pdf. 
___________________, 2009, Investing in more sustainable Indonesia, Jakarta. 
_________________,2012,’ Inclusive Green Growth: The Pathway to Sustainable Development,’  The 
World Bank. Washington D.C, seen at 24 May 2015 at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSDNET/Resources/Inclusive_Green_Growth_May_2012.pdf. 
___________________, Inter-American Development Bank, 2004, Restoring Fiscal Discipline for 
Poverty Reduction in Peru: A Public Expenditure Review, Washington DC. 
Thomas A, Treviño J, 2013, Resource Dependence and Fiscal Effort in Sub-Saharan Africa, IMF 
Working Paper WP 13/188. 
Thornton, J 2008, ‘Corruption and the composition of tax revenue in Middle East and African 
economies’, South African Journal of Economics, vol. 76:2 June 2008. 
Tiebout, CM, 1956,’ A pure theory of local expenditures,’ Journal of Political Economy, volume 64 
(October): 416-424. 
Timofeev, A 2011‘The Design of a Performance-Oriented Fiscal Transfer in West Bengal, GSU -
Working Paper 11-17. 
United Nation Capital Development Fund and Finance, ‘Performance-Based-Grant Systems: Concept and 
International Experience, New York, USA. 
Ulph, A 2000,’ Harmonization and optimal environmental policy in a federal system with asymmetric 
information, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 39, 224–241 (2000). 
van der Goltz, J and Prabhat, B 2014,’ Mines: The Local Welfare Effects of Mineral Mining in 
Developing Countries,” Discussion Paper No.: 1314-19, Department of Economic, Columbia University, 
accessed on January 18, 2016 at: http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac%3A171770. 
van de Walle, Dominique, and Ren Mu. 2008. “Rural Roads and Poor Area Development in Vietnam.” 
Policy Research Working Paper 4340, World Bank, Washington, DC 
Vazquez, J M, Arze, J, Puwanti, R 2008,’Local government fiscal competition in developing countries: 
the case of Indonesia,’ Urban Public Economics Review, Number 8 , 2008, pp.13-45. 
Vasquez, JM, Qiao, B 2010,’ Expenditure assignment in China,’ Working Paper 10-28, Andrew Young 
School, GSU. 
Vasquez, JM 2011, The impact of fiscal decentralization: issues in theory and challenges in practice, 
Asian Development Bank,Manila. 
Wagstaff, A 2008,’ Fungibility and the impact of development assistance: evidence from Vietnam’s 
health sector,’ Policy Research Working Paper Number WP4800. 
167  
  
 
 
Wang, H, Di, W 2002,’ The determinants of government environmental performance: An empirical 
analysis of Chinese townships,’ Policy Research Working Paper 2937, the World Bank. 
Weingast, BR 2009,’ Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives,’ Journal 
of Urban Economics, volume- 65 (2009) 279–293. 
Wheeler D, Hammer D, Kraft R, Dasgupta, S,  Blankespoor, K 2013,’ Economic dynamics and forest 
clearing: A spatial econometric analysis for Indonesia,’ Ecology Economics, 85:85–96. 
Wilson, J 1999,” Theories of tax competition,’ National Tax Journal 53, 269–304.  
Wooldridge, J 2002, ‘Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data’, The MIT Press. 
Zinnes, C 2009, Tournament Approaches to Policy Reform. Making Development Assistance More 
Effective, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
